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PREFACE  
 
AUGUST 17, 1998 
On a misty Monday morning I arrived in Dahod railway station in Gujarat, India.  I was in 
this newly created tribal district (previously Dahod had been part of Panchmahal district) to 
join, as a social scientist, a renowned non-governmental organisation working on natural 
resource management and tribal development. My interest in working with Bhil tribal people 
arose during my Master’s degree educational fieldtrip to Bhil-dominated Dang district, 
Gujarat, in 1995–97. This first view of Dahod’s crowded railway platform mesmerised me. 
Bhil tribal women were wearing chaniya-ghagro – a long colourful cotton skirt – and were 
adorned with traditional silver jewellery on their anklets or kadla, tagli on their neck, kandora 
on their waist, and bormendli on their forehead; while men were in classic jhuladi – a blue 
shirt with white embroidery – and colourful turbans or paagdis on their head. These Bhil 
people were migrating to cities in search of work because the kharif crop had failed due to 
drought.  
 
One of my immediate professional tasks was to familiarise myself with these forest people. 
My image of ‘forests’ with lots of trees, grass, shrubs, and wild animals fell apart. The forest 
in this region looked useless to me. In most instances, the mud houses of tribal families were 
inside the demarcated forest area. Degraded deciduous forests were a typical scene in the 
adjoining poor tribal districts in three states in semi-arid western India: Jhabua district, 
Madhya Pradesh; Dahod district, Gujarat; and Banswara district, Rajasthan. The majority of 
the tribal villages were without tarred access roads, sanitation, electricity, safe drinking water, 
primary healthcare, and functional primary schools. My first encounter was with a 
government forest guard in one of the villages who explained to me, ‘tribals encroached upon 
our (government) forest lands. Forests are state-owned property.’ The same day I met a 70-
year-old Bhil man, a customary chieftain, who asserted, ‘we have traditional rights over these 
(forest) lands to access, use, and manage the forest land and its resources, but government do 
not recognise our traditional rights.’ Informal talks with tribal women soon made me realise 
that the degraded dry deciduous forests, which looked useless to me, were not only the major 
source for Bhil households’ subsistence needs, but also of significant cultural value.  
 
During three years of project management experience in this region, I found that policies 
addressing tribal development failed to understand the crucial aspect of tribal people’s 
traditional forest tenure rights. The Bhil people had access to non-timber forest products as a 
benefit in return for regenerating teak (Tectona grandis) and sal (Shorea robusta) trees in the 
degraded forests under the famous Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme. However, not 
everybody was convinced by the idea of ‘jointness’ in the JFM. The main issue of Bhil 
people’s individual and/or collective forest land tenure and access rights to forest resources 
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remained neglected under the JFM programme. I finished my assignment in these tribal 
districts, but my quest to know ‘why national forest policymaking excludes tribal people’ kept 
me pondering.   
  
AUGUST 18, 2008 
Ten years later, I re-visited this region to conduct my PhD research fieldwork on forest tenure 
policy reform in several tribal villages in Banswara district, Rajasthan. In a decade, things had 
changed in this tribal region, albeit slowly and differently. Most tribal families still did not 
have safe drinking water and sanitation, but many were connected by mobile phone! Tribal 
people’s traditional attire, practices, and food habits had to a large extent been replaced by 
mainstream costumes and customs. Many villages were comparatively greener as a result of 
agro-forestry, floriculture, and horticulture plantation, which were introduced a decade ago by 
the non-governmental organisation. Income from marigolds and roses, papaya, lemon, amla 
(Phyllanthus emblica), and mangoes provided supplementary annual income to the relatively 
well-off families who could afford to irrigate their land. Also, during my initial interaction 
with Bhil people, I realised that there were instances where young men had temporarily 
migrated for wage labour outside India, mainly to Dubai and Kuwait. This was unheard of a 
decade ago. A general observation was the increasing economic disparity in this otherwise 
poor region. From my initial transit walks, I found evidence of fewer rich families and a 
higher number of poorer households in this district than on my first visit. Moreover, the 
village elders who had been actively involved in local management of natural resources had 
been replaced by a younger generation with different forms of institutions. One thing that had 
not changed was the humbleness of Bhil people.   
 
A major change was the introduction of the Central Government of India’s historic 
decentralised forest tenure reform. For the first time since India’s independence, the 
traditional forest tenure rights of tribal people and other traditional forest dwellers were 
recognised through the enactment of the Forest Rights Act 2006. I saw the excitement about 
this reform among Bhil people. They were excited to receive recognition of rights to land that 
was ‘theirs’ traditionally. Yet, there was lack of clarity on issues such as who would claim the 
land, who would benefit, and how collective forest land would be managed under JFM. 
However, this forest tenure reform brought chaos to local institutional arrangements within 
tribal communities with regard to individual forest land claims and collective forest 
management. It is in this context that my research examines the social and politico-legal role 
of the new decentralised forest tenure transition vis-à-vis Bhil communities of Banswara tribal 
district, Rajasthan.  
 
In brief, this research analyses and explains the micro-politics of forest decentralisation and 
its implications for poor Bhil communities. Describing how and why Bhil’s traditional forest 
xi 
 
tenure rights matter is imperative because the governments of many developing countries in 
the South are in the process of introducing rights-based forest reform for forest-dependent and 
indigenous peoples. This book is therefore relevant to policymakers, scientists, students, and 
practitioners with an interest in the rights of indigenous and forest-dependent communities, 
decentralisation, and forest tenure policies and laws.  
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE MICRO-POLITICS CONTEXT  
 
 
 
“Why is the government hogging our land? We are adivasis [original inhabitants], 
but without forest rights. We are excluded and considered as encroachers on our 
own ancestral land. This land is priceless and represents what we have, who we are, 
where we belong to, and why.”  
 
- Taajudi-ben, an elderly tribal woman (2008, Banswara, Rajasthan).  
 
 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
1.1.1  Decentralisation and Forest Tenure Reforms  
The quotation above focuses on the bundle of rights – human rights, tenure rights, and 
citizenship rights – which has become the nexus of forest land tenure reforms. Forest land and 
forest resources play a significant role in the better livelihoods of marginalised forest-
dependent populations, particularly indigenous communities (Agrawal et al., 2008; FAO, 
2011; Larson et al., 2010). In many places, historically, forests were managed locally by 
forest-dependent communities. With the introduction of scientific forestry and forest policies 
by colonial governments, forest-dependent people lost their traditional rights (Peluso, 1990; 
Guha, 1983). In the 1990s, the second wave of political decentralisation for natural resource 
management, particularly forest tenure reform, was pushed as a developmental agenda in 
many developing countries. The intention was to remove forest policies that were selectively 
implemented to avoid reproduction of double standards such as decentralisation without 
representation, and to involve marginalised forest-dependent rural and tribal people in local 
forest management (Ribot, 2004; Larson et al., 2010; Sunderlin et al., 2008). This second 
wave of decentralisation – which resulted from pressure from international donors to 
downsize the government and bring transparency and accountability – differed from earlier 
decentralisation processes in that there was increased institutional proliferation and stricter 
laws and regulations (see also Ribot, 2001; Wardell and Lund, 2006). Scholars, policymakers, 
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and development practitioners believe that decentralisation may benefit rural development 
and enhance poverty alleviation and also increase political participation by forest people, 
which in turn will increase democracy (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Agrawal and Ostrom, 
2001), efficiency, and the equity of local institutions (Ribot, 2004). The World Bank (2000) 
acknowledges that decentralisation is pro-poor and increases participation through political 
decentralisation that directly improves the lives of the poor with an increase in distributional 
equity and a decrease in civic conflict.  
Political decentralisation is different from the earlier wave of deconcentration, delegation, 
deregulation, or administrative decentralisation that was limited mostly to the transfer of 
functions and resources to lower levels of the national government (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999). The effective implementation of political decentralisation requires the devolution of 
decision-making powers over resources from the central government to local democratically 
elected institutions and representatives (Ribot, 2007). Political decentralisation aims for 
greater citizen participation in the decision-making process in local institutions to make the 
political system transparent and elected representatives accountable to citizens (Ribot, 2004). 
It aims to rectify the failures of centralised forms of interventions by devolving decision-
making power to local elected representatives, improving representation of citizens, 
increasing distributional equity, reducing civic conflict, and increasing community 
participation in natural resource management, especially forests, in developing countries 
(Crook and Manor, 1998; Ribot, 2001; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Baviskar, 2004; Pacheco, 
2004). However, it is to be seen to what extent local institutions and individuals are capable of 
utilising the newly acquired decision-making power. Examples from country case studies on 
decentralisation and devolution in Latin America and West Africa indicate that central 
governments limit the ability of local authorities to exercise real power, and that, despite local 
people’s participation being promoted, they were excluded from discretionary decision 
making (Pacheco, 2004; Ribot et al., 2006; Ribot, 1995). 
Numerous civil society organisations, activists, and donors have emphasised the 
significance of political decentralisation in the hope that the state would provide citizens with 
discretionary decision-making power to manage local forest resources. Thus, several 
governments in different countries, under pressure from international donors and local social 
movements, have introduced some form of deconcentration (Ribot et al., 2006). On paper, 
decentralised forest management has progressed from deconcentration – i.e. partnership 
arrangements by government for community forest management – to devolving authority to 
local people to use and access forests. The international human rights campaign for a 
decentralised forest management process has also taken a rights-based approach to demand 
the reinstatement and recognition of the traditional forest land and forest resource rights of 
marginalised forest-dependent people (see Colchester, 2008; Sunderlin et al., 2008; Larson et 
al., 2010). The main reasons for promoting forest tenure reforms are the failure of government 
forest management, decentralisation and resource management devolution, the decrease in 
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natural forest timber rents in various countries, and democratisation (Sunderlin, 2011). One of 
the most positive aspects of the recognition of forest rights is the commitment through the 
signing of international treaties by many governments to respect, protect, and fulfil human 
rights. This recognition has opened up the scope in many developing countries for 
marginalised populations to re-claim their forest land and resources, which were appropriated 
by the colonial and post-colonial state (FAO, 2011). It remains unclear whether the existing 
conditions are conducive enough for the betterment of marginalised forest people’s 
livelihoods through the strengthening of rights to local land and resources (Larson et al., 
2010; Sunderlin, 2011). The intended beneficiaries of decentralisation who belong to socially 
and economically weaker sections are often ignored, resulting in the loss of livelihood for 
many poor forest users (Edmunds and Wollenberg, 2003).   
The word ‘property’ in common contemporary usage refers to the ‘things’ over which a 
person claims more or less exclusive rights of ownership. Property relations as it exists, as 
Hann (1998: 5) explains, is more than just social relations, but refers to a ‘vast field of 
cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as the material contexts within 
which things are recognized and personal as well as collective identities are made.’ Scholars 
like Sikor and Lund (2009: 8) argue that ‘property rights have something in common with 
citizen rights as two fundamental aspects of social life: what we have and what we are – avoir 
and être. Property rights and citizen rights in their broadest form exist only to the extent that 
they are produced, endorsed and sanctioned by some form of legitimate authority.’ Hann 
(2007) states that ‘property ownership, and in particular the private ownership of land, was 
considered a basic human right and a precondition for full citizenship as more democratic 
societies emerged in the nineteenth century, notably in the United States’ (Hann, 1998:14), 
but in the twenty-first century the ownership of private property, such as land, was no longer a 
precondition for political citizenship. Property, especially land tenure, could be understood 
not just as alienation, but as a bundle of rights (e.g. use, access, control, manage), and changes 
in one dimension of rights affect another dimension and social relations (Ribot and Peluso, 
2003). The majority of forest-dependent people in many countries are indigenous people 
and/or marginalised populations without secure (statutory) forest rights. The determination of 
the human and citizen rights of marginalised populations in the new global trend towards 
forest tenure is complex. Citizenship rights and property rights take a different shape 
depending on whether the legitimate authority is a legal statutory or an informal traditional 
institution. Property rights are always contested depending upon the capacity and legitimacy 
of right holders to exercise effectively the rights they hold (Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001). 
Property rights to forest land and forest resources are rarely about ownership rights. As 
compared to agrarian reform, forest tenure reform rarely transfers individual or collective 
ownership rights to forest-dependent people (see Larson et al., 2010; Sunderlin, 2011). 
Whereas ownership rights include transfer, sale, and/or inheritance rights, forest tenure reform 
is a more generic term and may refer to the transfer of a variety of arrangements such as 
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statutory and/or customary rights, individual and/or collective rights, and one or a 
combination of rights that may include right to use, manage, control, exclude from, or access 
resources, among various others. In other words, decentralisation of different types of forest 
rights – use, management, access, exclusion/inclusion, and alienation – enable people to 
benefit from forest land and resources and self-organisation. This book focuses on tenure 
rights over forests land and forest resources in its broadest sense. An important measure of 
how effective the world’s forest tenure transition will be depends on who will have rights to 
use, access, exclude/include, and to manage the forests, who claims and who benefits from 
forest resources, and who loses, and how.   
 The extent of forest people’s realisation of citizenship rights and human rights is 
dependent on government’s decision to recognise their forest rights (Colchester, 2008; 
Sunderlin et al., 2008). At global level, this concern was expressed through the urgent and 
timely adoption of the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People in 2007. 
Against this background, recognition of forest people’s rights seems to emerge as a priority in 
the rights-based agenda of international development. Sikor and Stahl (2011: 7) point out that 
the rights-based agenda ‘does not require the empirical assumption that local people are better 
forest stewards than other actors, which is difficult to uphold in practice. [...] Neither does the 
focus on rights rest on a problematic assumption about the role of forest in poverty alleviation 
to justify forest people’s inclusion on the grounds of their needs.’ The human rights and 
citizen rights of forest people are crucial elements for effective forest tenure transition to 
overcome inequalities, and to increase people’s participation in decision making. The success 
of forest management depends on a multitude of factors, including local governance, tenure, 
and regulatory frameworks for appropriate implementation (FAO, 2011). Dahal and Adhikari 
(2008) warn, based on country case studies in Asia, that secure tenure alone is not sufficient 
for desired outcomes, but there is equal need for transparency, accountability, political 
representation, and empowerment. There is an urgency to analyse the implications of 
decentralisation and new forest tenure reform for forest-dependent marginalised populations.    
This book seeks to contribute an insight on the complexities and specificities of India’s 
decentralisation process and new forest tenure reform – particularly the Forest Rights Act of 
2006 – and its effects on a marginalised scheduled tribe,1 the Bhil of Rajasthan.  
  
                                                 
 
1
 The ‘Scheduled Tribes’ (henceforth interchangeably used with tribal people) are marginalised populations 
inhabiting mostly resource-rich areas. Scheduled Tribes are defined by the Constitution of India in Article 
366(25), which describes them as “such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes or 
tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be Scheduled Tribes for the purposes of this constitution.” 
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The book offers an insight into the emerging consequences of the micro-politics of 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform in tribal India,
2
 as highlighted in the title of this 
book. Tribal India’s decentralisation and forest tenure reform is an understudied issue 
compared to the many studies on forest governance reforms involving the mainstream 
population in India. Therefore, research insights from tribal India are pertinent for India’s 
(and other developing countries’) attempt to introduce decentralisation and forest tenure 
policy reform for all forest people. The book tries to take a novel approach in that it 
encompasses: (1) empirical evidence from different temporal (colonial and contemporary) and 
spatial (village, household, and individual) scales, and (2) analysis of these temporal and 
spatial dimensions with a common framework. It is expected to provide different perspectives 
on the outcomes of forest tenure reform. 
 
1.1.2  Research Problem  
India’s forests have been the location of more social conflicts and ecological changes than 
other landscapes in history, and more particularly in tribal areas (Rangarajan and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2012). During the early British colonial period, the Indian Imperial Forest 
Service was established in 1864, which introduced the first Forest Act of 1865 as a legal basis 
to assert authority over forests and forest people (Guha, 1983). This was the beginning of 
state intrusion into local customary forest use, which was followed by subsequent legal 
frameworks that demarcated economically valuable forests important for revenue generation 
for government (Sivaramakrishnan, 1993). In many cases, local customary rights were never 
settled and/or the forest people lacked understanding of the British colonial concept of 
property and did not register their claims, thus failing to secure their legal rights (Guha, 1983; 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). Many tribal areas were declared as falling under special 
administrative arrangements by the government under the pretext of protection, but in fact 
reduced the local people’s customary rights to privileges and in most cases extinguishment of 
customary rights (Rangarajan and Sivaramakrishnan, 2012). Most of the common lands were 
demarcated as forests, and large tracts of these forests were nationalised after India’s 
independence, often without surveys.           
As compared to other government departments, the Forest Department controls over 22 per 
cent of land designated as forest and has a large number of staff that are well represented at all 
administrative levels (see Appendix I for an overview of the staffing structure of the forest 
administration vis-à-vis the Tribal Department and the Panchayati Raj Department). The 
Forest Department has the unique authority to map forests, claim new territories, designate 
forest land, control revenue from timber and forest resources, but also has control over the 
                                                 
2
 Here, ‘tribal India’ refers to the administrative and legislative terms used for the ‘Scheduled Tribes’ inhabiting 
the ‘Scheduled Areas.’ Scheduled Areas (henceforth interchangeably used with tribal districts) are explained by 
the Constitution of India in Article 342 as those areas with a high percentage of inhabitation of groups 
categorised as Scheduled Tribes. The President of India and Governor of the state hold direct authority to cease, 
increase, alter, or rescind the area of the Scheduled Areas.    
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production of official policy narratives and knowledge discourses (Sivaramakrishnan, 1995; 
Jeffery and Sundar, 1999; Khare et al., 2000; Baviskar, 2001). For the past two decades 
(1990-2010), the Indian Forest Department has been put under pressure and criticised for 
being inflexible and not recognising people’s rights, for overlooking environmental 
degradation, and for claiming an increase in forest cover while having difficulties in 
protecting existing forests (Sivaramakrishnan, 1993; Baviskar, 2001; Sarin et al., 2003). The 
most recent political challenge to the Forest Department, as Blaikie and Springate-Baginski 
(2007: 77) explain, is from 
  
tribal land rights, which challenges the legality of the forest reservation of extensive 
tracts of land in tribal areas and which takes the form of the Tribal Forest Rights Bill 
that threatens to contest the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ exclusive control 
over lands designated as ‘forest’, particularly in majority tribal areas.  
 
The severest criticism and widespread protest from local civil societies, academicians, 
activists, and local communities came when the Forest Department conducted evictions of 
tribal and other forest dwellers from forest lands as ‘encroachers’ in 1992.  
In fact, the last two decades (1990-2010) can be considered as a historic milestone for 
India’s forest legislation because of the enactment of progressive laws and policies and 
mainstreaming local people’s involvement in forest management (Rangarajan and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2012). This change in forest legislation happened as a result of the 
important role played by international non-governmental organisations, donors, and financial 
institutions
3
 in making forest programmes more people oriented. In India, forests are the 
second largest land-use category after agriculture. It is estimated that about 70 per cent of 
India’s population depends on fuel wood, mainly from forests. More than half of India’s 
forest-dependent tribal people, about 40 million out of 80 million people, depend on the forest 
for subsistence needs. People and forest issues are particularly relevant for the forest-
dependent tribal people’s struggle consequent to a lack of recognition by the forest 
administration of resource access, tenure rights, customary practices, cultural identity, forest-
based livelihoods, and institutional arrangements. Blaikie and Springate-Baginski (2007: 5) 
argue that ‘in the Indian case, many entire indigenous communities, not all of whom were 
originally deprived, have been made poor through the disenfranchisement and appropriation 
of their ancestral resources by forest administration.’      
The central government undertook several legal reforms to rectify the situation and to 
make forest laws and policies more inclusive and responsive to people’s rights. In the 1990s, 
the Joint Forest Management (henceforth JFM) programme was introduced as an initial 
attempt to involve people with a general idea of we decide (the Forest Department) and you 
                                                 
3
 International donor funding such as from Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), UK 
Department for International Development (DfID), German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), among others.  
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participate (the forest people). Forest people were largely allocated ‘degraded’ forest to 
regenerate and protect in exchange for some privileges, such as the use of some non-timber 
forest products through the JFM committees. However, participatory mapping by involving 
forest people to demarcate forest areas became a way for the forest administration to extend 
control over ‘degraded’ common land and classify it as forest, whereas in reality that land 
could have been valuable for open-grazing or grasslands (see Jeffery and Sundar, 1999; 
Sundar, 2000b; Khare et al., 2000). Joint forest management has reported many successes 
over the past two decades. However, most of these successes were partial and short lived 
(Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007; Sundar, 2000b). Also, 
the community management failed to consider women’s participation in decision making and 
their rights in relation to land and forests (Agarwal, 1997, 2001; Sarin, 2005).     
In 1992, India’s decentralisation process through Panchayati Raj excluded the tribal areas. 
This led to nationwide protest by social movements and human rights activists among others. 
In 1996, decentralisation became a reality in tribal areas with the provisions of the Panchayats 
(Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (No. 40 of 1996), popularly known as the PESA 
passed on 24 December 1996 for the Fifth Schedule areas.
4
 The legislation aimed to devolve 
power to tribal gram panchayats – elected third-tier village-level government institutions.5 
Decentralisation enforced through this statute was intended to bridge the gap between the 
tribal tradition of self-governance and the gram panchayats. This political decentralisation to 
locally elected self-government potentially challenged the bureaucratic top-down approach of 
the Forest Department. Unlike JFM village committees, the gram panchayats would be 
democratically elected, hence decentralised bodies with legitimate authority. The ability to 
have discretionary decision-making power at local level would bring empowerment to 
marginalised forest-dependent tribal people, which according to Mamdani (1996) would 
create a sense of people becoming citizens rather than being subjects. However, the success of 
the decentralisation of gram panchayats is critically dependent on a number of factors, 
including implementation by respective state governments, devolution of power and finance, 
downward accountability of the elected representatives, and collective management of local 
natural resources, particularly forest land and forest resources (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001; 
Johnson, 2003).   
In 2004, with increasing social upheaval and criticisms from human rights activists, one of 
the political agendas of the then newly elected national government (United Progressive 
Alliance) was to put an end to the Ministry of Environment and Forests’ eviction drive (that 
had begun in 2004) of forest dwelling tribal and traditional communities. The government 
gave the task of drafting legislation – the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest 
Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill 2005 – to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. The 
                                                 
4
 The Fifth Schedule covers nine states including Rajasthan, excluding the north-eastern states of India, which 
are covered in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. 
5
 Gram panchayat is the lowest of the three-tier government body at village level. The elected gram panchayat 
can include one or more villages.  
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draft bill was openly opposed by wildlife conservation lobbies and the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests, who asserted that forests were their domain for jurisdiction. After 
an open debate, the revised draft bill was approved by parliament on 19 December 2006 and 
received the assent of the President on 29 December 2006. The bill was passed as ‘The 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 
2006’ No.2 of 2007 (henceforth, the FRA). On 31 December 2007, as required by sub-section 
1 of the FRA, the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of 
Forest Rights) Rules were notified; these supplement the procedure to implement the FRA. 
The final Rules and FRA were enacted on 1 January 2008. This is a historic piece of 
legislation that aims to undo injustice by recognising the traditional individual and collective 
rights of forest people. The nodal agency for implementation of this legislation is the Ministry 
of Tribal Affairs. However, this was again initially contested by the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests with the argument that forests came under their mandate. The underlying strategy 
of this legislation is to involve multi-stakeholders in forest tenure transition by introducing a 
new committee with representatives of government line departments (Panchayati Raj, 
Revenue, Tribal Affairs, and Forest) at each administrative tier – state, district, and village 
level. This has added another form of authority to the already dynamic and complex forest 
management system in tribal India.  
One observation from the above complexities of forest governance is that new institutional 
arrangements have emerged out of new formal legal provisions. Law can be seen as a mode to 
empower and enable people, but could potentially have the exact opposite effect because 
statutory laws may not incorporate traditional practices and local customs about forest use. 
The legislation and institutions are a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for local forest 
management. The impact of these laws critically depends on how they are implemented and 
who participates in their implementation, given the administrative mechanisms in India. In 
this context, there is need to examine the historical pattern of annexations of forests land by 
government, and the resistance and struggle of people to gain their forest access. To 
understand the micro-level intricacies of political decentralisation and forest tenure reform, it 
is essential to take a holistic approach to patterns of change following legislation and new 
institutional dynamics, authority relations, and mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion. In other 
words, taking a holistic approach means that one needs to consider these processes at different 
temporal scales (colonial and contemporary legislation) as well as at different administrative 
and spatial levels (village, household, and individual) and analyse each level with specific 
concepts. Understanding the effects of these different dimensions helps us to identify 
approaches that will benefit the strengthening of local decentralised institutions while 
facilitating the needs of marginalised tribal people in the broader context of their forest rights. 
In this book, this multi-dimensional approach leads us to a study of the micro-politics of 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform. The idea of micro-politics acknowledges the 
complexity of the formal and informal power of individual and collective action in attempting 
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to influence others to achieve particular goals (Willner, 2011). Micro-politics is neither a 
paradigm nor a method. The notion of micro-politics is further discussed in section 1.2 on the 
conceptual framework. For the purpose of this research, the third-tier of government at village 
level, the gram panchayat, is considered as the unit for the micro-politic analysis.  
Numerous problems emerge from the current dynamics of decentralisation and forest 
tenure reform as presented above. At the level of gram panchayat, the book focuses on four 
dimensions to provide different perspectives on decentralisation and forest tenure reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Four dimensions of the research problem 
 
Figure 1.1 schematically shows the two ends of a continuum for each dimension that cross-cut 
with the centralisation and decentralisation axis of forest management. The reasons for 
choosing these four dimensions are now briefly explained.  
 First and foremost, there is the issue of the nature of the interconnection between 
history and contemporary forest governance. The scientific forest management 
approach introduced in the British colonial era is inherently related to the current 
dynamics of decentralisation and forest tenure reform in tribal India. The underlying 
assumption is that one can better understand the present by knowing its historical 
dimension.  
 The second dimension relates to the emerging contrast between (new and existing) 
interest groups, different frames of law, and local practices that simultaneously use 
strategies to influence the outcomes of decentralisation and forest tenure reform in 
their favour. Understanding the working of different institutions and authority can 
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determine the way in which diversity adds value, contradicts, or dominates and 
favours certain types of local forest tenure arrangements over others. 
 The third substantive concern is about the lack of scientific knowledge on forest-
dependent tribal people’s strategies to align their identity with mainstream citizenship 
rights. Taking into account the dimension of emerging tribal people’s citizenship can 
elucidate their social struggle to claim their traditional belonging to forest land and 
their struggle for tenure rights.   
 The fourth dimension is that of gender inequity. Mainstreaming gender equality is an 
essential element, especially for the inclusion of tribal women in decision making and 
recognising their bundle of rights. Addressing women’s rights can explain the need for 
gender mainstreaming in decentralisation and forest tenure reform.     
 
These four dimensions are partial rather than whole in gaining in-depth knowledge on 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform. Neither are they water-tight compartments. 
Together these dimensions subtly explain the influence of the past in shaping the current 
forest governance and the ways in which pluralism and identity determine outcomes for 
forest-dependent tribal people, including (the lack of) women’s forest tenure rights. Each of 
the outlined dimensions contributes to frame a related key research question as presented in 
section 1.1.3.     
      
1.1.3  Research Objective and Key Questions  
The objective of this research is to critically investigate the emerging – sometimes unintended 
– consequences of decentralisation and new forest tenure legislation for marginalised tribal 
forest people in India.  
Based on this general scientific objective and taking into account the dimensions 
distinguished in section 1.1.2, the following four broad key research questions are proposed:    
1. How has the history of forest legislation shaped the current decentralisation process 
and forest tenure reform in tribal India?  
2. How do the new formal tenure arrangements add value to, contradict, or dominate 
existing local authority in collective forest management?  
3. How does forest tenure reform influence tribal households’ perspectives on individual 
forest tenure claims and their idea of citizenship?  
4. How are tribal women’s forest-related rights determined by the new decentralised 
forest tenure reform?  
Each research question is addressed individually in the following four chapters, which are 
peer-reviewed research papers. Each of these research questions consists of a couple of sub-
questions that help to make the question operational and relevant to empirical reality.  
The sub-questions are presented in one-pagers before each research paper. These one-
pager presentations act as connectors that shape communication between the preceding and 
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the next research paper. The one-pager helps the reader to relate to each chapter’s main 
question and its operational sub-questions along with its specific concept(s) for analysis.   
 
1.2  MICRO-POLITICS OF DECENTRALISATION AND FOREST TENURE: 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
The complex process of decentralisation and forest tenure reform that involves different 
actors and varied contextual dynamics is understood from a micro-analytical framework in 
this thesis. This framework refers to a combination of concepts and qualitative designs for 
micro-political analyses in socio-political science research. The term ‘micro-politics’ used in 
the sub-title of this book is extensively defined in the study of the politics of education, with 
theoretical roots in political science and organisational theory (see Burns, 1961; Webb, 2008) 
and less so in the area of natural resource management. To overcome the limitations of 
understanding the concept of micro-politics as used by the different schools, Blase’s (1991: 
11) description provides a comprehensive perspective: 
 
Micropolitics refers to the use of formal and informal power by individuals and groups 
to achieve their goals in organizations. In large part political actions result from 
perceived differences between individuals and groups, coupled with the motivation to 
use power to influence and/or protect. Although such actions are consciously 
motivated, any action, consciously or unconsciously motivated, may have political 
‘significance’ in a given situation. Both cooperative and conflictive actions and 
processes are part of the realm of micropolitics.  
 
Politics can be used in a broader way and consists of macro-politics and micro-politics, which 
change as society changes. This book uses the term ‘micro-politics’ in the sense that 
‘everything is political, but every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a 
micropolitics’ (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 213 - italics in original). In short, micro-
politics analysis is more insightful because ‘the specific context of action is reflected 
theoretically and empirically’ in small-scale research settings (Willner, 2011: 162). In order to 
investigate the micro-politics of decentralisation and forest tenure reform for tribal people in 
India, it is crucial to go beyond the limits of one specific concept. To illustrate, identity-based 
politics and/or decision making is just one of the many micro-political arenas in decentralised 
forest tenure reform. By bringing together several concepts, the framework enables an 
analysis of micro-politics, particularly explaining how historical and macro-political decision 
making shapes identities, institutions, and authority at local level.  
To answer the proposed research questions, the book brings together concepts that will 
prove useful for the analysis of micro-politics and the outcomes of colonial and post-colonial 
forest tenure policy reform, and at different scales, ranging from the individual, via the 
household, to the gram panchayat. Figure 1.2 indicates that each dimension relates to a social, 
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political, and/or legislative issue or problem. Each dimension corresponds to a research 
question and is analysed through the lens of a specific concept. These concepts are: 
governmentality, institutional pluralism, authority, citizenship, and access rights (see Figure 
1.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Conceptual framework 
 
One of the conceptual approaches central to the micro-political framework originates from 
the French philosopher Michel Foucault’s (2000) lecture on genealogical analysis of the art of 
government. Foucault (2000: 208) explains:  
 
what government has to do with is not territory but, rather, a sort of complex 
composed of men and things. The things, in this sense, with which government is to be 
concerned are in fact men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrications 
with those things that are wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory with its 
specific qualities, climate, irrigation, fertility, and so on [...].  
 
The analysis of the art of government is called governmentality, which characterises most 
contemporary power relations (Foucault, 2000). This first analytical concept is helpful in 
analysing India’s colonial and post-colonial forest management (see Agrawal, 2005). Scholars 
of governmentality have broadly focused on three analytical domains: the rationality of 
government, the technologies of government, and the making of subjects of government 
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(Dean, 2010). The rationality of government helps us to understand on the one hand a diverse 
range of ‘external’ ways in which governmental practices and social relations construct 
subjects by disciplining, organising, mainstreaming, and imposing a particular type of 
identity, whereas on the other hand individuals adopt certain techniques that shape their own 
‘self’ identity. Through the interaction of ‘external’ and ‘self’ aspects, forms of identity are 
constructed. Fraser (2000) argues that with the identity model the subordinated group 
produces a self-affirming identity and culture of its own that will give them status and 
recognition similar to those of the dominant group. This self-affirming identity, Fraser (2000: 
122) argues, puts moral pressure on the members of the subordinated group to conform to ‘a 
single, drastically simplified group-identity which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the 
multiplicity of their identifications and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations.’ The 
significance of studying subject-making is to describe how government seeks to shape the 
conduct of individual and collective identities by using rules of law to discipline and promote 
practices of particular identities, while focusing at the same time on how individuals negotiate 
to accept, adapt, or resist those rules of law. In this context, governmentality becomes a 
meaningful concept to trace the genealogy of subject-making (of the forest-dependent tribal 
people) and the things that (made through law and tenure reform) are the subject’s relation to 
the territory (forest land and forest resources) not just in a post-colonial, but also in a colonial 
context.  
The concept of governmentality is evident in the state’s interest in taking control and 
governing through the instrument of legislation. The government attempts to legitimise 
certain forms of institutions and authority and/or create a new set of rights, rules, and 
regulations through new forms of tenure legislation. In political decentralisation, Ribot (2001) 
argues, local government can be representative, downwardly accountable to local 
communities, and integrate multiple local interests. However, most often in the name of 
decentralisation, alternative institutions are empowered that undermine the authority of an 
existing representative body. In this context, at the gram panchayat level, the concepts of 
institutional pluralism and authority are important to analyse the role of new and existing 
institutions vis-à-vis decentralisation and forest tenure reform. Christian Lund explains (1998: 
25) that ‘in societies where multiple state institutions perform roles as definers and enforcers 
of law – where legal pluralism prevails – contradictions and ambivalence characterise the 
legal norms and incongruence and competition characterise relations between various 
institutions.’ The decision to legitimise (or to de-legitimise) an institution is under the control 
of the government, as ultimate authority. In addition, the government holds authority over 
resources and distribution of rights and claims to resources, in this case forest land and forest 
resources. Nevertheless, politico-legal institutions are not homogenous. Most African states’ 
politico-legal institutions, for example, have a ‘polycentric character because different 
authorities in different fields of regulations use different source of law’ (Lund, 1998: 26). This 
polycentric character of politico-legal institutions emerges out of struggles relating to land 
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entitlement and has contributed to legal pluralism resulting in institutional proliferation, 
which makes people choose between different forms of law, including formal and informal 
institutions (Berry, 2009; Lund, 1998). Such dynamic functioning of institutional pluralism 
and authority, more often than not, disrupts the democratic process of governance, thereby 
changing the functioning of the micro-politics of local natural resource management.  
The third concept focuses on citizenship from a tribal household’s perception. Citizenship, 
as defined by Marshall, is the ‘basic human equality associated with the concept of full 
membership of a community’ (1950: 8 as quoted in Sundar 2011: 421). The citizenship 
concept in this book is not only about people without legal citizenship rights such as 
nationality or voting rights, but also about people who are marginalised in a country and are 
therefore not able to exercise their rights despite being citizens. The academic literature on 
citizenship in the context of forest-dependent tribal people (in India) remains relatively scarce 
but has increasingly gained attention in recent years (see Sundar, 2011). Patterson (1999) 
shows that citizenship could be understood from rights and responsibilities of individuals 
towards the community, other than the right to vote and residency status. The citizenship of 
an individual changes when the politico-legal institutions, by design, may exclude them (by 
making them marginal subjects) and promote the ideas only of those who dominate society. 
The idea of citizenship is shaped by the rules of law relating to tribal self-governance and 
forest land (Sundar, 2011). Explaining the concept of citizenship in India, Nandini Sundar 
(2011: 422), aptly summarising different theories of citizenship (from libertarian, liberal, and 
Marxist perspectives), states that ‘citizenship has always been underwritten by a rule of law 
that preserves negative liberty – one that ensures a citizen is not subject to arbitrary whims of 
the sovereign. However, any more substantive or positive understanding of citizenship must 
necessarily engage with the question of how laws get made, and what kind of political 
economy they imply.’ Even when marginal people resist government decisions, they look 
upon the government as the ultimate rule of law to provide justice for their rights (Sundar, 
2011). The citizenship concept is not understood in a homogenous way, thus leaving space for 
different expectations among people. In the context of post-colonial India, tribal people 
express their desire as citizens through a range of activities from seeking equality and justice 
by collectively demanding implementation of existing laws, and social movements resisting 
reform, to the other extreme of social conflicts for competing forest tenure claims.  
The last concept for the micro-politics analysis framework is access rights. There is a thin 
line distinguishing access and property rights; this explains the dynamics of ownership of 
forest land versus usufruct rights to forest land and forest resources. In their article ‘A theory 
of access,’ Ribot and Peluso (2003) argue that the ability to benefit from things (material 
objects, persons, institutions, and symbols) is about access. Sikor and Lund (2009: 19) nicely 
sketch the difference between access and property and between power and authority, 
explaining that ‘just as many people struggle to turn access claims into legitimate property, 
many are stripped of property rights to their possessions when the institutions that guaranteed 
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them are weakened.’ Access from a rule of law perspective is not necessarily claimed only 
through statutory law, but can also be enforced through force or illegal claims, or based on 
informal customary systems such as practices, norms, and rules of the local community, 
personal abilities, knowledge, social relations, status, and gender. The gender aspect in the 
ability to claim access to resources needs to be understood from the angle of what government 
can do to maintain participatory parity (which means being at par with others) between men 
and women (see Fraser, 2000). The micro-politics framework of this research would be 
limited if the gender dimension was underplayed – especially the political exclusion of tribal 
women and the differences within the tribal women’s group (elite vs. marginalised) in the 
context of their forest access rights.   
The micro-politics concept relates to the Foucauldian notion that where there is a power 
relation there are opportunities for resistance and negotiation. Although this conceptual 
framework purposefully avoids explicit use of the term ‘power,’ it maintains that power exists 
at different levels and forms within each concept described above.  
       
1.3  RESEARCH AREA AND POPULATION 
 
The Republic of India is the second most populous country in the world with over one billion 
people, and it is estimated that the country has a third of the world’s poor. About 40 per cent 
of India’s population lives below the poverty line (BPL).6 The Government of India aims to 
achieve the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce poverty to 22 
per cent by 2015. In 2011, a new survey was conducted as a reference tool for the Right to 
Food Bill. On the basis of the new survey, the Government of India is planning to change the 
existing criteria to identify BPL families. The new proposal plans to reduce the minimum 
standard of living cost in rural areas from approximately US $1 to US$ 0.30 cents/day per 
head. This has been contested by Right to Food activists because a change in this criterion 
would mean a change in the standard used to measure India’s poverty and help India 
superficially attain the MDGs without any effort. The interconnection of forest tenure with 
poverty reduction is significant in improving the livelihood conditions of marginalised people 
dependent on forest resources.  
Of India’s over one billion population, approximately eight per cent, that is, 84 million, are 
administratively categorised as belonging to scheduled tribes (henceforth, tribal people, see 
section 1.1.1). They are a heterogeneous set of ethnic and tribal groups and form ethnic 
minorities in the country. The terms adivasi (original inhabitants), vanvasi (forest dwellers), 
and girijan (hill people) are often used synonymously for tribal people by the mainstream 
population. Most tribal people live in isolated and vulnerable areas, including forest. The 
                                                 
6
 BPL is an economic benchmark used by the Government of India to identify an income of less than US 
$1.25/day per head (based on the 2002 survey used by the Planning Commission of India).  
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majority of them are socio-economically deprived and struggle to secure basic minimum 
rights such as food, shelter, and housing. India’s major developmental activities such as the 
construction of large-scale dams, roads, and industries displaced large numbers of the tribal 
population in the country (Baviskar, 2004), in most cases without proper rehabilitation and 
compensation.  
Tribal people continue to face threats from mining companies, and in many cases tribal 
people resist and struggle to maintain their land, resources, and culture. For example, in a 
recent case (2010–11) involving Vedanta Resources – one of the largest mining companies in 
the world – the company had planned to mine bauxite on the sacred hills of the Dongria 
Kondh tribe. This was eventually blocked by the Minister of Environment and Forests after 
protests from tribal people and civil society organisations. In recent decades, the government 
through the Tribal Sub-Plan strategy (TSP) has been making an attempt to address tribal 
people’s socio-economic development and protect tribal people as well as tribal areas against 
exploitation. Integrated Tribal Development Plans/Agencies are among several development 
programmes launched by the government, but tribal people continue to be deprived of these 
benefits and statutory rights, partly due to lack of awareness and the apathy of implementing 
agencies.    
Compared to urban and rural India, in tribal areas people are more vulnerable because they 
are socio-economically and politically marginalised, and lack secure means of sustenance as a 
result of ecological changes such as climate variability. The new approach to mitigating 
climate change, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in 
developing countries, could intervene by reversing decentralisation and the forest tenure 
rights of tribal people (Bose et al., 2010a; Phelps et al., 2010). In such a circumstance, there is 
even more urgency to understand the changing policy reform of forest governance in tribal 
India. The study area for this research is semi-arid Banswara tribal district in the state of 
Rajasthan in western India, and Bhil tribals are the study population.              
 
1.3.1  Banswara District, Rajasthan  
Rajasthan is geographically the largest state in India with 342,239 km
2
 or about 11 per cent of 
the country’s total geographical area (Figure 1.3). The state’s land area is equivalent to that of 
some European countries, for example, Italy (301,200 km
2
), Norway (324,200 km
2
), or 
Poland (312,600 km
2
). In total, there are 33 districts, 41,353 villages, and a total population of 
56.51 million with population density of 165 per km
2 (Census of India, 2001). Rajasthan is 
located in the north-western part and lies between latitudes 23º 30’and 30º 11’ North and 
longitudes 69º 29’ and 78º 17’ East. Most of the land is arid. The total natural forest covers 
about 9.5 per cent of the total area – one of the lowest compared to other states in the country. 
In contrast, the state has the largest amount of ‘wasteland’ – about 20 per cent of the total 
wasteland in the country. As per the 2001 census, the Scheduled Tribe of Rajasthan numbers 
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7 million, constituting 12.6 per cent and 8.4 per cent of the total tribal population in Rajasthan 
state and in India, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 1.3: The study area in Banswara tribal district, Rajasthan, India 
 
Banswara district has the highest concentration, 72.3 per cent, of tribal people in 
Rajasthan. The majority of the tribal population households in Banswara district are below the 
poverty line and illiterate. Banswara district forms the eastern part of the region known as 
Vagad and is located in the southern part of Rajasthan. There are two stories regarding the 
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etymology of Banswara. One tradition believes that Banswara got its name because of bans or 
bamboos which were found in abundance in the forest. Another version is that a Bhil tribe 
ruler Bansia ruled the area and thus the region was named after him around the sixteenth 
century. This former princely state ruled by the Maharavals was created as a separate district 
with the merger of princely states – Banswara State and Kushalgarh Chiefship – and became 
part of Greater Rajasthan in 1949. Banswara is a tribal district
7
 with a total geographical area 
of 5037km
2
 (453612 hectares) and lies around latitude 23° 30’ North and longitude 74° 24’ 
East. The Tropic of Cancer passes south of Banswara town. Banswara is bounded by 
neighbouring tribal districts to the southeast by Jhabua in Madhya Pradesh state and to the 
southwest by Dahod in Gujarat state. These contiguous tribal districts are inhabited mostly by 
Bhil tribes. Administratively, Banswara district is divided into three sub-divisions which are 
further divided into five tehsils and eight development blocks.  
The soil type in this semi-arid region is generally black cotton soil, sandy clay loam with 
moderately organic fertile soil, and quite a lot of stony land. Annual rainfall is approximately 
750mm, and the bulk of precipitation occurs in the monsoon season from August to 
September. The region has a rugged terrain with undulating ridges and 20 per cent of its total 
area is classified as forest land. The biotic and climatic potential in this region allows for dry 
deciduous forest, dominated by Tectona Grandis (teak), Shorea Robusta (sal), 
Buteamonosperma (palash), Maduca Longifolia (mahua), Gmelian Arorea (sevan), 
Azardirachta Indica (neem), and Diospyros Mesamoxylon (timru) among other species (see 
Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1 Administrative structure and land use in Banswara district  
Administrative set-up Units Land use and climate Units 
Sub-divisions  3 Total district area (in hectares) 453,612 
Tehsils  5 Forest area (in hectares) 91,200 
Development blocks  8 Sown area (in hectares) 224,605 
Gram panchayats  307 Irrigated area (in hectares) 80,210 
Revenue villages  1505 Annual average rainfall (cms) 82.59 
Total population  1,420,601 Population density  (per km
2
) 298 
Source: Census of India, 2001 
 
1.3.2  Bhil Tribals 
The Bhil tribe is the third largest scheduled tribe in India and forms the predominant tribe 
(913,932 of a total national population of 1,420,601) of Banswara district and its adjoining 
tribal districts. The name ‘Bhil’ is believed to have been derived from a Dravidian word, 
Billu, meaning bowman because of their renowned archery skill. Bhilli is the most common 
                                                 
7
 Banswara is a tribal district as per the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of India.  
 ~ Chapter 1~ 
20 
 
language spoken in this region. Historically, Bhil identity has been transformed through a 
complex history of rule and resistance in relation to forest livelihoods, particularly struggles 
with dominant groups (Skaria, 1999; Mosse, 2005). In other words, the loss of power, 
influence, and control over land and forest resources is closely associated with the making of 
the contemporary Bhil tribe – a poor, marginal, ignorant, uncivilised community, and 
‘encroachers’ on forest land. The dry deciduous teak forest areas are mostly devoid of trees 
and degraded. For the majority of the people, forest including gaucher (communal grazing 
land) and wasteland (administrative term for land with a low economic value) is one of the 
main sources of livelihood. The average household size is seven, and an average agricultural 
land holding is 2.5 acres (1 acre = 0.4045 hectares) per household. Smallholder agriculture is 
rain fed and labour intensive. Poor soil quality due to soil erosion and low rainfall are major 
determining factors for the choice of crops. Crops grown during the kharif (summer) season 
are largely rain-fed crops such as non-hybrid varieties of maize and millets such as bajra 
(Pennisetum typhoides), kutki or little millet, which form the staple diet of the Bhil.  
A typical Bhil village is composed of several phaliyas (hamlets) spread across hillocks and 
ridges. The social composition of phaliyas is cultural and historical in that it reflects a history 
of settlement, because traditionally land was allocated and/or offered in lieu of bride-price, 
locally known as dej, to men who were invited to marry and stay in the village in order to 
clear forest, expand cultivation, and increase security (Mosse, 2005). This is different from 
the mainstream traditional Hindu practice of dowry (money or valuables given by the bride’s 
family to the groom). The weekly traditional market (haat) continues to be important in 
selling and buying for tribal households. The tradition of the yearly harvest festival, Bhagoria, 
around March–April displays the unique cultural practices of Bhil people in this region. 
Bhagoria, apart from being a trading harvest festival, serves as a custom for tribal men to 
elope and marry a woman (often with mutual consent), whereas for the village elders 
Bhagoria is a time to settle for example property right disputes by fighting with bows and 
arrows. Tribal women may have a certain degree of freedom to choose their partners, but 
often traditionally they become a thing for property claim negotiation; for example, her natal 
family claim a bride-price on marriage from her in-law family, or her in-laws claim 
compensation if she separates or remarries (see Hardiman, 1987; Skaria, 1999, Baviskar, 
2004; Mosse, 2005).   
 
1.3.3  Study Villages 
The selected case study villages are about 60 kilometres from Banswara city and about 80 
kilometres from Dahod town, Gujarat. Table 1.2 gives detailed characteristics of four villages 
B1, B2, B3, and B4 from the Lankai group gram panchayat
8
 [P1] in Bagidora tehsil cum 
block, and two villages K1 and K2 from the Khutachatra group gram panchayat [P2] of 
Sajjangarh block, Kushalgarh tehsil.  
                                                 
8 Group gram panchayat refers to a village-level government body comprising more than one village.  
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Table 1.2 Characteristics of selected villages in Banswara  
Tehsils (sub-district) Bagidora (B) Kushalgarh (K) 
Development blocks Bagidora Sajjangarh 
Revenue villages  B1 B2 B3 B4 K1 K2 
Group gram panchayat (GGP) P1   P2  
Ward members of GGP 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Joint forest management (JFM) 
committee 
B1+B2 1999-2006 & B3+B4 2002-08 1996-2006 
Village FRA committee formed 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 2008 
Number of households 46 139 70 76 73 35 
Total population of the village 340 923 455 471 438 233 
Below poverty level households 10 41 18 51 10 5 
Land area in hectare 189 311 298 143 121 245 
Village forest area in hectares 110 140 110 51 50 100 
Other caste  2%   1%  
Other settled groups  3%     
Scheduled Tribes  100% 95% 100% 100% 99% 100% 
Notes: Village FRA committee: committee formed as part of the Forest Rights Act 2006 (FRA); Below poverty 
line (BPL) income less than US $1/day per head; B1–B4 tribal villages from Bagidora sub-district; K1 and K2 
tribal villages from Kushalgarh sub-district; P1 gram panchayat for B1–B4 villages; and P2 gram panchayat for 
K1 and K2 villages. Source: Bose 2008–2010 field work 
 
Each village has one or more hamlets (phaliyas) and delegated elected ward members 
(village block representatives) on the gram panchayat. In terms of population, village B2 has 
the highest number of households (139) and village K2 has the lowest (35). The Joint Forest 
Management (JFM) was initiated by a local non-governmental organisation in collaboration 
with the Forest Department, and in most cases a JFM committee was formed between two 
villages. At the time this study was conducted, JFM committees were either not functional 
and/or had merged with the newly formed individual village Forest Rights Act (FRA) 
committee.  
The criteria used to select these six study villages included remoteness of tribal villages, 
presence of a forest-dependent tribal population, households below the poverty line, village 
with land classified as forest, joint forest management programme being implemented, 
individual forest land tenure claims, new forest rights village institutions constituted, and 
presence of women’s self-help groups. 
All six selected case study villages are predominantly inhabited by Bhil scheduled tribe 
members. The villages are devoid of tarred or paved roads, electricity, secondary schools, 
sanitation, or piped tap water. More than 60 per cent of people in this area are illiterate.  
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1.4  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section explains the fieldwork data collection, qualitative research, and data analysis 
methods used for this research in general. Each research question uses specific empirical data 
(for example, group discussion, individual interviewing) for the micro-politics conceptual 
analysis. Each research paper, constituting chapters 2 to 5, has a methodology section 
explaining the method and data used therein.     
 
1.4.1  Fieldwork Techniques  
A combination of random and non-random sampling techniques was used for data collection.  
Simple random sampling was used as it gives an equal and independent chance of selecting a 
probability sample (Kumar, 2005). The results using a random sampling technique can be 
generalised to a larger population, which is one of the objectives of this study. Purposive non-
random sampling was also used to construct a historical reality and to describe a phenomenon 
for which limited information is available. Being familiar with the region and having 
knowledge of the local dialect and local issues for the past ten years proved beneficial in re-
establishing contacts and in understanding the local context. At the same time, care was taken 
to maintain a neutral position when ethical and sensitive topics were involved in order to 
ensure open-minded observation during data collection.  
Seeking informed consent is a very common feature of medical and social science research 
(Bernard, 2002). Therefore, before each interview, the consent of each respondent was 
obtained, including explaining to them individually and in detail the purpose of the data 
collection and its use for this research. With prior consent, it was easier to talk about sensitive 
and intrusive information such as forest land encroachment, forest land tenure claims, or 
gender division in forest rights. All respondents were interviewed without any form of 
inducement, and none of the respondents had any kind of expectations about compensation 
for their time and information.    
The survey sample included a total of 274 individuals (133 women and 141 men) from 105 
households in six villages [villages B1, B2, B3, B4, K1, and K2] as shown in Table 1.3. Of 
the total 105 households interviewed, 25 households are BPL according to the Rajasthan state 
survey list of 2009. Focus group discussions with the abovementioned six villages, along with 
key actor interviews (officials from government departments and non-government 
organisations), gave diversity in data collection and an opportunity to gain multi-dimensional 
views.   
Primary data were collected with the support of a senior field assistant from the local host, 
a non-governmental organisation, Sadguru Foundation, based in Dahod, Gujarat. The field 
assistant had 25 years of work experience in tribal development, was fluent in local dialects, 
and had higher secondary education with a community-based forestry training background. 
This skill proved helpful in translation and in explaining to the respondents the complicated 
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questions on concepts like citizenship rights. After a pilot study, the fieldwork was conducted 
in the selected villages for a period of fifteen months in three main phases. The first phase of 
data collection was from June to November 2008, the second phase was from January to April 
2009, and the final round was from July to December 2010. During the first phase of data 
collection, the region was facing its second consecutive drought year. Therefore, Bhil men 
and women had migrated to neighbouring cities for wage labour. Phase two of the fieldwork 
was therefore needed to conduct interviews with those household members who had migrated 
because they were back in the villages either to cultivate the rabi (winter) crop, or to engage 
in wage labour provided by the Rajasthan government through an employment guarantee 
programme, or to collect tendu pattas (i.e. leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon used for rolling 
beedis – local cigarettes) from the forest.   
 
Table 1.3 Respondents to the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions 
Tehsils Bagidora Kushalgarh 
Village name B1 B2 B3 B4 K1 K2 
Households interviewed (incl. BPL 
hh) 
15 (4) 25 (10) 10 (3) 20 (8) 16 19 
Female respondents    9 43 12 10 29 30 
Male respondents  15 27 12 24 25 38 
Total population interviewed 24 70 24 34 54 68 
Focus group discussions P1  P2  
Key actor interviews 46 18 
BPL: below poverty line; B1–B4 tribal villages from Bagidora sub-district; K1 and K2 tribal villages from 
Kushalgarh sub-district; P1 gram panchayat for B1–B4 villages; and P2 gram panchayat for K1 and K2 villages.  
 
A social science technique of ‘saturation point’ was used to determine the sample size of 
the study population.  According to Guest et al. (2006), one has reached saturation point in 
data collection when interviewing more informants would not provide any additional valuable 
and new information. It was ensured that the sample size was proportional to the size of the 
village household population and each stakeholder group. At village level, respondents were 
from different backgrounds, making it possible to gain a broader perspective to analyse and 
compare whether their points of view were similar or varied on the interpretation of 
decentralised forest governance implementation and management (see Appendix II). These 
backgrounds included: 
(i) institutional and political status such as chairperson, secretary, sarpanch (gram 
panchayat president), upa sarpanch (gram panchayat vice-president), ward 
representative, traditional leader, gram sabha (village council) members; and    
(ii) social and economic position such as BPL and non-BPL families, collectors of 
non-timber forest products, cultivators, and agricultural labourers. 
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Almost 20 per cent of the interviews and meetings were either audio and/or video recorded 
with the respondents’ prior consent. 
 
1.4.2  Qualitative Data Collection        
Micro-politics as an approach does not have one analytical toolkit for empirical analysis. 
However, the most common methodological designs used are open and semi-structured 
interviews, ethnographic data collection methods, and focus group discussions (Willner, 
2011). This study selected a qualitative data collection approach because it allows description 
of the nature of a situation, event, or phenomenon. Because of the high illiteracy rate among 
the study population, individual interviews with semi-structured and open-ended questions 
were employed for this study. Weiss (1994) argues that close-ended questions limit the 
opportunity to obtain detailed information, whereas semi-structured interviews are data rich, 
inexpensive, flexible, and stimulating to respondents. Focus group discussions were used to 
gain in-depth understanding of the villages, context, and phenomena within the gram 
panchayats (Kreuger and Casey, 2000). In addition, participant observations, transit walks 
with villagers in the forest area, and the timeline method were used to understand the Bhil’s 
history of forest tenure rights, and stakeholder analysis was used to understand better the 
authority relationships. Such participatory techniques helped to gain better understanding of 
the community’s perception of land use and their dependence on forest.   
For the purpose of this study, a combination of primary and secondary data is used. 
Secondary data were collected from government publications, archives, scientific literature, 
conference proceedings, PhD theses, personal records, and print and electronic media. 
 
Household interviews: From each household, I interviewed the household head plus one or 
more additional adult household members using a flexible semi-structure household interview 
schedule (see Appendix III, section III.1). Each face-to-face interview took approximately 
45–90 minutes. Interviews with individual women lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and 
were conducted in the afternoon when generally women had some ‘free-time’ from household 
and agricultural activities. In contrast, interviews with men happened either early in the 
morning or in the evening. An additional unstructured interview with 22 women from B3 and 
B4 villages was conducted to get the women’s perspective on how forest tenure rights are 
important (see Appendix III, section III.2). As compared to other villages, there were more 
women-related development activities in B3 and B4 villages, including women’s self-help 
groups, a women’s horticulture farm, a former woman sarpanch,9 and women nominated to 
executive committee positions on village forest institutions.  
                                                 
9
 Sarpanch: literally meant five heads of village-level local self-government in former days. Now, a sarpanch 
connotes a democratically elected head of the statutory village-level self-government, the gram panchayat, and 
together with other members is a contact between government and the village community. Panchayati Raj 
initiated gender mainstreaming by introducing a quota system reserving seats for women.  
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Focus group discussions: The focus group discussions were conducted in two phases. Each 
focus group discussion lasted about three to four hours, and almost all stakeholder groups 
from gram panchayats P1 and P2 were represented and participated. The location for the 
focus group discussions was chosen by the villagers for convenience. Bhil women in this 
region are not veiled (unlike other villages in India), and this makes it easier for them to 
participate in meetings along with men. However, out of respect (an aspect of Bhil culture) 
the women sat separately in the front rows. In all the P1 and P2 discussions, women and men 
participated equally (in P1 women outnumbered men). In addition, 64 individual key actors 
from local institutions in six villages were interviewed in detail using open-ended questions as 
a protocol to facilitate the discussion (see Appendix IV).  
 
Meetings: Meetings were conducted with other stakeholders in addition to villagers. This 
included government officials from the Forest Department (district forest officer, range forest 
officers, beat guards), the Tribal Welfare Department and the Revenue Department at sub-
district level, and senior as well as field officers from local non-government organisations.  
 
1.4.3  Data Analysis 
During the fieldwork, the primary data collected were transcribed on a personal computer and 
supplemented with audio and video recordings and field observations. Often, for weeks, 
transcription of the interviews was delayed due to lack of electricity at the fieldwork sites. 
The text of interviews was crosschecked with the fieldwork assistant to clarify the concepts 
and to identify the main issues discussed by the respondents. The qualitative texts of focus 
group discussions were verified together with the fieldwork assistant and local experts to 
enhance the validity and reliability of the data.  
According to Kyburz-Graber (2004), triangulation of methods enhances the reliability and 
validity of the findings. To analyse the descriptive responses, content analysis of the interview 
texts was used; this is considered a useful qualitative analysis technique to identify and 
analyse data (Mayring, 2000). The interview qualitative texts were condensed  and then coded 
on the basis of a database code developed after transcribing the texts (Miles and Huberman, 
1984).  
The data analysis used for each of the four research papers assesses decentralisation and 
forest tenure reform from the micro-political unit of tribal gram panchayat, household, and 
individual women’s perspective. Different qualitative data inquiry techniques employed in 
this study offered empirical findings specific for each of these three tiers as explained in Table 
1.4.  
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Table 1.4 Empirical data analysis for the research papers 
Villages 
Papers                                                                     
B1 B2 B3 B4 K1 K2 
Literature review combined with empirical evidence 
 
Paper 1: Colonial and Post-colonial Legislation 
‘Forest Governmentality’: A Genealogy of Subject-
Making of Forest-Dependent ‘Scheduled Tribes’ in 
India 
 
X X X X X X 
Empirical evidence using mainly focus group 
discussions, meetings, and interviews  
 
Paper 2: Gram Panchayats (village institutions) 
Authority, Institutional Pluralism, and Forest Rights: 
Insights from Tribal Communities in India 
 
X X X  X X 
Empirical evidence mainly through household 
interviews, focus-group discussions and meetings 
 
Paper 3: Households 
Individual Tenure Rights, Citizenship, and Conflicts   
 
X   
P1 
X 
P2 
Empirical evidence mainly through focus-group 
discussions and interviews  
 
Paper 4: Women 
Forest Tenure Reform: Exclusion of Tribal Women’s 
Rights in Semi-Arid Rajasthan, India 
  X X  X 
B1–B4 tribal villages from Bagidora sub-district; K1 and K2 tribal villages from Kushalgarh sub-district; P1 
gram panchayat for B1–B4 villages; and P2 gram panchayat for K1 and K2 villages. 
 
1.5  ORGANISATION OF THE BOOK 
 
This book is organised in six chapters (Figure 1.4) with an introduction followed by four peer-
reviewed international journal papers and a final chapter on discussion and conclusions. This 
first chapter begins with an overview of global emerging concerns relating to decentralisation 
and forest tenure policy reform for indigenous people, and then explains the problem situation 
in India. It also outlines the key objective, research questions, and methodology, along with 
an analysis of current theories to develop a conceptual framework for decentralisation and 
forest tenure reform. 
Chapter 2 briefly analyses broad historical trajectories of national-level forest land 
demarcation and the construction of tribal people’s identity, particularly that of the Bhil. 
 ~ General Introduction ~ 
27 
 
Chapter 3 investigates at gram panchayat level whether (and how) institutional pluralism 
affects collective rights and joint forest management; who benefits; its effect on formal and 
informal authority in decision making in decentralised formal tenure reform; who is excluded 
(and why)? Chapter 4 explores household-level tenure rights by focusing on how tenure rights 
change perceptions of forest tenure and citizenship rights of tribal households; whether (and 
how) new forms of inter-household conflicts take place. Chapter 5 addresses the gender 
perspective, i.e. tribal women’s inclusion and/or exclusion from access rights to forest land 
and forest resources; and whether (and how) the law and decentralisation in practice 
guarantees tribal women’s forest rights. Finally, chapter 6 concludes with an analysis of 
decentralised forest tenure reform through the lens of micro-political analysis of the tribal 
gram panchayat, followed by the general discussion and lessons learned.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Organisation of this book 
 
As mentioned earlier, a one-pager is provided at the beginning of each of the four paper-
based chapters. The one-pagers act as a connector between the research papers because they 
briefly introduce the chapter, reflecting on the main question and introducing the two 
operational sub-questions, and the concepts used for micro-politics analysis. 
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1.5.1  Related-Research Outputs 
The overall research project outputs, in addition to four peer-reviewed papers, include an 
international symposium, a documentary film, and an info-brief. These outputs were initiated 
outside the scientific requirement and financial budget of this research. These outputs, 
however, have proved to be a valuable addition in supplementing the scientific outputs and 
reaching out to a range of audience other than academic scholars. The international 
symposium, an infobrief, and the film are not explicitly used in the analysis of this research, 
but some of the elements relevant for this research are summed up in a section in the 
concluding chapter.    
  
1.5.1.1  International symposium (2009) 
An international symposium titled ‘Decentralisation, Power, and Tenure Rights of Forest-
Dependent People’ was initiated and organised with the intention of bringing together 
international scholars, lawyers, and practitioners to share and exchange empirical research 
papers for two days. The symposium was hosted by Sadguru Foundation in Chosala village in 
Dahod district, Gujarat, 27–29 October 2009. About thirty people participated and presented 
their research papers. The symposium provided a platform to gain insight on the dynamics of 
power in decentralisation and forest tenure reform from Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, 
Ethiopia, India, Nepal, Philippines, and Tanzania (see Appendix V for the list of presenters).  
 
1.5.1.2  A short video documentary film (2010-11)      
A short video documentary film (12 minutes) ‘Forest Rights’ Jung Jungle aur Jungle ke 
Logon Ka: voices of Bhil tribal people in semi-arid Rajasthan was produced and directed 
based on the fieldwork data collection (see ‘Forest Rights’ DVD inside back cover). One of 
the purposes of using visual and audio media is to supplement this research with a more 
human face for this book’s readership. A desired consequence of visual and audio media 
(over oral or text) is that it stimulates emotions and feelings, especially in cases where the 
extent of local conditions (e.g. degraded dry forests or drought in the semi-arid areas) cannot 
be visualised or guessed. Moreover, a video-audio media has the potential to make isolated 
situations more close and real, to allow voices of local communities to be heard, and to 
facilitate interaction with a range of viewers in communicating information. However, there is 
a potential risk of misuse or misinterpretations of the video-audio media if the audience is less 
connected with the context.   
The film complements this research study by using the voices of marginalised scheduled 
tribes, in particular the Bhil tribal of Rajasthan, to express the complexities of tribal India’s 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform in their lives and in tribal self-governance of forests. 
This documentary film aptly coincided with the United Nations’ Year of Forest (2011), and 
was screened for academic courses, workshops at Wageningen University, and other 
academic institutes outside India and the Netherlands. The film premiered for a mix of 
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international and national academicians, foresters, and social scientists at the 13
th
 
International Association for the Study of Commons Conference, held at Hyderabad, India, 
January 08–14, 2011. Generally, it is assumed that video-audio media, such as this short 
documentary film, are of great advantage to influence policy arenas. However, there is little 
documentation of scientific studies exploring the use of video-audio in natural resource 
management, especially forests, to inform policy arenas (see Petheram et al., 2012).   
 
1.5.1.3  Infobrief (forthcoming) 
The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) infobrief titled ‘Forests: Gender, 
Property Rights and Access’ (see Sun et al., forthcoming) draws on Bose (2011a) in addition 
to two research papers from Africa and Latin America respectively. The infobrief provides a 
scope for this research study to identify the applicability of the forest tenure reform in the 
global comparative analysis. This infobrief together with the international symposium and the 
film is briefly discussed in the concluding chapter. 
 
    
  
  
 
 
 
Historical Perspectives 
 
 
A wooden plough used by smallholders in the tribal villages, Banswara. 
Photo credit: Han van Dijk 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
History plays a crucial role in analysing the current state of affairs of forest governance, 
because the origin of many of the current institutions governing India’s forests can be 
traced back to the British colonial period. Not only is colonial forestry the oldest legacy of 
legislative forest governance in India, it also reveals an interesting pattern in the way 
forest-dependent people and forests were categorised in the development discourse. The 
question, then, is how much of the colonial scientific forestry legacy continues to define 
twenty-first century forest governance. 
 
In this context, chapter 2 broadly reflects on how the historical trajectories of the 
scheduled tribes’ categorisation and forest land demarcation have shaped current forest 
governance processes and outcomes. More specifically, the chapter seeks an answer to two 
operational questions:    
 What are the implications of the history of categorisation for the Bhil people and 
for forest governance?  
 To what extent does the identity of the Bhil people enable or constrain them in 
claiming forest rights?  
The micro-political analysis conducted here uses Focault’s governmentality notion in view 
of government’s past efforts at subject-making of scheduled tribes and territorial 
demarcation and present tribal forest governance.  
 
 
 
This chapter has been published. Bose, P., Arts, B., and van Dijk, H. (2012). ‘Forest 
governmentality’: a genealogy of subject-making of forest-dependent ‘scheduled tribes’ in India. 
Land Use Policy, 29: 664-673 
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2  ‘FOREST GOVERNMENTALITY’: A GENEALOGY OF SUBJECT-MAKING 
OF FOREST-DEPENDENT ‘SCHEDULED TRIBES’ IN INDIA  
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This paper analyses the historical trajectories of both British colonial rule and independent 
India to categorise scheduled tribes and to appropriate and legalise forests in tribal areas. It 
builds upon Foucault’s notion of governmentality to argue that the history of the scheduled 
tribes’ subject-making and the related history of forest demarcation is indispensable for 
understanding the current politics of decentralised forest management in India. Three 
dimensions of ‘forest governmentality’ – the history of categorisation, the politics of social 
identity, and the technologies of forest governance – are discussed to show how recent efforts 
to politicise forest tenure rights have reinforced political control over the scheduled tribes 
through new forms of authority, inclusion and exclusion. However, to claim their individual 
and community right to forestland and resources, the scheduled tribes have internalised their 
‘new’ ethnic identity, thereby creating countervailing power and room to manoeuvre within 
the current forest governance regime. This is supported by a case study of the Bhil, a 
predominantly forest-dependent scheduled tribe in the semi-arid region of western India.  
 
 
Keywords: Scheduled tribes, identity, semi-arid forests, governmentality, India 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The term ‘scheduled tribes’ (henceforth interchangeably used with the term tribal people) is a 
vague and ambiguous denomination to identify India’s eight per cent of ethnic minorities. 
They are the so-called adivasis – or original inhabitants – of India and should not be confused 
with the ‘scheduled castes’ at the bottom of the Indian caste system (although adivasi in itself 
is a complex ‘governmentalized identity’ and a relatively modern concept subject to different 
interpretations; see Hardiman, 1987; Skaria, 1999). The term scheduled tribe is used for a 
group of more than 400 so-called deprived communities listed in an official schedule. During 
British India, the term was chosen to identify hill and forest tribes, and in 1950 this schedule 
was adopted and added to the Constitution of India. At its basis, there is no clear definition or 
set of criteria for the classification of the tribes and/or tribal people in the country. 
Nevertheless, there exists a common understanding about classifying tribes on the basis of 
their geographically isolated location, deprivation, use of tribal language, practice of animism 
and physical features, among other factors (Ghurye, 1963). The majority of tribal people live 
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in or around forest areas and are dependent on forestland and forest resources for their 
livelihoods. Their claim to be recognised as tribal people is intertwined with their claim on 
traditional access rights to natural resources. The issue of whether some 84 million people 
categorised as scheduled tribes can also be referred to as ‘indigenous people’ is politically 
contested within the country, because such terminology might grant them additional rights 
(Béteille, 1998; Xaxa, 1999), despite the fact that India has voted in favour of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly 
in September 2007.  
In recent years, several marginalised communities have contested decisions of the 
Government of India to exclude them from the Indian Constitutional List of Scheduled Tribes. 
Such contestation occurs because the scheduled tribe category is closely associated – since the 
colonial period – with special benefits through the Constitution of India (Ghurye, 1963). In 
May 2008, for example, several people belonging to the pastoralist Gujar community in 
Rajasthan state were killed while protesting against the state government. The Gujars were 
demanding recognition as a scheduled tribe to get economic benefits from the government. 
This incident is not an isolated case, and often such social movements attract political 
attention. The problem of categorisation also exists for those tribal communities who are 
already included on the scheduled tribes list. Most of these scheduled tribe communities have 
struggled for a long time to gain formal recognition of their traditional rights to resources, 
including forests (Guha, 2001). Historically, some of these struggles in remote tribal-
dominated forested areas have taken the form of armed conflicts (Guha, 2001; Skaria, 1999). 
For the tribal people inhabiting the forest, the demarcation of so-called forestland during a 
hundred years of colonial exploitation is representative of a violent past and a history of 
subjugation. Assessing current armed conflicts in the tribal areas, the Planning Commission of 
India Report – Development Challenges in Extremist Affected Areas – indicates land 
alienation, poverty, illiteracy, degraded natural resources, lack of access to resources and 
flawed governance as the root causes of the growth of armed conflicts in tribal areas 
(Government of India, 2008). The report highlights the displacement of tribal people from 
their ancestral land, degradation of the forest and the categorisation of traditional forest 
dwelling tribal communities as encroachers on forestland as some of the major issues 
demanding immediate attention.  
The social construction of the scheduled tribes category has become entangled with the 
history of forest management. When scientific forestry was introduced in the early nineteenth 
century by the British, new ways to govern forests emerged in India, based on the production 
value of timber, statistical representations of forests and redefined ways to use them 
legitimately (Agrawal, 2005). The forest-dependent and forest-inhabiting tribal people were 
directly affected by the centralised regulations implemented by the British colonial state and 
later by independent India. It was only in the early 1990s that the local communities were 
involved in co-managing and regenerating degraded forestland. However, the new forest 
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policies failed to recognise the traditional rights of the tribal people. The failure of centralised 
forest management combined with civil society and human rights activism, demanding 
statutory recognition of forest rights, created pressure on the Government of India. Thus, the 
Scheduled Tribe and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act – 
henceforth, the Forest Rights Act – was introduced in haste by the government in 2006. The 
Forest Rights Act concerns rights of forest-dwelling communities to land and other forest 
resources that were denied to them due to the continuance of colonial forest laws in 
independent India. This forest tenure reform is presented by the government as India’s effort 
to realize political decentralisation of forest management. Political decentralisation involves 
the transfer of resources, including discretionary power, to elected local authorities (Ribot, 
2003). Generally, political decentralisation is believed to benefit local communities, 
particularly forest-dependent indigenous people, and promote equitable use and sustainable 
management of natural resources (Agrawal et al., 2008; Ribot, 2003). However, in practice, 
the Forest Rights Act does not effectively devolve such decision-making powers to 
democratically elected local institutions, a necessity for political decentralisation (Bose, 
2011a).     
In this paper we aim to show: (1) that the process by which the state made the formerly 
excluded ‘wild’ hill tribal people into subjects implied both domination and recognition; (2) 
that this categorisation process is intrinsically related to the demarcation of forests by the state 
as well as to the changing nature of forest governance and management in India; and (3) that 
the current forest policy reform can only be understood when these political-historical 
trajectories of Indian forests and people are taken into consideration. In the paper, the Bhil of 
the semi-arid western region of India serve as a case study, and the analysis below draws on 
secondary and primary data collected during fieldwork between 2007 and 2010 (conducted by 
the first author). The rest of the paper is divided into five parts. The first part explains the 
term ‘forest governmentality,’ drawing inspiration from the work of Foucault (1979) on 
governmentality and of Agrawal (2005) on environmentality. Forest governmentality, we 
argue, provides an analytical lens for a genealogy of tribal subject-making and of forest 
governance reform. The second part deals with the history of Bhil categorisation and of forest 
demarcation. The third part examines the politics of identity, showing how various forest-
related and externally imposed Bhil identities (from encroachers to guardians) have 
determined their inclusion in, and exclusion from, forest rights and forest resources. The 
dynamics and ‘technologies’ of decentralised forest governance are discussed in the fourth 
part. Finally, the paper draws some conclusions on the future implications of forest 
governmentality. It shows that new meanings of forest governance and of tribal identity are 
currently in the making.  
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2.2  FOREST GOVERNMENTALITY 
Governmentality, as conceived by Michel Foucault (1979), is the association of the 
rationalities of the state, the technologies of power and the processes of subjectification, 
which needs to be understood in the broad sense of governing human behaviour. 
Subjectification, as coined by Foucault (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1977, 1979, 2002; Lemke, 
2000, 2001), refers to the construction of the individual subject. Subjectification is about 
ruling and controlling others by shaping their self-determination. It precedes the subject in the 
same way as the process of individuation precedes the creation of the individual. In the 
Foucauldian sense, the concept of governmentality refers to conduct, or, more precisely, to 
‘the conduct of conduct,’ which ranges from ‘governing the self’ to ‘governing others’ 
(Lemke, 2001). Thomas Lemke (2000: 3) stresses that governmentality as an analytical tool 
‘offers a view on power beyond a perspective that centres either on consensus or on violence; 
it links technologies of the self with technologies of domination, the constitution of the 
subject to the formation of the state; and it helps to differentiate between power and 
domination.’ Governing others dominates the art of governing – the techniques in which the 
state and its power intervene into and manage the habits and activities of subjects (Rose et al., 
2006). Governing people, then, is ‘not a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it 
is always a versatile equilibrium, with complementarities and conflicts between techniques 
which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or modified by 
himself’ (Foucault, 1978, as cited in Lemke, 2000: 4). Given these perspectives on 
governmentality, a very relevant question for this paper is whether the trend of contemporary 
decentralised forest tenure reform in India – which seems to point to more opportunities for 
self-governance at regional and local levels – is not implicitly a continuation of  ‘the conduct 
of conduct’ by the central state. This question becomes even more pertinent in view of the 
limited literature on decentralisation of tribal forest governance that uses a governmentality 
approach.  
Foucault’s idea of governmentality is attracting increasing attention in studies on the 
environment, including in India (Agrawal, 2005; Birkenholtz, 2009; Guha, 1996; 
Sivaramakrishnan, 1995, 1999; Skaria, 1999). It has even been applied in the physical 
sciences, particularly geology. For example Braun (2000: 28) shows that ‘territory’ does not 
exist in the ‘objective’ problem of population, but when ‘the “right conduct” of citizens 
becomes a problem in ever new ways in response to nature’s construction.’ 
Governmentalisation of the environment has been a process of reshaping forest institutions, 
practices and subjectivities by the colonial and independent Indian states through the creation 
and execution of new laws, regulations and procedures for forest management (Agrawal, 
2005). Poor forest-dependent communities living in and around forests were directly affected 
by many of the new regulations implemented by the colonial government (Guha, 1996; 
Skaria, 1999). Often, these forest-dependent communities resisted the processes of forest 
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governmentalisation that redefined or denied their existing forest rights (Agrawal, 2005; 
Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Guha, 2001). Such forms of resistance by people against the external 
governance and control of environmental resources, be they water or forest management, are 
not exclusive to India. Generally, social struggles by people against forms of domination 
(ethnic, social or religious) and forms of subjugation have always been part of our society 
(Foucault, 2002). These struggles exist, as Foucault explains, due to a form of political power 
produced by the state that takes an interest only in the totality of the group of citizens, 
ignoring individuals.  
In his interesting book Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of 
Subjects, Arun Agrawal (2005) uses the term ‘environmentality,’ referring to a fusions of the 
concepts of the environment and Foucauldian governmentality, indicating the ‘simultaneous 
redefinition of the environment and the subject as such redefinition is accomplished through 
the means of political economy’ (Agrawal, 2005: 23-24). Through the lens of 
environmentality, Agrawal shows us how technologies of power and government have been 
instrumental in shaping environmental subjects. Environmental subjects are ‘those for whom 
the environment constitutes a critical domain of thought and action’ (Agrawal, 2005: 16). The 
verb ‘subjects’ in environmentality, draws inspiration from Foucault, being a ‘form of power 
that subjugates and makes subject to,’ that is, ‘the way a human being turns him- or herself 
into a subject’ (Foucault, 2002: 331). Environmental subjects, being the forest-dependent 
communities in Agrawal’s study, not only adapt to the environmental regulation practices as 
set by the state, but also change their behaviour from initial resistance to state regulation to 
pro-active participation in forest management. However, the making of such environmental 
subjects – as non-identity-based categories, in contrast to ethnicity, caste or class – raises the 
question of how new social categories created by the state are instrumental in the inclusion 
and exclusion of the old identity-based subjects in forest governance.  
Birkenholtz (2009) in his paper on groundwater deals with this latter issue. He exemplifies 
the state’s efforts to introduce new decentralised groundwater regulations in Rajasthan, India, 
and the ways in which these efforts were resisted by the villagers. His study examined the 
political-economic motivation of the state and other agents to produce ‘willing’ 
environmental subjects within the new decentralised groundwater reforms. However, in 
contrast to Agrawal, Birkenholtz’s case study indicates that social identities of farmers, 
namely caste and class, played a crucial role in influencing the groundwater reform policies. 
Stressing the idea that these farmers had multiple subject positions – related to state, caste, 
class and ecological change – he shows that such complex multiple subjectivities led farmers 
to either accept or resist the new groundwater governance reforms. However, the subject-
making in Birkenholtz’s analysis is devoid of any history – or genealogy, as critical analysis 
of historically contingent discourses and practices (see Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1979; Peluso 
and Vandergeest, 2001) – of governmental authority and of people’s resistance against the 
domination of the state. One assumption of a genealogical approach is that the processes of 
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producing (environmental) subjects in (colonial) history and its continuation in recent 
decentralised policy reforms inform scholars about current struggles (including resistance) by 
forest-dependent people. Tracing these historical processes helps us to understand the making, 
inclusion and exclusion of subjects, and the consequences – both intended and unintended – 
of new forms of environmental regulations for local people.   
In this paper, we use governmentality as an analytical perspective to explore the history of 
changing forms of forest governance, institutional authority and social practices relating to 
scheduled tribes and ‘their’ forests, and its evolution over time. In doing so, we advance the 
notion of forest governmentality as a perspective on colonial and present India by taking into 
account scholarly work on subaltern (or tribal) studies (such as those of Guha, 1983; Skaria, 
1999) and by focusing on less discussed issues in political ecology and in the study of the 
commons, namely tribal people as an identity category in forest governance. The tribal people 
as a ‘new’ social identity category have been an important phenomenon in India’s adoption of 
scientific forestry and in its recent shift towards decentralised forest tenure rights. While 
taking insights from the environmentality (Agrawal, 2005) and governmentality (Foucault, 
1979) approaches into account, the paper examines how ‘subject construction’ and ‘forest 
demarcation’ has happened during colonial and independent India, how subjects were and are 
represented in laws and regulations, and how this has influenced the socio-political struggles 
of forest-dependent scheduled tribes. Doing so advances our understanding of identity-based 
categorisation of the scheduled tribes – in relation to historical re-definitions of forest 
ownership, access and rights – shaped by India’s new decentralised forest tenure reform for 
tribal people. Forest governmentality, we argue, is a perspective that – contrary to more 
mainstream accounts of forest governance – can critically scrutinise the legal and political-
ecological dimensions of the subject- and object-making of the scheduled tribes and ‘their’ 
forests in India.  
The paper discusses three dimensions of forest governmentality: (1) the history of 
categorisation, (2) the politics of social identity, and (3) the technologies of forest governance. 
These dimensions are based on the three general axes of government, as distinguished by 
Dean (2010: 27) in his much cited book on governmentality: episteme, ethos and techne. The 
first notion, the history of categorisation, refers to two intertwining entities, namely forests 
and the scheduled tribes inhabiting these forests, which together represent a strenuous past 
and a forgotten history of forest governance. It explains the historical construction of the 
scheduled tribes and forest categories in contemporary India. The second concept, the politics 
of social identity, though related to the above processes of categorisation, emphasises the 
ways through which the externally imposed social identities of ethnic communities – such as 
encroachers in or guardians of the forests – play a role in their inclusion in and/or exclusion 
from ‘their’ forestlands. Constantly, these communities struggle to identify themselves with 
or distinguish themselves from these imposed identities. This makes them all the more crucial 
to examine, because the imposed identities (or the process of subjectivation, whereby new 
 ~ Chapter 2 ~ 
38 
 
moral subjects come into being via practices of the self) imply not only subjugation, but also 
certain degrees of empowerment (gaining benefits). The third concept, the technologies of 
forest governance, is concerned with the exercise of power, with the many means, 
mechanisms and instruments through which the governing of forests and people is 
accomplished. The new modes of decentralised forest governance policy, of which the 
recently adopted Forest Rights Act is one such instrument, have revived the century-old 
debate on rights versus privileges, and on forests versus human society.  
 
2.3.  HISTORY OF CATEGORISATION 
 
2.3.1  Subjectification of the Bhil 
The name Bhil is believed to have been derived from the Dravidian word, Billu, meaning 
bowman, as the tribe is renowned for its archery skill. With around twelve million people, the 
Bhil are the third largest group (among the 624 recognised scheduled tribes in India) 
inhabiting hilly, dry deciduous forest areas in the semi-arid tribal districts of western India 
(see Figure 2.1). Various local terms have been used to describe people living in forests, such 
as the Adivasis, Vanputra, Jangli, Vanavasi, Vanyajati, which literally mean original 
inhabitants of forests. Reference to this oldest ethnological group dates back to the pre-
medieval period around 325 to 273 BC (Jha, 1994). Heterogeneity among the scheduled tribes 
is immense and sometimes observed within the same tribe across geographical boundaries 
having distinct languages and dialects, habits, modes of dress, beliefs, religion and customary 
practices, although this heterogeneity may not apply to all Scheduled Tribe groups today, if 
we take for example seasonal migration and trends of modernization into account. This sheer 
diversity puts it beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive analysis of all 
tribal communities. Nevertheless, our analysis of the Bhil tribe illustrates implications of 
subjectification of the forest-dependent scheduled tribes within the forest governance domain. 
Around the eighteenth century, during the reign of the Rajput warrior rulers, the Bhil 
politically dominated the teak and sal forested regions of many western and central hilly parts 
of India. These regions were divided into a number of small princely states, which were 
governed with the support of Bhil chiefs. The region witnessed several battles; the Rajputs 
employed the Bhil as bowmen to defend their territory or to raid peasant villages in the 
adjoining areas (Baviskar, 1995). Hereafter, this region came under the control of Peshwas-
Maratha rulers who introduced agriculture by clearing forests and settling peasants. During 
this period, the Bhil were able to maintain their political and cultural independence to a great 
extent by maintaining local customary rules for forest governance (Deliège, 1985; Skaria, 
1999). 
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Figure 2.1: Bhil tribal districts in semi-arid western India 
 
Citing work of several scholars, Mosse (2005: 49) states that ‘during the colonial period, the 
stereotypical image of “wild hill tribes” was based on the discourse that viewed Bhils as a 
people forced by powerful pre-British Rajput and Maratha rulers into the remote forest tracts, 
from where they became a source of raiding and dacoitry.’ 
Identity-based categorisation and subject-making of the original forest inhabitants, such as 
the Bhil, began during British India (see Table 2.1). Around 1860, various marginalised castes 
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and tribes in British provinces in India were all grouped together as ‘Depressed Classes’ in 
order to provide them with socio-economic benefits (Revankar, 1971). In 1919, the Indian 
Franchise Committee created a separate sub-category within the Depressed Classes to 
recognise the identity of ethnic marginalised minority groups to provide them with job 
opportunities. The Government of India (Scheduled Castes) Order of 1936, contained a list, or 
schedule, of castes to implement reservation of seats in educational institutions and to create 
government jobs for them (Government of India, 1935). The Government of India Act (1935) 
defined the term ‘scheduled castes’ as ‘such castes, races or tribes or parts of groups within 
castes, races or tribes, which appear to His Majesty in Council to correspond to the classes of 
persons formerly known as the Depressed Classes, as His Majesty in Council may prefer.’ 
This scheduled caste list was inclusive of tribal communities; and the list was a yardstick to 
recognise rights and privileges of communities living inside the forests.   
After India’s independence in 1947, the categorisation of tribal communities was 
formalised through a detailed separate statutory list of the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1950 
that came into force following the reorganisation of the Indian states (Ghurye, 1963). The 
criteria applied by the different state governments to identify a community as a scheduled 
tribe were ambiguous, however, and are contested to the present day (Srivastava, 2008). The 
Constitution of India fails to provide a clear definition of the category, since Article 366(25) 
describes them as, ‘such tribes or tribal communities or parts of or groups within such tribes 
or tribal communities as are deemed under Article 342 to be scheduled tribes for the purposes 
of this constitution’ (Government of India, 1950). In addition to the categorisation of 
scheduled tribes as a socio-ethnic identity, the Constitution of India also creates a spatial 
identity by specifically recognising areas with high percentages of scheduled tribe 
inhabitation. It reads:  
 
… the Governor in the scheduled areas states may make regulations for peace 
and good governance particularly to: prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by 
or among members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas; regulate the 
allotment of land to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas; regulate 
money-lending to members of the Scheduled Tribes in such areas (Government 
of India, 1950).  
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Table 2.1. Overview of forest governmentality in relation to scheduled tribes in India 
Year Scheduled tribe Forest 
Pre-colonial India  
Before 1850 
Discretion: Princely states.  
 
Adivasis or original inhabitants. There 
was no category of scheduled tribe.  
Princely states managed forests. Rights to 
forestland and forest resources varied 
among states.   
 
British colonial India 
Around 1850 to 1946 
 
Discretion: British rule. 
 
 
 
1860s: Category of Depressed Classes 
was created for socio-economic benefits 
of marginalised groups.  
 
 
 
 
1864: Indian Forest Department and 
scientific forestry established. 
1878: Indian Forest Act: ownership of 
forestland as right vs. privileges became 
prime issue, and faced resistance from 
forest dependents.   
 
 
 
 
1936: Scheduled Caste Order (included 
caste as well as tribal) – gave job 
opportunities for Depressed Classes.  
Forest dwellers resisted because village 
forest was not formalised. 
 
 
1927: Indian Forest Act classified forests 
into three types: reserved, protected and 
village forest.  
1930s: Establishment of Forest Department 
at state level.  
 
Post-colonial India 
From 1947 to 1989 
 
Independence in 1947  
 
Discretion: President of 
India. Central rule. 
 
 
1950: Constitution of India adopted the 
definition of the scheduled tribes  
1950: Scheduled Tribes Order: gave 
recognition to a separate statutory list of 
scheduled tribes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1952: Forest Policy Act: state took control 
of more forestland to achieve 33% forest 
cover.   
1976: Creation of separate Ministry of 
Environment and Forests. 
1980: Forest Conservation Act - attempt to 
evict so-called encroachers. 
 
Contemporary  India 
1990s 
 
Discretion: On paper, trend 
towards decentralisation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006  
 
 
 
 
1992: National Commission for 
Scheduled Tribes created 
1999: Creation of separate Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs. 
 
 
 
 
 
2007: India voted for United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples adopted by the General 
Assembly.    
 
1990s: People’s participation. Joint Forest 
Management programme involving Forest 
Department and local people to protect 
forests.  
 
 
2000: Proposal to revisit the definition of 
forest by the Ministry of Environment and 
Forest.  
2002: Ministry of Environment and 
Forests’ directive to evict illegal 
encroachers on forestland (MoEF 13/1-90) 
 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs (and not Ministry of Forest and Environment) initiated a key 
piece of forest legislation: the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers 
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006, also called the Forest Rights Act.  
The Forest Rights Act aims to undo historic injustice done to the scheduled tribes and 
other traditional forest dwellers by recognising their traditional forest rights.  
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The construction of categories of scheduled tribes as a subject, and the ‘scheduled areas’ as a 
territorial demarcation, were further institutionalised through the creation of separate 
constitutional bodies – the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes in 1992, and the 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs in 1999 – to ensure the development of the marginalised 
communities involved. 
Thus, the scheduled tribes have been subjected to purposive classification and to legislative 
processes of inclusion and/or exclusion from their access rights to forests. The idea of 
exclusion in Foucault’s thinking, as Dean (2010) suggests, refers to ‘dividing practices,’ 
which happen when certain categories are created by the state by dividing the population into 
sub-categories. Consequently, the parts of the population that have different ways of life or 
fail to possess or display the criteria set by the state are excluded from certain practices and 
rights, with the intent to discipline them through exclusive juridical and political status, or to 
eventually mainstream them. The dividing practices for India’s scheduled tribes have led to 
the subjectification of the Bhil and to a consolidation of their social identity (see section 4). 
 
2.3.2 Classification of forests (as an environmental category) 
A similar process of conscious categorisation took place in the field of forests and forestry. 
With the recent advent of decentralised forest tenure reform in the dry, deciduous, almost 
degraded teak (Tectona grandis) and sal (Shorea robusta) forests in the Bhil populated areas 
of western and central India, this categorisation has again become a political subject. Since 
the British colonial period, forests have been state property. The state monopoly on land and 
forest resources began with the creation of the Indian Forest Service in 1864, which also 
marked the beginning of full state control and of intrusion into the existing traditional 
resource access rights. E.P. Stebbing (1982), a historian, had in the 1920s criticised the Forest 
Service for extending its control and territories, and considered the British forest 
administration as a unit for the production of timber revenues only. Any land that was not 
economically productive, according to the British colonial Forest Service, was categorised as 
wasteland, even though the land had high value for local forest-dependent people. However, 
the term wasteland continued to prevail in independent India. Stebbing (1982: 70) also 
documented that in 1807 a proclamation by the British India Company asserted that ‘a royalty 
rights in teak claimed by former governments were vested in the Company, and all 
unauthorised felling of the teak by private individuals was prohibited.’ A Bhil chief in Dang 
district who protested against the government of Bombay Presidency for demarcating the rich 
teak forest in 1880s said: ‘we do not wish to let the Dang jungle [be] demarcated, for thereby 
we shall lose our rights and we and our poor rayat [cultivators] shall always be under the 
control of Forest Department and the Department will always oppress us’ (as quoted in 
Skaria, 1999: 216). The eminent Indian historian Ramachandra Guha (2001) explains that the 
European model of scientific forestry with strict state control over forests, when exported to 
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India by the British, caused the resistance of forest-dependent tribal people to become a 
recurring trend.  
However, there were also efforts within the Forest Department to recognise the rights of 
the communities living inside the forests. Dietrich Brandis, the first Inspector General of 
Forests, expressed an interest in reviving and strengthening village communal institutions and 
indigenous forest management practices (Guha, 2001), but his ideas were never implemented. 
Instead, the Indian Forest Act, adopted in 1878, started the process of forest reservation that 
effectively meant that forest inhabitants were dispossessed of the forestland and of the forest 
resources. This Act classified state forests into three types. The first type, reserved forests, 
was meant for commercial timber exploitation that prevented the practice of customary rights. 
In protected forests, the second type, the rights and privileges of original inhabitants were 
recorded but not settled. The third classification, formalisation of village forests, implied that 
any revenue from village forests was meant for village communities managing such forests. 
The formalisation of village forests was never implemented however. Interestingly, after this 
legislation, the protected areas were gradually converted into reserved forests where the state 
could have more power. Gadgil and Guha (1992: 134, citing Stebbing) said that ‘the 14,000 
square miles of state forest in 1878 (the year the act was passed) had increased to 56,000 
square miles of reserved forests and 20,000 of protected forests in 1890 – the corresponding 
figures of a decade later being 81,400 and 3,300 square miles respectively.’ 
An era of debate on rights versus privileges emerged with the Forest Act of 1878 that 
advocated total state control over India’s forests by ignoring the existing customary rights, 
norms and practices about having access to forestland and forest resources (Gadgil and Guha, 
1992). Traditional rights were converted into privileges that were either limited or abolished 
at the will of the Forest Department. Importantly, the duty of reporting violation of rights fell 
to the forest people, who failed to register as such primarily because they were illiterate and 
lacked the western notion of property rights. The Forest Department’s interest in owning and 
managing land became the prime issue in tribal conflicts.  Gadgil and Guha (1992, p.135) 
write,  
 
… each family of ‘right holders’ was allowed a specific quantum of timber 
and fuel, while the sale or barter of forest produce was strictly prohibited. 
This exclusion from forest management was therefore physical – it denied 
or restricted access to forests and pasture – as well as social – it allowed 
‘right holders’ only a marginal and inflexible claim on the produce of the 
forests.  
 
Attempts to re-invigorate the provision of village forests were made through the revised 
Indian Forest Act of 1927, which by the way still governs independent India’s forest 
administration today, but to no avail. Instead, this legislation introduced a clause that required 
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claims relating to practices of shifting cultivation or access rights to land and forest produce 
by tribal and other forest-dwelling communities to be settled by the forest settlement officer. 
It further aggravated the ongoing tribal resistance including in western India, as Guha (2000: 
39) recounts, ‘in all kinds of ways: through arson, breaches of the forest law, attacks on 
officials and on government property, and quite often, through co-ordinated and collective 
social movements aimed at restoring local control over forests.’ By 1930, the state-level 
Forest Department was set up so that the respective states would control their own forests. 
Mosse (2005: 51) says that ‘unruly mosaic forests were disciplined into ordered high-value 
timber-producing reserve forests of teak, protected from Bhils and their hunting, gathering 
and shifting cultivation. Bhils lost the forest by stealth, as colonial knowledge (“scientific 
forestry”) created Bhil ignorance.’ 
Thus, about a century ago, as a consequence of scientific forestry and political 
subjectification of tribal people, forests were demarcated on the basis of statistical 
calculations of valuable timber harvests, and tribal people were categorised as new ethnic 
groups without recognising their customary forestlands and rights. In cultural, ecological or 
geographical terms however, the scientific definition of the term forest explains little. At 
present, all that remains of the previously demarcated rich teak forest in semi-arid western 
India is now categorised as degraded forestland. Thus, the historic construction of forests and 
tribal relationships explains that those demarcating the forest are not only in control of how 
the forest is managed and exploited, but also liable for categorising what is considered a 
forest. These embedded histories are crucial components in the re-construction of 
contemporary forest tenure reform, in particular, in the recognition of the current forest rights 
of the Bhil.  
 
2.4  THE POLITICS OF BHIL’S FOREST-RELATED IDENTITY  
In this part, we examine the changing, forest-related social identity of the Bhil as shaped by 
the government and by the Bhil communities themselves. Below we elaborate this identity 
politics, which is twofold: first, the (mis)use of Bhil identity by the government – to be 
summarised as subjectification – and second, the internalisation of this imposed identity – or 
subjectivation – by the Bhil communities. The making of the present-day tribal identity of the 
Bhil – a poor, marginal, ignorant, uncivilised community and encroachers on forestland – 
combines the history of colonial oppression and exploitation with the loss of power, influence 
and control over land and forest resources (Mosse, 2005). In brief, the political and cultural 
identity of the Bhil people is enmeshed with the making of forests as an environmental 
category.  
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2.4.1  Bhil identity imposed by the state 
Representations of tribal identity by the state have been paradoxical and have moved between 
two perspectives: (1) tribal people as protectors and original inhabitants of forests vs. (2) 
tribals as encroachers and main agent of deforestation. A classic example of tribal people as 
protector emerges from ecological and cultural identity movements that include the Appiko 
movement against illegal over felling of forests in the state of Karnataka, the Chipko peasant 
movement in Uttarakhand in response to deforestation (Kapoor, 2003), and the Bhil tribal 
movement against the Narmada River Valley Dam Project in Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh 
(Baviskar, 1995). These discourses have been institutionalised into practices of law, 
particularly the encroachment school of thought, which has had the most influence in 
governing the relationship between forest and tribal people (Suykens, 2009). The identity of 
the Bhil has emerged with the inception of exclusive policies since the early nineteenth 
century in British India. Skaria’s (1999) extensive study on Bhils in Dang district in Gujarat 
focuses on constructions of ‘wildness’ through the changing meaning of jangal (forest 
wilderness) and jangli (inhabitants of jungle). Skaria (1999: ix) argues that, ‘the values 
associated with the jangal and being jangli were crucial to the construction of power, 
authority and identity in both Dangs and surrounding plain societies; it was in this sense that a 
discourse of wildness was influential.’ Further, he points out three common strategies adopted 
by the state to civilise the tribes and the forests: (i) ‘protecting from the outsiders’ because 
Bhils had to be protected from the liquor merchants, and forests from timber traders; (ii) 
‘protecting from themselves’ because the Bhil’s high-spirited boisterousness had to be kept in 
check, and forests too had to be managed through silvicultural techniques; and (iii) ‘excluding 
each from the other’ because it was considered that Bhils became lazy because of their 
dependence on the forest, which in turn wrecked the forests (Skaria, 1999: 199-200). David 
Mosse (2005: 54) explains that their current identity is shaped by discourses and policies: 
‘Bhils have been patronized and disciplined, displaced or protected, integrated or excluded, 
reformed or rescued, ennobled or accused in colonial or post colonial policies on the tribal or 
in contemporary environmental debates on deforestation or dams.’ Thus, with the 
establishment of the Forest Department in colonial India in an attempt to discipline them, the 
Bhil’s traditional rights were suppressed; instead, they were granted privileges to use fuel 
woods, fruits and other non-timber forest produces for livelihood purposes. Moreover, the 
customary (informal) local institutions to manage resources were replaced by the statutory 
institutions, particularly the Forest Department. The rights of the scheduled tribes, as 
described by B.H. Baden-Powell, were ‘strict legal rights which unquestionably exist, and in 
some instances have been expressly recorded in land settlement records, while privileges 
defined as concessions of the use of grazing, firewood, small wood, etc., which though non-
claimable as of legal right, are always granted by the policy of the government for the 
convenience of the people’ (as cited in Gadgil and Guha, 1992: 125).   
 ~ Chapter 2 ~ 
46 
 
In contemporary India, one of the most controversial Indian laws has been the Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980 (with amendments in 1988) that requires mandatory central 
permission for diverting forestland for other uses. This law dealt the biggest blow to the forest 
dwellers’ claim on property rights. Large number of tribals inhabiting the forests, whose 
rights were either not recorded (due to oral tradition) or settled or who were not residing 
inside the forest but dependent on its resources, became encroachers on the basis of this Act. 
However, with the introduction of the Forest Policy of 1988, community participation, 
conservation and subsistence needs became important issues too. This resulted in formal 
acceptance of the Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme in 1990 that gave certain rights 
to the community to protect and manage the – by now – degraded forestland themselves. 
However, during 1995, with the systematic enumeration and demarcation of forestland, most 
forest-dwelling tribal communities and original cultivators were still categorised as 
encroachers. In May 2002, the problem of demarcation re-surfaced when the Ministry of 
Environment and Forests (MoEF 13/1-90) unilaterally issued a directive to all state 
governments to evict illegal encroachers on forestland (settled post-1980s), and to complete 
the process within five months. The consequence was perceived as unfair eviction in various 
parts of tribal areas. In July 2004, acknowledging the injustice done to tribal people, the 
Ministry of Environment and Forests, in an affidavit filed in the Supreme Court, admitted the 
following:  
 
That, for most areas in India, especially the tribal areas, record of rights 
did not exist due to which rights of the tribals could not be settled during 
the process of consolidation of forests in the country. Therefore, the rural 
people, especially tribals who have been living in the forests since time 
immemorial, were deprived of their traditional rights and livelihood and, 
consequently, these tribals have become encroachers in the eyes of law. 
That these guidelines, dated 5 February 2004, are based on the recognition 
that the historical injustice done to the tribal forest dwellers through non-
recognition of their traditional rights must be finally rectified. It should be 
understood clearly that the lands occupied by the tribals in the forest areas 
do not have any forest vegetation. Further, that because of the absence of 
legal recognition of their traditional rights, the adjoining forests have 
become ‘open access’ resource as such for the dispossessed tribals, leading 
to forest degradation in a classic manifestation of the tragedy of commons 
(as quoted in Blaikie and Springate-Baginski, 2007: 77). 
 
So far, we have highlighted narratives that have influenced the forest-related identity of the 
Bhil with the changing political scenarios. They have successively been categorised as 
protectors, encroachers, managers and/or rightful access holders of forests. The image of 
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encroachers has very much determined their relation with the Forest Department. At the same 
time, the Bhil have resisted this subjugation by the state to maintain their identity as forest 
dwellers.  
 
2.4.2  Being Bhil people 
The second aspect of Bhil identity concerns their perception of being Bhil. Today, the Bhil 
community is uncertain about the longevity of their recognition by the government as a 
scheduled tribe. Although the Bhil have resisted subjugation and categorisation on the one 
hand, they currently fear exclusion from the recognised scheduled tribes list. This uncertainty 
stems from a provision in the Constitution of India, Article 342(2), that states ‘[p]arliament 
may by law include or exclude from the list of the Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification 
issued under clause (1) a tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or 
tribal community’ (Government of India, 1950). A loss of scheduled tribe status would imply 
a loss of political recognition of their ethnic identity as well as a loss of support for their 
traditional rights-based claims on natural resources. This paradox of the Bhil simultaneously 
resisting and internalising the scheduled tribe identity is hard to understand, but as David 
Mosse (2005: 7) notes while reflecting on the centrality of the Bhil’s struggle for identity and 
forest tenure: ‘historically, Bhil identity has been forged from a complex history of forest 
livelihoods, rule and resistance, and a history of relationships with dominant groups in 
society.’  
Unlike the colonial history, the current politics of tribal identity occurs on two scales. First, 
the social scale relates to the current distinctions between scheduled tribes (Bhils), the 
‘reformed’ scheduled tribes (Bhilalas) and the non-scheduled tribes. In general, the Bhil 
people are identified as animist, but many claim to be atheists. Hardiman’s book ‘Coming out 
of devi’ (1987) on Bhil tribal suggests that it would be very difficult to make this claim of 
being atheists. In recent years many tribal villages have constructed religious places, and 
several households, known as Bhilalas, have given up their tribal cultural practices of 
drinking alcohol and eating meat in an attempt to gain societal status with the mainstream 
(non-scheduled tribe) community (information derived from fieldwork conducted by the first 
author in western India between 2008 and 2010). Such identity-based re-categorisation of the 
scheduled tribes exemplifies the state’s (historic) attempt at strategic divide-and-rule 
practices, excluding those who fail to fit within the state’s rationalities. Nevertheless, it also 
shows – being the other side of the governmentality coin – the self-control of people to match 
society’s dominant values and norms. The second scale, which is political in nature, concerns 
the different macro policies of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, and the Ministry of 
Tribal Affairs. Whereas the former claims many tribal lands to be forestlands, thus excluding 
tribals as illegal encroachers, in contrast the latter claims these to be tribal lands, giving forest 
rights to tribal people. This schizophrenic situation of course creates additional tension and 
anxiety for the Bhil.  
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Over time, the Bhil have become subject to a complex array of laws, policies and 
administrative structures, in both colonial and independent India. Their identity as people 
belonging to the socio-economic and political category of the scheduled tribes has been part 
of this complex interaction. In myriad invisible ways, they have also tried to identify 
themselves with mainstream society. Yet, this change in adapting to cultural mainstream 
practices does not signify that the Bhil want to renounce the political identity category of 
scheduled tribe. A narrative of a Bhil (customary chief) villager explains: ‘In the past, we 
faced the exploitation of Raj (British India). Some Bhils had resisted the cutting down of the 
(then) dense teak forests, whereas others had been made part of the process. Today, we protest 
with a non-violence approach; we collectively make use of our legal rights of Bhil identity to 
claim back our land rights.’ For example, a Bhil farmer from Banswara tribal district in south 
Rajasthan stated that, ‘it is our [Bhil’s] pride and responsibility to protect the forest (land and 
resources) from being claimed by the non-tribal settlers’ (data derived from in-depth 
qualitative household interviews conducted in August 2008 by the first author). Claiming the 
land as part of their traditional rights from the government-demarcated forest area could be 
seen as the Bhil’s current strategy to exercise their identity. Consequently, the way in which 
they use their tribal identity as a tool to change from being encroachers on the land to rightful 
claimants of the land reflects their struggle against the state's efforts to make them into 
subjects. Paradoxically, this further reinforces their subjectification in the form of a separate 
object of policy making. 
     
2.5  DECENTRALISED FOREST GOVERNANCE 
From restitution to rights, Bhil communities in western India have experienced alienation 
from forestland and denial of access to forest resources. Although their classification and 
recognition as scheduled tribals indicate a certain extent of identity-based representation in 
forest legislation during British India and in recent reforms for decentralised forest 
governance, customary forest rights have not been properly addressed so far. Currently, 
though, a rights-based approach seems to be emerging in India’s forest governance, although 
such an approach is not new to India. As far back as the 1860s, as indicated in section 3.2, 
Brandis proposed to recognise the customary rights of people residing inside forests (prior to 
their being classified as scheduled tribes). However, this idea was never implemented, 
resulting in contestation over much forestland. 
A similar rights-based approach seems to have been implemented, although under popular 
pressure, with respect to administrative decentralisation. In 1992, when the decentralisation 
process was first introduced through the Panchayati Raj in India, it excluded the tribal areas. 
It was only in 1996, after nationwide protest by tribal groups and human right activists, that 
decentralisation became a reality in the tribal areas as well, with the provisions of the 
Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, (No. 40 of 1996), popularly known as 
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PESA (henceforth, the PESA). The PESA aimed to devolve power to the tribal gram 
panchayats – the elected third-tier village-level government institution. Decentralisation 
enforced through this Act aimed to bridge the gap between the hitherto respected tribal 
traditions of self-governance on the one hand and decentralisation of the administration 
through elected gram panchayats on the other. Below the level of gram panchayat, the PESA 
stipulated the establishment of a gram sabha at the level of the hamlet. Moreover, section 4.a 
of the PESA determines that ‘a State legislation on the Panchayats that may be made shall be 
in consonance with the customary law, social and religious practices, and traditional 
management practices of community resources.’ It required state governments to amend their 
existing laws to make them consistent with the federal legislation. Just like the recognition of 
customary rights proposed by Brandis in 1860, the PESA had to date not been adopted.  
For forests in particular, decentralised governance was also introduced in India with the 
launch of Joint Forest Management (JFM) in 1990. JFM aimed – and still aims – at involving 
rural people in the protection and management of forest, jointly with the Forest Departments. 
So far, there has been some positive outcomes of JFM, such as a betterment of forest quality 
and quantity in several areas, but on the negative side, villagers did not gain any decision-
making powers through JFM, there has been a lack of transparency and democracy within the 
villages involved and exclusion of poor, landless and female members of communities has 
been rather common (Banerjee, 2007; Poffenberger and Singh, 1996). Moreover, tribal rights 
to forest produces remained unclear (Das, 1996). In 2004, one of the items on the political 
agenda of the then newly elected national government (United Progressive Alliance) was to 
put an end to the eviction drive against forest-dwelling tribal and traditional communities and 
to overcome the shortcomings of JFM. The government gave the task of drafting the so-called 
Forest Rights Act to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs. The Ministry of Environment and Forests 
opposed the decision, claiming that forests came within their domain of jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, the Forest Rights Act was passed.  
The assumption is that the implementation of the Forest Rights Act will benefit forest 
dwellers. Its paradigm shift towards a rights-based approach seems to be producing a new 
meaning for tribal communities’ involvement in forest management. Nonetheless, the concept 
of forest has long been debated in Indian legislation and still does not have a clear definition 
today (Rastogi, 2007). Thus, forestland tenure and forest resources have been contentious 
issues as a result of the Forest Department’s authority to reserve forests for exploitation and 
protection on the one hand vis-à-vis the constitutional rights of tribal communities to access 
the forests on the other. After 60 years of independence, the Forest Rights Act is the first 
legislation in India that duly recognises those who do not have any documentary proof of their 
land holding but can claim that they are cultivating the land themselves for a livelihood. Thus, 
the Forest Rights Act recognises that many scheduled tribe communities and other traditional 
forest dwellers can legitimately reside on demarcated forestlands without any formal 
(colonial) records or prior recognition of their rights.  
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There are several aspects of the Forest Rights Act that demand special attention in the 
context of future tribal forest governance, and we elaborate below on the following four: (1) 
the creation of a new social category; (2) the implementation problem; (3) the dilution of 
existing authority; and (4) the individualisation of tenure rights. First, the law not only applies 
to the identity-based category of the scheduled tribes, but also creates a new vague social 
category of ‘other traditional forest-dwellers’, without, however, clearly communicating who 
belongs to the latter category. This is important because, on the one hand, non-tribal elite 
communities have – in the name of ‘other traditional forest dwellers’ – already claimed 
encroached land in several Bhil-dominated villages (Bose, 2011a). On the other hand, a too 
restrictive interpretation of the term may pose a threat to the claims of vulnerable pastoralists 
and nomadic tribes, who have been traditionally dependent on natural resources. For example, 
there is evidence of an increase in conflict due to Bhil people’s denial of the traditional barter 
system of nomadic pastoralist communities (first author’s field work 2008-2010). This 
legislation considers December 13, 2005, as the cut-off date for consideration of land rights. 
For traditional forest dwellers other than scheduled tribes, a lease will be given for land that 
they have occupied for three generations, or 75 years prior to 13 December 2005, for bona 
fide livelihood needs. At least on paper, the Forest Rights Act recognises traditional forest 
rights of tribals that include nistari (community forests), minor forest produce, fish and other 
products of water bodies, grazing land, traditional seasonal resource access for nomadic or 
pastoralist communities, community rights to intellectual property and traditional knowledge 
relating to biodiversity and cultural diversity. Prior to the Forest Rights Act, most of the Bhil 
people had been either displaced or regarded as illegal settlers by the state Forest Department, 
but through the Forest Rights Act, those whose land is in dispute or whose land has been 
taken by the Forest Department are eligible to legitimate land claims.  
Secondly, besides creating confusion about who is addressed by the Forest Rights Act, 
other problems have emerged with its implementation. For implementation, the Forest Rights 
Act has different tiers – state, district, sub-divisional and village – of committees. Each tier 
committee will consist of officers each from the Revenue Department, Forest Department, 
and Tribal Department of the state government and three members of the Panchayati 
institution at the appropriate level, of whom two shall be scheduled tribe members and at least 
one shall be a woman. Such judicial clauses for reservation of seats provide for mere 
representation of minority groups on the committee without actually devolving any resources 
to local people or empowering tribals, particularly women, to make decisions themselves 
(Bose, 2011a). Moreover, these multi-stakeholder committees at higher administrative level 
are not accountable to the gram sabhas. There are several inconsistencies between the rules of 
the Forest Rights Act and the PESA, for example regarding the definition of the gram sabha. 
The Forest Rights Act rule 3.1 defines gram sabhas of the panchayat as the larger entity that 
may oversee more than one village (or several hamlets); this contradicts the PESA, which 
defines a gram sabha in tribal areas as being at the level of one hamlet. There is concern that, 
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although the Forest Rights Act envisages the involvement of democratic institutions at the 
grassroots level, the gram sabha does not have the power to recognise forest rights or enforce 
such rights.  
Thirdly, there is no doubt that on paper the Forest Rights Act could be regarded as a step 
towards political decentralisation, since it clearly gives sole authority to the gram sabha 
(village assembly) as the competent authority for initiating the process of determining the 
nature and extent of individual forest rights. However, different tiers in the decision-making 
process dilute the authority of the gram sabha to form village-level forest-right committees to 
assess the individual and collective forest tenure claims. An individual or community can 
appeal within 60 days to a sub-divisional committee if they are dissatisfied with the village-
level committee decision. Although the village committee can veto the decision of the sub-
divisional-level committee, the decisions of the district level committee remain final and 
binding. Moreover, the district-level committee holds the authority to decide the period for 
which forest rights should be ‘derecognised’ in the event of repeated contravention of the 
provisions of the Forest Rights Act. Moreover, due to high levels of illiteracy and a lack of 
empowerment, Bhil people hardly know about their rights to claim forestland, let alone appeal 
against a higher authority’s decision (first author’s field work data 2008-2010). Our case of 
decentralised forest governance in Bhil communities corroborates Ribot’s (2003) extensive 
findings in developing countries, suggesting that common problems of political 
decentralisation in the forestry sector are related to the choice and the form of representation 
in local institutions, to accountability, transparency and the general lack of devolution of 
resources. 
The fourth aspect is that the emphasis in the Forest Rights Act on the statutory forestland 
rights of the individual (tribal) household undermines collective forest rights. Under 
customary law, land was held by the village as a whole, guaranteeing the continuity of the 
community and ensuring that each household had access to resources to sustain its livelihood. 
With the individualisation of tenure rights, inequality is created within the village, and this 
may potentially lead to opportunistic behaviour by tribal (and non-tribal) individuals. On one 
hand, those who acquire individual tenure rights enter into institutional arrangement with the 
state (instead of a relation as a kinship group: the Bhil), and therefore acquire an interest in 
the new situation created by the Forest Rights Act. On the other hand, those whose individual 
tenure rights are not recognised are faced with identity-based exclusion both from the 
government and within their own tribal community. The other related issue is about the 
rights-based approach in forest governance, because in reality, in the case of the Bhil, such 
rights are not true rights, but rather privileges because they do not have alienation rights. In 
general, the perception of the Forest Rights Act can best be summarised by quoting a Bhil 
respondent who explains that, ‘the rightful land that belonged to us was taken away, and it 
was classified as forestland. Now, our land is returned (through the Forest Rights Act) to us as 
a privilege – without giving us any alienation rights – making the forestland totally state-
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controlled.’ Another challenge of the Forest Rights Act is the way the decision making about 
rights is organised. The formal institutions (for instances panchayat, sub-division committee, 
district committee) can influence the allocation of forestland within the tribal villages, 
superseding local customary arrangements. This means that the government (through 
Revenue, Forest, Panchayati, and Tribal Welfare Departments) increasingly has the ability to 
influence local practices of land use and land allocation because they have the mandate to 
intervene in disputes about forestland, triggered by the implementation of the Forest Rights 
Act. Thus, the individualisation of forest rights not only divides the tribal people politically, 
but makes both forest and tribal people easier subjects of more centralised governance. 
The success of the decentralised Forest Rights Act depends upon the respective state 
governments of India adopting specific forest and tribal rights laws, which may or may not 
recognise all the clauses of this legislation. Furthermore, implementation of the decentralised 
forest tenure reform also relies on coherence with other existing statutory laws and the extent 
of collaboration among different government department officials.  
 
2.6  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have analysed three dimensions of forest governmentality – the history of 
categorisation, the politics of social identity and the technologies of decentralised forest 
governance – in relation to the Bhil tribals and their forests. As we hope to have shown, forest 
governmentality offers an insightful analytical lens to explain the mechanism that created the 
scheduled tribes category during the British colonial period and governed the inclusion and 
exclusion of tribals in respect of forest use and management on the basis of this 
categorisation. This same categorisation process produced the tribal people’s resistance 
against and – later on – embracing of these identity-based categories, and helped maintain 
state control over forestlands through new modes of forest governance in historical and 
contemporary contexts. A long lineage of commonalities is evident between colonial state 
forest policies oriented at categories such as village communities, and independent India’s 
Forest Rights Act recognising traditional forest rights for the scheduled tribes and other 
traditional forest dwellers. Yet, India’s land or agrarian reform in the past was different 
compared to the current forest governance that promote – at least on paper – political 
decentralisation. The distorted land classification of the past (dispossession of forest 
inhabitants) therefore poses a challenge to future forest governance.   
Despite codified edicts, laws and policy discourses, for several reasons tribal forest tenure 
rights in India do not necessarily match with reality on the ground. One of the biggest future 
implications of forest governmentality is the forest tenure transition from customary 
collective ownership to individualisation of forestland, mainly because it fails to identify 
distinctions between different local customary property arrangements, often managed through 
kinship or hamlet. The fact that most tribal people have specific tenure systems of collective 
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forest rights based on customary arrangements leads to their exclusion from the Forest Rights 
Act’s scope, which is – ironically – supposed to defend their forest rights.  
This paper has deliberately chosen to examine the making of categories of forestland and 
scheduled tribes that have become part of modern legal-political and environmental discourse. 
Our point is straightforward. First, with the construction of the scheduled tribes during the 
colonial period, this socio-ethnic identity category has been internalised by the post 
independent state to control practices of certain groups of marginalised people. Consequently, 
the state is able to maintain domination over the scheduled tribes by new modes of regulation 
of forestry resources. Second, the unchanged hierarchical structure of forest administration 
that continues to function uses a traditional authoritative approach by implementing rules that 
apply uniformly, ignoring difference in forest–people relations, and further perpetuating 
social identity through identity-based tenure reforms. Finally, the Bhil have adopted this state-
imposed identity category as their own ‘indigenous tradition’ to further claim and control 
forest rights in their favour. This process illustrates the articulation between techniques of 
state control and the self-constitution of the ‘subject’ (Foucault, 1977).  
Our paper shows the urgency for in-depth socio-political research on three dimensions of 
forest governmentality to examine, for example, how forest governmentality influences 
exclusion and inclusion within the scheduled tribes. If tribal resource governance systems are 
to be sustained, there is a need for thorough investigation of tribal people’s changing 
individual and collective forest rights. In addition, critical assessment of changing authority 
relations and institutional arrangements for forest management in the scheduled areas is 
required. Addressing these research questions could facilitate the next generation of forest 
tenure reform efforts to effectively integrate people’s interest in forest governance in tribal 
India.  
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A groundwater well in Kushalgarh semi-arid tribal sub-district in Rajasthan. 
Photo credit: Purabi Bose 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Authority changes with the introduction of new institutional arrangements, and this 
holds true for the various actors contesting for secure forest tenure rights. India’s 
decentralised forest reforms have brought new forms of authority and institutions, on top 
of traditional ones. An optimist would argue that institutional pluralism enhances equity, 
accountability, and decision-making participation in collective forest management, 
whereas a pessimist would consider exactly the opposite. The question is not about a 
romanticised choice ‘for’ or ‘against’ certain institutions or authority; rather it is about 
how pluralism influences local forest governance.  
 
Following from chapter 2, the future and outcomes of current tribal tenure reform 
remain unclear. Chapter 3 therefore investigates how institutional pluralism and diverse 
forms of authority are changing tribal people’s collective forest management today.  
 
The two operational sub-questions proposed for this research are:   
 In what ways do customary and statutory institutions simultaneously function in 
villages in recognising collective forest rights (who gains and who loses)? 
 What is the interaction between different types of institutions and authority in 
decentralised local forest management? 
 
The micro-political analysis conducted here uses the concepts of authority and 
institutional pluralism from the spatial level of the tribal gram panchayat.  
 
 
 
This chapter is in process for submission for peer-reviewed journal. Bose, P. and van Dijk, H. 
Authority, institutional pluralism and forest rights: insights from tribal communities in India. 
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3  AUTHORITY, INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND FOREST RIGHTS: 
INSIGHTS FROM TRIBAL COMMUNITIES IN INDIA   
 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
Institutional pluralism is generally believed to provide a level playing field with polycentric 
sources of authority and institutional choice that would benefit local people. Forest tenure 
reform has created such a polycentric system of institutions for local-level forest management 
in India’s twenty-first century tribal villages. Historically, the traditional forest rights of tribal 
people were denied. Recent decentralisation and forest tenure policy reforms to formalize and 
transfer traditional rights to forest people have created new institutions and new forms of 
authority. This paper examines the effects of institutional pluralism and authority relations on 
tribal people’s struggle for collective forest tenure rights. Empirical evidence is drawn from 
qualitative case studies of the functioning of multiple institutions – customary, joint forest 
management, panchayati raj, women’s groups and Forest Rights Act committees – in five 
Bhil tribal villages in Banswara district, Rajasthan. The findings indicate that institutional 
pluralism restricts Bhil people’s collective forest rights because no real authority has been 
decentralized, and gives the elite and line ministries more discretionary authority to control 
forest management.  
 
Keywords: Authority, institutional pluralism, collective forest tenure, forest rights, 
decentralisation, tribal, India 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
In many countries, governments are giving land titles and devolving authority to their 
indigenous people to manage forestland and its resources. Within this global wave of 
decentralisation,10 attempts are being made to identify the rights of those customary actors or 
institutions historically excluded from official decision making about forest management. 
Several countries, for example, are beginning to recognize customary rights of traditional 
forest peoples by devolving part of the ‘bundle of rights’ (use, access, withdrawal, exclusion), 
but alienation rights are retained by the government (Larson et al., 2010; Sunderlin et al., 
2008). The direct effect of this forest tenure reform is the emergence of a variety of 
institutions covering various aspects of forest management. Forest tenure reform, therefore, 
                                                 
10 Decentralisation is any act by which a central government formally cedes power to actors and institutions at 
lower levels in a political–administrative and territorial hierarchy (Ribot, 1999). 
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has become a complicated process because multiple stakeholders make competing claims in 
relation to different institutions mediating access to forest resources. Forest tenure reforms 
create new local institutions and new forms of authority on the assumption that polycentric 
systems of resource governance open up space for bargaining for the disadvantaged groups as 
they can rely on multiple institutions to make their claims (Fairhead and Leach, 2001; 
Ostrom, 1999). A new form of authority may strengthen or weaken a pre-existing authority of 
an institution and/or actor. However, little is known about the impact of institutional pluralism 
and authority relations on local natural resource governance. What are the interactions and 
conflicts between different layers of authority and local institutions, and what effects do they 
have on traditional forest people’s tenure rights? How does institutional pluralism promote or 
restrict collective forest tenure rights? Similar questions are beginning to emerge among 
academics, policy makers and practitioners with the global trend towards forest tenure 
transition (Larson et al., 2010).  
Despite the fact that local resource management in India has been extensively studied 
(Agrawal, 2005; Edmunds et al., 2003; Rangan, 1997; Schug, 2000; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999), 
this has rarely explicitly been done in relation to India’s scheduled tribes (Bose, 2009c; 
Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007). British colonial rule and its influence on forest 
management in tribal India have had an enormous impact on customary institutions and the 
way in which they adapted to, and accommodated, the changing socio-political and legal 
environment. Despite the fact that about 500 tribal communities have been recognised as 
scheduled tribes living in or around forest areas and form 8 per cent of the nation’s 
population, their recognition as indigenous people is politically contested in India. As a result, 
tribal people’s (henceforth used interchangeably with scheduled tribes) access to forest 
resources has become dependent on the discretion of state authorities and institutions. 
Following a number of tenure reforms over the past decades, there is a growing concern about 
the effects of institutional pluralism and new authority relations on tribal people’s access to 
forest resources. This has become even more crucial with the implementation of the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 
2006 (henceforth the Forest Rights Act) that recognizes traditional forest rights of tribal and 
forest-dependent people.  
In this paper, we examine the effects of institutional pluralism and multiple authority 
relations created through various forest tenure reforms, on tribal people’s collective forest 
rights in Banswara district, Rajasthan. The analysis of institutional pluralism and authority in 
in relation to the collective rights tribal people on forestland and its resources will highlight 
the way in which tribal people perceive their forest rights, and the way in which authority is 
created, maintained, gained or lost due to forest tenure reform and the interaction between 
institutions. We will argue that, multiple new institutions that are uncritically introduced to 
address traditional rights and ignore customary authorities may help to maintain and even 
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deepen unequal authority relations so that rights of poor tribal people to forest resources may 
be jeopardized.   
After this brief introduction, the second part outlines an analytical argument by considering 
current literature on local authority and institutional pluralism in forest tenure reform. The 
third part summarizes tribal India’s colonial and post-colonial institutional pluralism before 
describing the study area and method. In the fourth part, in-depth case studies on institutional 
pluralism in the five tribal villages of Banswara district, Rajasthan, are presented, showing the 
functioning of the institutions and authority relations currently in place from the Bhil tribals’ 
perspective. In the fifth part, we analyse and discuss the two key issues emerging out of the 
studied decentralised forest governance reform: (1) the creation of contradictory authority 
relations and rights; and (2) the dynamics of institutional pluralism. Finally, we draw 
conclusions with respect to institutional pluralism and authority relations in tribal forest 
governance.    
 
3.2 AUTHORITY AND INSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM IN LOCAL FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
 
Over the past decade, there has been a growing body of literature on forest tenure reform, 
decentralised forest management of forest resources and the dynamics of authority relations. 
This body of literature covers the emergence of a new global to local forest regime by 
assessing a variety of issues such as legal and institutional pluralism, the regulation of forest 
access rights, changing relations of authority and their implications for traditional forest 
people.
11
 Institutional pluralism in forest management can broadly be understood as the co-
existence of multiple institutions that guide or regulate the interaction of multiple actors, 
cultures, practices, policies and individual interests that have a bearing on forest resource 
management. In the case of India, this refers to the interplay between self-initiated and 
externally introduced institutions and their sources of authority that govern the management 
of forestland and forest resources. Often, pre-existing customary institutions co-exist and/or 
overlap with statutory modern rule and territorial administration. For example in Ghana, the 
constitutional right to manage resources is vested in the president, but ownership remains in 
many places in the hands of the traditional tribal chiefs who each control a specific portion of 
land – different from the state administrative boundaries – called ‘stool land’ (Larson et al., 
2010).  
Authority is referred to as the power or the ability to make decisions that is recognised (or 
not recognised) by certain individuals and/or institution while contested by others (Larson et 
al., 2010; Sikor and Lund, 2009). As Lund (2006: 693) notes, authority is closely linked to the 
legitimacy of the specific institution not because ‘an institution has to be legitimate to 
                                                 
11 For example see Bose et al., 2010; Larson et al., 2010; Ribot et al., 2008; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Sunderlin et 
al., 2008; von Benda-Beckman, 1981.  
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exercise authority, but especially because the actual exercise of authority also involves a 
specific claim to legitimacy.’ Recognition or creation of a new authority strengthens or 
weakens the authority of existing institutions and may render their practice legitimate or 
illegitimate. The recognition of authority is a political act, and territoriality, for instance 
making and enforcing village and forest boundaries, is a core aspect of the exercise of 
authority (Lund, 2006). Any reform by the government, international donors, NGOs or 
activists therefore brings change in authority relations. However, rarely does the government 
take into account the need for consultation with the local community to legitimize authority.    
In the theoretical literature on the management of common property resources, the 
existence of multiple institutions with different (polycentric) sources of authority is 
considered beneficial to the interest of citizens. These polycentric systems are able to provide 
for institutions for self-organizations on the one hand, whereas problems of equity and 
discrimination can be handled by larger general-purpose governmental units ‘that are 
responsible for protecting the rights of all citizens and for the oversight of appropriate 
exercises of authority within smaller units of government’ (Ostrom 1999: 528). Institutional 
pluralism provides an opportunity for different people to rely on different institutions to 
support their claims to environmental goods and services and shape different ways in which 
people access, use and derive well-being from them (Leach and Fairhead 2001: 238).  They 
can also choose between institutions, which may be beneficial with respect to inclusiveness 
and accountability (Ribot et al., 2008) because it gives actors a certain degree of freedom to 
choose the one that favours and recognizes their needs. Von Benda-Beckmann (1981) labels 
this situation ‘forum shopping’, to pinpoint the ability of an actor to shop, bargain, negotiate 
and choose the best option among the available institutions. They can choose between 
institutions, which may be beneficial with respect to inclusiveness and accountability (Ribot 
et al., 2008) because it gives actors a certain degree of freedom to choose the one that favours 
and recognizes their needs. Multiple institutions also help to prevent state authorities or a 
single centre of local power to acquire too much power at the detriment of local communities 
(Ostrom 1999: 528). By creating new authorities and giving them executive, legislative and 
judicial power, the state creates new institutions and opens up new space for recognition, 
negotiation and interpretation (Buur and Kyed, 2006; Ribot et al., 2008; Sikor and Lund, 
2009). Yet, multiple actors empowered through multiple institutions as an alternate to 
democratic institution also form a risk because they may not be representative and may 
undermine the legitimacy of the local democratic institution (Ribot 2001; 2003).       
Equally important is the recognition (or non-recognition) by the state of a pre-existing 
institution and authority. However, the assumption that customary authorities and institutions 
are democratic and accountable by nature would be naive. Law within customary systems was 
contested and continuously reconstituted and was primarily and was primarily administered 
through interpretation by an authority whose legitimacy is based on the ways he addresses the 
interests of his constituency. However, with British colonial policies, which made customary 
 ~ Chapter 3 ~ 
60 
 
chiefs part of the administration and the recognition of customary law, customary chiefs and 
political hierarchies meant solidifying and privileging specific cultural and legal ideas and 
relationships into reproducible rules, which led to a multiplication of new claims to resources, 
labour and authority (Roberts and Mann 1991:4). As a result traditional authority came to 
serve the purpose of upholding as well as internalizing the colonial order on the basis of so-
called traditional institutions labelled ‘decentralised despotism’ (Mamdani 1996: 37). These 
hierarchies continued to exist in the post-colonial states. Therefore, what is labelled 
customary law was formed in the interaction between indigenous society and European 
colonialism (see Roberts and Mann 1991: 4).   
Extrapolating from a number of African case studies, Ribot (2007) therefore warns against 
the uncritical acceptance of customary authorities in forest tenure reform because this may 
threaten democratic decentralisation of forest management. Other scholars argue that not all 
traditional leaders agreed to play the role of colonial despots and that some resisted (Buur and 
Kyed, 2006; Keulder, 2000).  So even with reforms and the creation of new institutions, 
authority remains contested. The reasons may vary from lack of popularity of the leadership 
among people, to mistrust, to an overlap of decision-making responsibilities between one or 
more actors or institutions. Often, government’s choice of an institution is not satisfactory for 
the local marginalised groups because such recognised institutions may have a long history of 
denial of rights and lack of accountability. Even though the institutions chosen to represent 
communities to some extent is based on traditional authorities and takes into account existing 
customary arrangements, Fitzpatrick (2005) warns that the chosen authority may not act in the 
interest of the community. The interests of higher authorities are obvious in acknowledging, 
selecting or appointing certain authorities, thereby creating new identities and a sense of 
belonging among the locals, which may fragment communities (Agrawal, 2001; Ribot, 2007).  
Although institutional pluralism is expected to improve local participation, the issue of 
accountability remains crucial. The creation of decentralised authorities without making them 
accountable in practice to their constituency may fail to ensure local participation and 
empowerment (Larson et al., 2010; Ribot et al., 2008). It also rests on the assumption that 
local actors have access to the same level playing field and are able to exercise the same 
powers as higher-level institutions. Agrawal (2001) shows that, despite being accountable to 
locals, elected local government is easily susceptible to political manipulation and domination 
by local political elites, thereby further isolating the marginalised poor. On the basis of 
findings from francophone West Africa, Ribot (1999a) suggests that with democratic 
decentralisation of rural institutions and representation rarely genuine powers and rights of 
decisions are transferred to representative local bodies. One of the downsides of institutional 
pluralism is that it could result in community fragmentation, conflict between institutions and 
locals, and competition between different institutions (Bose, 2009c; Larson et al., 2010).  
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3.3 CONTEXT, STUDY AREA AND METHOD  
 
3.3.1 Tribal Forest Institutions in Colonial and Post-Colonial India 
Many of the struggles for rights to use or exploit land and forest have been critical in Indian 
politics, particularly those in the so-called scheduled areas (henceforth interchangeably used 
with tribal areas).
12
 The forest in these areas is not just an economic resource for livelihood, 
but also forms a basis for the social and cultural identity of tribal people. Before the 
eighteenth century, the small kingdoms and princely states managed the forest, land and 
natural resources in their territories. During the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, 
British colonial rule in India introduced scientific forestry and ‘acquired by conquest and 
cession large tracts of forest land’ (Schug, 2000: 230). In 1864, the Indian Forest Department 
was established along with forest-related laws and policies that served the purpose of timber 
extraction for the colonial government of India (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). This so-called 
scientific forestry demarcated and categorized villages and forest areas, and created forest 
reserves by excluding and evicting forest people (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Sivaramakrishnan, 
1999). The rights of forest-dependent people to forestland were simply ignored rendering 
them illegal (Bose et al., 2012) Given the increasing demand for timber, the number of forest 
officers to guard the forests (to keep forest people away) increased from 10,000 to more than 
132,000 during the twentieth century. The demarcated forestland under the control of the 
Forest Department increased to over one-fifth of India’s total land area (Gadgil and Guha, 
1992; Schug, 2000). Explaining the situation of forest people’s loss of forest resources due to 
dispossession by the Forest Department under the British India regime, Wilson (1961: 64) 
narrates:  
 
[Forest resources] were vital to [villagers’] well-being and always they had 
taken them where they could find them. And then an authority came into being 
which denied them what they had always looked upon as their rights. They 
fought most bitterly, and indeed understandably, against the new tyranny. They 
had neither the education nor the intelligence to realise that their little village 
forests were fast disappearing and that, if the process continued, the country 
would become uninhabitable.  
 
As a result of the strict enforcement of forest legislation, the number of forest offences 
committed by forest people increased dramatically.
13
 Any new statutory forest laws that made 
                                                 
12
 Scheduled Areas under the Indian Constitution is an administrative term to designate an area with a high 
density of tribal population. We use tribal areas interchangeably with the scheduled areas without changing the 
legal definition.  
13
 Forest offences from a formal statutory legal perspective; local communities in contrast perceived their use of 
the forest as legitimate on the basis of their system of customary rights pertaining to the use of forest and its 
resources.  
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another customary forest right of the tribal people illegal only aggravated the ongoing tribal 
resistance that led to all kinds of retaliation such as breaches of the forest law or attacks on 
forest officials and government property. In many parts of India, collective social movements 
during the colonial period gained momentum because of the will to restore local forest rights, 
but most of these tribal movements lost against the repressive capacity of the forest 
administration (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). Even in post-colonial 
India, the forest administration considered traditional forest rights a hindrance to sustainable 
forest management and made no attempt to recognize the customary local institutions and 
legitimize customary authority (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). In other words, there was continuity 
between colonial and post-colonial forestry regimes in the sense that the ownership of 
forestland remained under the authority of the Forest Department. 
However, in response to the national human rights movement and the global trend towards 
decentralised natural resource management, the tribal areas also became an object of national 
legal reforms. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the politico-legal and administrative 
provisions have promoted various new participatory and decentralised institutions as an 
attempt to involve local people in protecting degraded forest. These reforms have led to a 
situation of legal pluralism in tribal areas and in turn have resulted in institutional pluralism, 
with new institutions that overlap and compete with customary practices of regulation of 
access to forestland and its resources.  
 
Source: fieldwork of lead author (2007–10) 
 
Figure 3.1: Institutional pluralism and authority in decentralised forest management in 
a tribal village, India 
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Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the existing institutions and authority relations in 
decentralised forest management in the study area and their date of introduction. Initially, the 
forest was managed under an informal customary institution, based on shared customs and 
practices, with flexible rules changing over time to accommodate the needs of local 
community members. Unlike in several African countries colonized by the British, neither 
tribal customary institutions nor forest people’s rights were deemed legitimate under the law 
during colonial rule, and tribal people were stripped of their forest rights. However, to date in 
many parts of tribal India, these customary collective and individual forest rights are 
considered legitimate by the local communities (Bose et al., 2010b).  
The Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme was introduced in the 1990s by the 
central government and executed by the Forest Department, to protect and regenerate 
degraded forestland with villagers’ participation. The Indian Forest Department ‘has policing 
and quasi-judicial powers, with powers to judge, fine and imprison offenders’ (Blaikie and 
Springate-Baginski, 2007: 73 - italics in original). The JFM programme failed to recognize 
the traditional rights of tribal communities because the traditional forest boundary and the 
term ‘degraded forestland’ remained open to the discretion of the Forest Department (Saigal, 
2000; Saito-Jensen and Jensen, 2010). The top-down ‘participation’ approach that was 
adopted lacked downward accountability and imposed Forest Department rules and 
management plans had to meet criteria of scientific forest management that directly conflicted 
with the existing local practices and rights (Sundar, 2000a; Sunderlin et al., 2008). 
The third type of institution relevant for forest management in tribal areas is the panchayati 
raj. Formal political decentralisation in most tribal areas came into effect under the 
constitutional provisions of the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas (PESA) legislation 
in 1996. With this legislation, the sarpanch (elected head) of the gram panchayat (village 
government body) became downwardly accountable to the gram sabhas (village council 
consisting of all persons aged 18 years or more who live in the area covered by the gram 
panchayat; the gram sabha elects the sarpanch for five years), as was already the case in the 
rest of India, and was given decision-making authority over minor forest products. There was 
confusion about what constituted minor forest products. However, the implementation of 
PESA has failed for many reasons, particularly local elite capture, the lack of empowerment 
of the poor in the villages, the non-devolution of discretionary decision-making powers to the 
village council and a general lack of accountability of the panchayati raj (Bose et al., 2010b; 
Kurup, 2008; Sarin et al., 2003; Sundar et al., 2001 ).  
Another relevant institution is the mahila samitis, meaning women’s groups, which were 
created with the financial support of the Ministry of Tribal Welfare. Forest management is not 
a mandatory role, but many samitis take initiatives to protect and manage non-timber forest 
products. Agarwal (2009) suggests that the higher proportions of women in forest committees 
increases their knowledge of group rules and political participation. The fifth institution refers 
to the landmark attempt of the central government to undo historic injustice perpetrated on the 
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tribal communities by recognizing their traditional forest rights. The Forest Rights Act 2006 
(FRA) introduced FRA committees at village, district and state level to assess the individual 
and collective forest tenure claims and recognize these rights if the right holders could 
provide sufficient proof to underscore their claim. At village level, the FRA executive 
committee includes the village-level government officials from multiple line ministries, 
including the departments of panchayati raj, tribal welfare, revenue and the Forest 
Department. Apart from being upwardly accountable to the sub-district-level FRA committee, 
the village FRA committees are downwardly accountable to the village council.   
 
3.3.2 The Study Area: Banswara Tribal District, Rajasthan  
Rajasthan is the largest state of India in terms of total geographical area: 342,239 sq. km. The 
majority of the area is arid or semi-arid land. The total natural forest of Rajasthan is about 9.5 
per cent of that state’s total land area, which is one of the lowest compared to other Indian 
states. In contrast, the state has the largest proportion of ‘wasteland’, about 20 per cent of the 
total wasteland in the country. As per the 2001 census, the scheduled tribe population of 
Rajasthan is seven million, constituting 12.6 per cent of the population of Rajasthan and 8.4 
per cent of the total scheduled tribe population in India. District-wise distribution shows that 
the state’s highest tribal population concentration (72.3 per cent) is in Banswara district, 
which is located in the southernmost part of Rajasthan. The Bhil are the third largest 
scheduled tribe in India. Banswara district is sub-divided into three sub-divisions which are 
further divided into five tehsils and eight development blocks. Until the 1980s, Bhil 
communities were able to maintain their customary practices over forestland and its resources 
to a large extent, despite pressure from the Forest Department (Deliège, 1985). 
The fieldwork for this research was conducted in five Bhil dominated villages, which were 
part of two gram panchayats, P1 and P2, in Bagidora and Kushalgarh sub-districts 
respectively of Banswara district.
14
 Three villages (B1, B2 and B3) from the P1 gram 
panchayat and two villages (K1 and K2) from the P2 gram panchayat were selected. 
Geographically, the research covers two development blocks of Banswara district where the 
JFM programme was implemented in the 1990s, and the implementation of the Forest Rights 
Act was started in 2007. The total population of the five villages is approximately 2,000, and 
the majority (99 per cent) of the population consists of Bhil tribal people. The region is 
drought prone and poverty stricken, and in the past five years two consecutive droughts have 
led to out-migration of male members from these villages (Bose et al., 2010b). An average 
land holding is two to three acres (about one hectare) per household. The majority (90 per 
cent) of households do not have access to piped water, electricity or tarmac roads, and some 
families inhabit falias (hamlets) inside the village forest area. Typically, the land is undulating 
hilly terrain and agriculture is rain-fed. The region’s dry deciduous forest is either degraded or 
                                                 
14
 The gram panchayats P1 (in Bagidora sun-districts’ B1, B2 and B3 villages) and P2 (in Kushalgarh sub-
districts’ K1 and K2 villages) are pseudonym, as are the names of the five villages used in this chapter.   
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devoid of trees. Fodder, leaves, fruits, bamboo and fuelwood are the main non-timber forest 
products and highly valuable for the poor Bhil tribal households, particularly for women and 
the landless.  
  
3.3.3 Method  
The empirical data are drawn from fieldwork conducted between 2007 and 2010 by the lead 
author of this paper. A combination of qualitative methods, such as in-depth interviews, 
observations and focus-group discussions, was used to collect data about the existing local 
institutions in each village. In each village, interviews were held with up to 142 villagers 
about the functioning of decentralised forest management. Focus-group discussions were 
conducted in two phases: before and after the FRA committees were created. Each focus-
group discussion with customary institutional authorities, executive committee members of 
JFM and FRA committees, women’s groups and gram panchayats lasted about three to four 
hours. Individual in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with Forest Department 
authorities (two beat guards, one range forest officer and an interim district forest officer) and 
two senior staff of an NGO to understand their perspective. Field observation – regarding 
functioning of multiple institutions and authority – included attending executive committee 
meetings, leadership training and gram sabhas; visits to the forest area with local 
communities (for example during harvesting and distribution of fodder); assessing individual 
and collective forestland claims; and attending traditional leaders’ informal meetings. The 
discussions and interviews were conducted in Hindi, the Bhilli tribal dialect and the 
Rajasthani language and later translated into English, coded and used for qualitative analysis. 
Most of the focus-group discussions were audio and/or video recorded with the prior consent 
of the respondents.  
 
3.4 CASE STUDY FINDINGS  
 
This section provides the findings about Bhil tribal people’s perspective on both modern and 
traditional collective forest tenure rights and authority relations under the various reforms. We 
begin with the customary institution, followed by the JFM, gram panchayats, mahila samitis 
and the FRA committees (see Table 3.1).  
 
3.4.1 Customary Institutions  
Customary institutions – those rules and norms arising from the shared customs and practices 
of local communities – are not legitimized by the government in the study villages, but they 
are legitimate in the eyes of poor tribal villagers. Because their forest use was rendered illegal 
by the Forest Department there were no formal rules with respect to their use of the forest and 
therefore customary ways of using and managing resources remained important also as a way 
to claim (collective) access to forest resources, which was particularly important for the poor. 
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Table 3.1. Profile of study villages in Banswara District, Rajasthan 
 
Panchayats P1 P2 
Villages B1 B2 B3 K1 K2 
Village profile 
- Forest area (ha) 
- Population 
- Households 
- BPL hhs
a
 
- STs
b
 
- Others  
 
110 
340 
46 
10 
100% 
Nil 
 
140 
923 
139 
41 
95% 
5% 
 
110 
455 
70 
18 
100% 
Nil 
 
50 
438 
73 
10 
99% 
1% 
 
100 
233 
35 
5 
100% 
Nil 
Customary group 
- Role in forest 
management 
 
Jointly manages 
forestland and its 
resources  
 
Inactive 
 
Resolves conflicts and 
claims collective forestland  
JFM committee 
- Active years 
- Forest status 
- Committee 
 
1999–2007 
Degraded forest 
Defunct 
 
2002–09 
Denuded 
Defunct 
 
1996–2006 
Teak and sal trees protected 
Dissolved  
Gram panchayat 
a. Sarpanch 
b. Forest  
 
Male from elite tribal family; in 2
nd
 term 
Before FRA, panchayat had shown no 
interest  
 
Male from elite tribal 
family 
Panchayat involved 
partially 
Mahila samitis 
- Established in 
- Forest rights 
 
  2002– 
Inactive 
 
 1997– 
 Inactive 
 
2000– 
Active role 
 
1998–2005 
Active without authority 
FRA committee  
- Established in 
- Household forestland 
claim 
- Collective forestland 
claim 
 
2008  
44 claims 
Not 
claimed 
 
2008  
110 claims 
Not 
claimed 
 
2008  
61 claims 
Not claimed 
 
2008  
58 claims 
Rejected 
 
2008  
24 claims 
Rejected 
Source: fieldwork of lead author (2007-10)  
Note: a. Below Poverty Line households (BPL hhs) constitute 23 per cent of the total households in the five 
selected study villages as per the Census of India (2001). b. STs or the Scheduled Tribes are mainly Bhil tribal 
people. 
 
Local customary authority positions are held by elders – men and women – from a group of 
neighbouring hamlets that may or may not be similar to administrative (revenue) village 
boundaries. Prior to the state forest demarcation, households from the study villages 
collectively managed the forest under customary arrangements. This is evident, for example, 
in the P2 panchayat villages (K1 and K2) where the customary elders negotiated on the 
forestland boundaries, managing the local conflicts related to the forest access and use, and in 
the management of collective forest rights. Thereafter, under the state forest regime, they 
managed forest resources within the limits set by repression through the Forest Department. 
Despite the fact that many local customary practices of forest management are illegal 
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according to the government, Bhil people in the study area use to customary authority 
whenever there is need to settle inter-village conflicts over usufructs benefit sharing rights or 
to make a plan for protection of forestland to generate fodder. For example, during the 
consecutive two-drought years (between 2008 and 2010), the functioning of customary 
authority was critical (in B1, B2, K1 and K2) because they solved the problem of fodder 
distribution (without consulting the forest officials) by enclosing the wasteland. The 
customary authority decided to distribute the fodder based on the household’s socio-economic 
demands (as against ‘equal’ bundles for all rules introduced by the JFM committees).   
The perspective of tribal people towards customary authority was in general positive, 
particularly among the poor and landless households. The major reasons put forward by 
people interviewed in the study area were:  
 transparent decision making on rights access, and management of forest; 
 resource sharing was on the basis of the livelihood socio-economic situation of the 
tribal households, so that the poor and landless tribal families could benefit;  
 conflict resolution over benefit sharing between hamlets or kinship groups; and  
 elders provided proof for individuals to claim forestland under the – the FRA.  
However, in village B3, the majority of new generation male relatives of the village elders 
(customary authorities) joined the gram panchayat, resulting in manipulation of customary 
forest rules. This young group of elite tribal family members misleadingly claimed individual 
rights on forestland, which was collectively managed forestland according to the villagers. In 
contrast, the forest area of villages B1 and B2 was managed jointly by customary authority 
(approximately 250 hectares), but their claims on collective forest management were ignored 
by the district Forest Department. Likewise, villagers of K1 and K2 reasserted their collective 
forest rights through claims on historical custom, but failed to gain any statutory recognition.  
The village-level Forest Department officials neither supported nor openly opposed 
customary institutions. One of the beat guards explained that the risk associated with 
legitimizing customary institution was that the forest administration would lose authority over 
forestland and its resources, which is an important source of revenue for the Forest 
Department. A range forest officer suggested that the local customs were not rigid and 
therefore allowed room to manoeuvre claims, making them difficult to implement or 
acknowledge, unlike the formal rules that are easy to generalize, implement and monitor. 
However, the customary authorities are finding themselves in the important role of providing 
proofs to those individuals applying for forestland title claims through the newly created FRA 
committees.   
 
3.4.2 Joint Forest Management (JFM) Committees  
As per the Rajasthan state guidelines, the JFM programme was implemented by creating JFM 
committees in the study area by the Forest Department with financial aid from a Japanese 
development agency. Despite the fact that the forest area map was prepared by means of a 
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participatory approach involving local people, the end result was always at the discretion of 
forest officials. There existed no consensus or criteria on what constituted degraded forest and 
what constituted forest, and this helped the forest service to extend control over land by 
classifying it as forest and put it under a more strict management regime. For example, in B1 
and B2 villages the gauchar (grazing) land as well as forest fallows were categorized as forest 
and came under JFM regulations, along with some forestland with root-stock of teak (Tectona 
grandis), tendu (Diospyros melanoxylon) and sal (Shorea robusta) trees. After the JFM 
official map was prepared, these newly categorized degraded forests were no longer available 
as pastureland, which otherwise was highly valuable to poor tribal households for open-
grazing their livestock.  
The Forest Department created the JFM committees in the study villages. In doing so they 
excluded village elders (particularly those involved in customary forest management) and 
women from active roles. Instead, those who had a close relationship with the forest beat 
guard and range officer were ‘offered’ (not democratically chosen) a post on the executive 
committee. Although the village elders were excluded, they occasionally used their customary 
authority to bypass the village JFM regulations, for example by allowing non-members to 
access non-timber forest products. Typically, a JFM committee was created in the forest area 
demarcated for a village, but not all villagers became members by default. Those who failed 
to pay the monthly membership fees and/or offer voluntary service, mostly the poor and 
landless, were left out. In villages K1 and K2, a combined JFM committee was created due to 
pressure from the village elders to follow the traditional forest boundary. Later, B1 and B2 
villages also demanded that the JFM committee in their customary forest boundary be 
combined for the two villages plus a hamlet from an adjoining tribal village. According to the 
ex-chairperson of the JFM committee, this was possible because of the customary authority’s 
strong hold over the villagers. The JFM committee members (excluding the landless and other 
non-members) became actively involved in protecting, regenerating and even planting on 
what was otherwise grazing land in return for parts of the revenues of these activities and in 
the expectation of being granted statutory recognition of their collective forest tenure rights.   
The chief executive of a local NGO argued that the JFM created hope among different 
groups of tribal people that they would gain collective rights. However, in practice, funding 
that brought in development work such as construction of village wells, plantations (for 
example, bamboo and jatropha), stone-wall fencing of the forest area, collective purchase of 
tractor and generator, and partial funding support to women’s credit groups, was more of an 
incentive to participate in the JFM. The major changes resulting from the JFM from the Bhil 
people’s perspective were: 
 standardized and conditional participation based on the requirement to pay 
membership fees instead of inclusive membership of all villagers;  
 entitlement of members to 25 per cent of income from timber sales;  
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 equal distribution of revenue among members from the sale of non-timber forest 
products;  
 fodder was shared equally among those who were members of the JFM; however, 
those excluded lost resources (as compared to the need-based distribution in the 
customary system); and  
 creation of the village forest boundary wall as a safeguard against intruders.  
This was a de facto enclosure of the forest, and reduced possibilities for open-grazing or 
fuelwood collection, because the non-members were excluded from access to otherwise 
common resources. Lack of access to forest resources forced members of Bhil households 
from this village to migrate for seasonal labour and tribal women to breach forest 
management rules imposed by JFM institutions and often created conflicts. However, 
according to JFM members, it was accepted in the hope of receiving benefits from the JFM’s 
village development investment. The forest officials introduced the concept of ‘guarding’ the 
forests by making Bhils rotationally take charge of protecting the forest and collect fees from 
every household to manage the forest. The defaulter and trespasser or those who breached the 
rules, mostly women and landless Bhils who may or may not be JFM members, were fined 
(non-negotiable) by the JFM committee members. The authority to collect fines was 
delegated by the Forest Department.  
In all the study villages, JFM committee members were denied income from the final tree 
felling by forest officials claiming that the JFM benefit sharing agreement about timber sales 
had been amended. This led to massive ‘illegal’ collective felling of regenerated trees, 
according to villagers, to express their discontent with the JFM executive committee members 
and forest officials.  Similarly, in village B3, villagers had to fight with a local forest guard – 
an ex-officio JFM authority – who was trying to harvest fodder from their forestland. The 
majority of the villagers reverted to village elders to secure their individual and collective 
forestland and forest resource rights claims. By 2006, all the JFM committees in the study 
area had become defunct and dissolved mainly for the above reasons, in addition to the end of 
donor funding, failure to devolve the authority and lack of statutory recognition of the JFM 
committees.  
 
3.4.3 Gram Panchayats – Elected Local Government  
Through the PESA of 1996, in tribal areas the panchayat was supposed to be legitimized by 
the state to have political, financial and administrative authority to manage village land and its 
resources. In the study area, the gram panchayats managed more than one village and the 
elected chairman belonged to a politically well-connected elite family (see Table 3.1). Our 
enquiry in the study villages revealed that the majority of tribal households have no idea of 
the role and authority of PESA. About three-quarters of elite households including executive 
members of the gram panchayat have heard about PESA, but are unaware of what functions 
and resources it delegates to the gram panchayat. The PESA act provides the gram panchayat 
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with authority to control, manage and trade non-timber forest products. This on the one hand 
meant loss of local communities’ rights to forest products and on the other hand meant an 
unexpected liaison between the Forest Department and the gram panchayat to monopolize the 
revenue earned from the sale of the resources.  
The sarpanch of the P1 panchayat mentioned that, despite the fact that in practice political 
and administrative devolution from the state government was absent, the panchayat made its 
own rules to control, manage and sell non-timber forest produce. However, this was done 
without the consent of the majority of the village council. The decision of the sarpanch to 
appropriate non-timber forest products was challenged and rejected by the majority of the 
gram sabha members (mostly poor forest-dependent tribal households), which made the 
panchayat withdraw the decision. Nevertheless, the panchayat continues to hold the sole 
authority to market the tendu leaves in the area under its jurisdiction (villages B1, B2 and 
B3).
15
 The income from this sale, according to the sarpanch, helps in village development 
work. However, villagers are unaware about any village development fund because of a lack 
of transparency and accountability on the part of the panchayat.  
Interestingly, the P2 panchayat had played an active role in executing its authority over 
access to, and use of, forest resources such as mahua (Maduca longifolia) flowers, jatropha 
seeds and tendu leaves. Along with some of the JFM executive committee members, the 
sarpanch of P2 panchayat created a new panchayat rule with regard to distribution of 
benefits. The sale of non-timber forest products to traders came under authority of the 
sarpanch and denied access to poor forest-dependent Bhil families (after 2006). However, this 
decision of the sarpanch cost him his political office in the next gram panchayat election, and 
the newly elected sarpanch immediately amended the marketing rule in favour of the 
villagers. So, there was a degree of democratic control over non-timber forest products 
managed through PESA. Moreover, the newly elected sarpanch gained his popularity during 
his election campaign by promising to use his authority (if elected) to give title deeds for all 
individual forestland claims made via the FRA, irrespective of whether the land had been 
occupied for the specified time period. Almost all well-to-do households (K1 and K2) paid 
Indian Rupees 100 (approximately US$ 2.5) off the record for the application form to make 
their individual forestland claim to encroach on forestland that they had not been using. 
According to a tribal woman, chairperson of the P2 JFM committee, those households unable 
to pay the bribe to get their individual ‘customary’ land title deeds opposed the sarpanch and 
local forest officials.  
In none of the study villages, had sarpanchs or other executive members of the panchayat 
ever attended the JFM committee meetings. According to the executive members of the 
panchayats, the JFM committee was not a statutory body, and it was not necessary to create 
another institution alongside the panchayat, because it diluted the panchayat’s authority. 
                                                 
15
 Tendu leaves are used for rolling beedis (local cigarettes) and provide high revenue from their sale. The 
villagers get a daily wage based on the number of leaves collected, dried and rolled in bundles.  
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Nonetheless, the sarpanch and JFM committees often collaborated to control forest resources 
to earn revenue. In general, the gram sabhas of panchayats are held bi-annually mainly to 
report the progress of village developments. The majority of the villagers interviewed 
suggested that they were either unaware of the gram sabha meetings or did not attend because 
such meetings were not participatory and their opinions were never sought. Although the 
gram panchayat is not ruled by party politics, political parties try to influence its decisions 
through the sarpanch – for or against – the collective forest management rights of tribal 
people.    
 
3.4.4 Mahila Samitis – Women’s Committees 
The formal mahila samitis (see Table 3.1) in the study villages were created with the financial 
assistance of a local NGO. Their main aim was to empower women and help them become 
economically independent. With funding from external institutions, women were asked to 
participate to receive endowment grants – starting capital for collective enterprise – that 
would raise their household socio-economic status. Mainly women from middle-income 
households were excluding those who belonged to well-off and poor households because the 
well-off women were considered to be manipulative in credit activities, while the poor 
households did not had secured income and often were defaulters in paying back credits. In 
the absence of a JFM in the villages, women took the initiative even though it was not a 
mandate of their committee to protect and share the non-timber forest products equitably 
among the households. At present, these women’s group are active in promoting credit 
schemes, thereby limiting the activities of tribal elite families’ land mortgaging business as 
well as an external money lender’s role in the village. In villages K1 and K2, there were no 
women’s groups because the ex-sarpanch withdrew his approval to create the samitis under 
the influence of local money lenders who feared competition in credit provision. A minority 
of women respondents held the opinion that such committees further promoted the 
mainstream definition of women’s gendered domestic roles.  
Women participated very little in forest management projects. The main reason given by 
women in the study area for minimal participation in externally driven projects was that it was 
unclear what their role would be and how their active involvement would benefit their 
household subsistence. According to the mahila samiti president of villages K1 and K2, 
women were excluded from village planning and JFM decision making. Likewise, according 
to women, the reservation quota in the JFM, panchayat and FRA only further excluded their 
active participation and gave limited scope to a few elite selected or elected women to voice 
poor tribal women’s problems (see Bose, 2011a). Illiteracy and changing expectations of 
women’s roles within households, and to some extent the gender-biased perception of project 
development workers including male forest officials and NGO staff, further hampered 
women’s participation.  
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According to the Bhil women, the role of mahila samitis in forest management was marginal 
due to: 
 the exclusionary structure of mahila samitis – that is, through the creation of a 
separate entity without men and apart from men-oriented activities of distribution 
of property rights or forest resource access; 
 the general perception of the village-level forest officials and ward members of 
panchayats that illiterate tribal women hinder development activities;   
 the pressure on women to assimilate into mainstream culture, thereby limiting tribal 
women’s traditional participation in public life and eventually their active 
involvement in JFM and panchayat meetings; 
 the promotion of literate women from elite and politically connected households 
(with little or no interest in forest-based activities) to represent women on JFM, 
panchayat or FRA committees;  
The majority of women from villages B1, B2 and B3 expressed the view that lack of statutory 
recognition of traditional collective forest rights may have a negative impact on their struggle 
for forest rights. Furthermore, the women’s perspective about pre-existing customary practice 
was that it gave them unrestricted authority to collect fuelwood and fodder, and they had an 
important position in the forest management decision-making process. This was in contrast to 
external institutions that required them to be passive participants (because of illiteracy, the 
reservation quota and changing restrictive social gender ideologies) in forest management (see 
also Bose, 2011a).  
 
3.4.5 Forest Rights Act (FRA) Committees  
The Tribal Welfare Department is in principle the nodal agency for implementing the FRA. 
They created village-level FRA committees in the study area. A unique feature in the 
implementation of the FRA is that, even though the Tribal Welfare Department is the nodal 
agency, the Forest Department as well as the Revenue Department are in practice equal 
partners in the village FRA executive committee, in addition to representatives from the 
villages. Interestingly, the JFM executive committee members were excluded; instead, people 
who were well-connected to gram panchayats were nominated for these positions. Exclusion 
was justified by the local Forest Department officials on the grounds that authority should be 
delegated in a new institution to new people. More than 50 per cent of respondents said that 
this exclusion further adversely affected the already defunct JFM programme in the villages 
because the JFM committee members lost credibility. The FRA executive committee 
members were selected by the government officials without the knowledge and consent of the 
gram sabhas. Nevertheless, they were given authority to approve or reject the forest tenure 
rights of their fellow villagers. From the executive committee’s perspective, their authority 
was limited because the ultimate decision about approval (or rejection) remained with the 
FRA committees at the district and the state level.  
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The majority of FRA committee members interviewed explained that the FRA process is 
decentralised in such a way that the preliminary decisions about the allocation of tenure rights 
happen at the village level, whereas the final decisions are still made by the powerful state-
level monitoring committee. None of the executive committee members in the five study 
villages was fully aware of the individual or communal land tenure provisions of the FRA. 
The executive committee members expressed the view that their knowledge of the FRA was 
limited to the information provided by the village-level Forest Department as well as Revenue 
Department officials, and that there was no information from the Tribal Welfare Department 
in the case study area. The key responsibility and authority delegated to the FRA committee 
was to scrutinize individual forestland claims and to approve or reject them in consultation 
with the sarpanch and the ex-officio members (from Forest, Revenue and Tribal Welfare 
Departments) before forwarding them to the district-level FRA committee.  
The functioning of the village FRA committee, according to more than three-quarters of 
the interviewees, hindered the existing institutional arrangements for community forest 
management. The main hindering factors were that the village FRA committees:  
 approved individual tenure rights claims to forestland that had previously been 
managed collectively under the JFM programme and informally by customary 
institutions that were not in actual use by the individuals filing a request;  
 sought approval of the village elders for individual land-claim proofs without 
recognizing their authority or traditional rules and practices of collective forest 
management;  
 attempted to establish new claims of authority and legitimacy by negotiating with 
those people favouring their (the FRA committee’s) actions and justifications – this 
further divided the people with respect to the issue of collective rights. In village 
B3, for example, the FRA committee persuaded the JFM committee and elders to 
approve their decisions; and 
 re-defined the very concept of access to forestland and forest resources and 
nullified all the rights local people held previously by custom or practice by 
changing the village bye-laws with respect to forest management.  
The active attitude of customary elders in villages K1 and K2 led to an initiative for 
claiming collective forest tenure rights through the FRA committees. However, their claim 
was rejected by the district-level FRA committee. With this experience, the villagers felt 
neglected because they were excluded from the decision-making process and from setting the 
criteria for determining collective rights. The other study villages did not make any such 
attempt to apply for collective forest rights. One of the reasons was that the village level 
forest officials managing the FRA process did not make any deliberate attempt to mobilize the 
community despite its legal provisions on collective right.   
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3.5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
In this section, we focus on the two key issues emerging out of the studied decentralised 
forest governance reform: (1) the creation of contradictory authority relations and overlapping 
claims and rights; and (2) the dynamics of institutional pluralism. The case studies of the five 
tribal villages show the complex dynamics of institutional pluralism affecting the 
management of already degraded forests in the tribal areas of India.  
Tribal people have a history of contestation about forest rights that traces back to the 
establishment of the Forest Department. Colonial law annulled customary rights of tribal 
people, however in practice they continued using forest resources illegally, which was 
regulated by their own customary rules and authorities. Since the early 1990s, a number of 
newly introduced institutions have further restricted tribal people’s access to forest resources. 
It started with the JFM programme, which was meant to increase participation in forest 
management but in reality led to the exclusion of specific user groups and the extension of 
control of the Forest Department over forest use through the JFM committees, which operated 
under the technical guidelines of the Forest Department. This form of community-based forest 
management led to the exclusion of (mostly marginalised) people from grazing and NTFPs. 
Then, with the PESA implemented by the Ministry of the Panchayati Raj, the gram 
panchayat was given authority over minor forest produce that overlapped and contradicted 
both the JFM and informal customs and practices of tribal people. Even though the panchayat 
is an elected local government body, they were in practice not accountable to the gram sabha. 
In fact, panchayats often misused their authority in the research area. Mahila samitis can be 
considered as an attempt by another line ministry to empower women by creating an 
exclusive women’s group. This enabled women to some extent to raise their claims for 
collective forest rights even though the samitis did not have a mandate in forest management. 
Lastly, the introduction of the FRA committees, under the aegis of the Ministry of Tribal 
Affairs introduced hopes about the recognition of the collective rights of tribal people, but in 
practice it has so far focused on individual forestland rights. The individual forestland rights 
overlapped and contradicted the collective forest management within other existing 
institutions.         
 
3.5.1 Contradictory Authority and Rights 
A core policy dilemma in the implementation of decentralisation and forest tenure reform is 
the complex relationship between customary practices and rights, and formal rules and 
institutions put in place by the government. Interestingly, although the government does not 
recognize customary institutions and authority, has appropriated forestland, and claimed full 
management authority in the past, it has now recognised and even legalized some rights 
(excluding land alienation rights) of the forest people through the introduction of the FRA. 
However, this is something different from recognizing local authority. What binds the 
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customary institutions, as in the case of Bhil tribal villages, is that (1) who can access the 
forest and when and how the harvest will be distributed can be negotiated on the basis of 
needs and availability of resources, and (2) sanctions can be negotiated by the rule-breaker 
depending on the degree of offence. Precisely this power to negotiate rights is taken away by 
the various line ministries through the new institutions (JFM committee, FRA committee, 
mahila samitis) they set up over the past decades.  
The easiest way for the government to deal with the customary land tenure system was to 
codify some of the customary practices, lay down collective rights on forestland and resource 
use in a written law – the FRA (Bose et al., 2012; Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). However, the 
new institutions (JFM, PESA, FRA) still did not recognize the decision-making authority of 
the village elders to manage these collective resources, and this created contestation within 
the village. In practice, in all five case studies, the recognition by the state government of 
collective forest rights (either existing and/or externally-induced) in favour of the local Bhil 
committees did not even happen. Instead, the poor were excluded from access to forestland 
and resources through the JFM, the panchayat claimed authority over NTFPs. Individual 
rights for a few people have been approved at the village level as a result of the discretionary 
decision-making power of the FRA committees. In addition, the promise of the candidate for 
gram panchayat to provide individual forestland titling rights to everyone (who elected him 
as sarpanch) led to a fundamental change in the tribal people’s perception of, and 
identification with, customary practices of collective forest management. Tribal people fear 
losing access to their forestland and therefore rush to get title deeds to that land and to obtain 
individual land rights (see Bose et al., 2012). So, both in its legal texts (FRA) and in practice, 
the India government privileges some rights and authorities above others, which leads to new 
claims and conflicts (cf. Roberts and Mann, 1991).  
Top-down, various government departments have created and delegated new authorities 
that cover various aspects of forest management, such as non-timber forest products by the 
panchayat and collective forest management through the JFM programme, which compete 
with the existing authority. This is qualitatively different from allocating collective rights to 
manage forestland and constructing authority from below by the tribal gram sabhas. The 
authority and discretionary decision-making ability of customary authority became marginal 
with the creation of, and the authority attributed to, new local institutions by the state.  
 
3.5.2 Institutional Pluralism  
Despite the claim that institutional pluralism is able to bring benefits to local communities and 
opens space for claim making and negotiation (see Ostrom, 1999; Leach and Fairhead, 2001), 
our case study findings indicate that institutional pluralism has become a way of subjugation 
by the line ministries. Even though the Tribal Welfare Department is the nodal agency for the 
FRA, they are dependent on the Forest Department for the execution and planning, primarily 
because the land under question is controlled by the Forest Department (since its 
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establishment during the colonial period), and also because of the sheer manpower capacity of 
the Forest Department, which is the only line ministry with sufficient outreach to reach 
village level. Therefore, the Forest Department was able to exert control through a few elite 
members within the tribal villages through this new institution. In this way, new authority was 
created at grassroots level which helps the Forest Department to extend its influence, while 
avoiding direct confrontations with the tribal people. For the village-level JFM and FRA 
committees, every intervention needed approval from above under the guise of participation 
and representation. These externally induced institutions became an object of competition 
between line ministries, lack an inclusive approach and fail to provide for poor tribal people. 
Institutional pluralism is not promoting transparent and accountable governance of forest 
resources if (a) new institutions are promoted to serve the interest of government ministries 
without taking into account the local people’s custom, identity and history of struggle; (b) an 
elected local representative ‘is forced to compete and struggle with other local institutions for 
legitimacy’ (Ribot et al., 2008: 7); or (c) newly created parallel institutions obstruct or overlap 
with existing customary authority. In practice, this leads to a lack of legitimacy and 
representation of democratically elected institutions.    
    
3.6 CONCLUSION  
 
The findings indicate that rather than recognizing, reorganizing or running pre-existing local 
governance institutions, the government has instead invested in creating multiple new 
institutions in tribal areas of India. In this way, the state has been able to gain more control 
through decentralised forest tenure reform rather than devolve authority to locally 
representative democratic institutions and retains enough discretionary decision-making 
power not to acknowledge collective rights of forest land. Giving an example of rural 
Senegal, Ribot (2009: 121) argues that ‘rights are empty when the claims are not enforceable. 
Without being able to make significant decisions over material resources – forest, pastures, 
schools, hospitals, clinics and infrastructure – rural councils have no role. They are elected 
but cannot serve’. Like Senegal’s rural councils, gram panchayats in India are elected 
councils. Sarpanchs took decisions discretionarily without being accountable to the gram 
sabha. JFM committees managed forest resources within the directives developed by the 
Forest Department. Similarly, the FRA committees function under the administration of 
multiple line ministries without being representative of, or accountable to, local communities. 
These new institutions associated with new positions of authority have become the object of 
competition between different governmental ministries and continue to practice exclusionary 
approaches to forest resource management. 
Second, newly created institutions have brought new contradictory forms of authority 
relations. The typical approach adopted by government to deal with elite capture was to 
exclude the old elites. The government by choosing to work with the multiple institutions and 
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not completely devolving authority to sarpanches further encourages elite capture by 
empowering new elites at the cost of those who were considered legitimate before the tenure 
reform. This cannot be labelled democratic decentralisation. Avoiding one elite by 
legitimizing another has done nothing to enhance collective forest management. As Lund 
(2006: 700) points out, people are classed because although ‘plurality of institutions may open 
alternate avenues for some – also for poorer people – … the more affluent, the better 
connected, and the more knowledgeable tend to have the upper hand in such contexts’.   
Third, we illustrated that forest resources are still centrally controlled by the multiple line 
ministries in tribal India. Each of these line ministries issues and follows its own policies, 
which concern the same limited forest resources at local level. The new democratic 
decentralisation laws such as PESA and the FRA call for the immediate need to expose what 
Ribot (2009a: 121) calls the ‘frontier of decolonization’, that is, to prevent the line ministries 
from further colonizing the forestland and its resources. Without devolving the authority and 
organizing appropriate representation of the poor who primarily use the forest, any future 
attempts by the government to empower the local people (gram sabhas) will be futile.   
Fourthly, by recognizing and uniformly defining the ‘traditional rights’ of the forest 
people, through the FRA, the government has opened up a Pandora’s Box. Traditional rights 
are associated with the customs and practices of customary institutions and authority, which 
are dynamic and flexible to the changing situation in the tribal areas. Formalization of the 
traditional rights (through land title deeds and property rights) without recognizing customary 
authority and practice and its history fails to capture the flexibility and adaptability that are 
core characteristics of customary institutions. Moreover, it will fragment the tribal people’s 
collective hamlet-based approach towards forest access, use and management, and will 
promote further individualization of forestland rights.   
Thus, in this case, institutional pluralism restricts forest people’s collective forest rights 
and democratic decentralisation, and in turn gives the elite and line ministries more 
discretionary authority to control forests. There is a pressing need to address tribal people’s 
forest tenure reform by sorting out the ambiguities of local institutional pluralism and 
authority relations. This may contribute towards more strategic intervention in collective 
forest governance that may eventually lead to real empowerment of tribal people.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Individual Tenure, Citizenship 
& Conflicts 
 
Individual forest tenure claim in Bagidora sub-district in Rajasthan. 
Photo credit: Purabi Bose 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Citizenship is emerging as a key concept in the global debate on ‘belonging,’ particularly 
with respect to minorities like tribal people. Historic (customary) and present (legal) 
forms of belonging complicate the understanding of equality, rights, and entitlements. 
Identifying the dimension of emerging tribal people’s citizenship can elucidate their social 
struggle to claim their traditional belonging to forest land and their struggle for formal 
tenure rights.    
 
Previous chapters discussed the ways in which inherited colonial forest laws continued with 
making tribal people subjects rather than reinforcing their citizenship rights, and how 
institutional pluralism failed to empower them in claiming collective forest rights. Chapter 
4 examines how the new forest tenure legislation shaped tribal households’ ideas of 
citizenship and their related individual forest rights struggle.  
 
In particular, the three operational sub-questions are:   
 Why and how are choices for specific forest tenure rights made by tribal 
households? 
 In what ways are tribal households’ notions of forest rights related to citizenship?  
 How do conflicts prompt and/or suppress households’ forest tenure and citizenship 
claims?  
 
The micro-political analysis conducted here uses the concepts of individual tenure rights, 
citizenship, and conflicts at the tribal household level.  
 
 
 
This chapter is under review as part of special issue on ‘Conflict Management’ by Swedish 
University of Agriculture Sciences. Bose, P. (under review). Individual tenure rights, citizenship, 
and conflicts: outcomes from tribal India’s forest governance. Forest Policy and Economics  
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4  INDIVIDUAL TENURE RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND CONFLICTS: 
OUTCOMES FROM TRIBAL INDIA’S FOREST GOVERNANCE  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In India, forest-dependent tribal peoples’ right to forest land is gaining attention on the 
national political agenda. This paper examines how the new Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (also called Forest 
Rights Act) shapes tribal households’ claims to forest land rights. The paper analyses the 
micro-dynamics of the Forest Rights Act using three dimensions: individual tenure rights, 
citizenship, and conflict to discuss the contested nature of household-level tenure rights to 
forest land. The arguments are based on data collected over fifteen months (2008–10) using 
in-depth semi-structured interviews with 105 households (274 individual respondents) from 
six Bhil tribal villages and 34 line department officials in Banswara district, Rajasthan. The 
findings indicate that the forest tenure reform promoted the individualisation of forest right 
claims – thereby increasing Bhil tribal inter-household-level conflicts – and that households’ 
forest land tenure claims relate primarily to the formal recognition of their citizenship rights.  
 
Keywords: Forest Rights Act, tenure rights, citizenship, conflicts, tribal, India  
  
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The traditional forest tenure rights of indigenous people are increasingly recognised in many 
developing countries. Forests are an important source of income, and their actual 
contributions to rural and tribal livelihoods vary considerably (Sunderlin et al., 2003). This 
depends, in particular, on the interaction between locally specific forest property relations and 
larger political forces (Sikor, 2006; Larson et al., 2010). In general, tenure can be understood 
as who owns and who can use what resources and how. Current forest tenure reforms ‘range 
from titling of vast territories to indigenous communities, to the granting of small land areas 
for forest regeneration or the right to a share in timber revenues’ (Larson et al., 2010: 4). In 
most countries, forests are public property over which the government exercises jurisdiction 
on behalf of the nation (FAO, 2011). Different tenure systems exist that are based on 
exclusive rights (of an individual or collective), or for certain time, for example access only 
during particular seasons, for specific products ranging across dry fuel wood, fodder, timber 
harvests, and/or for certain type of lease depending on purpose (Larson et al., 2010). Forest 
tenure reform also creates new contradictions among various institutions that legitimise 
different tenure rights, and may create competing claims for resources (Fortmann, 1985; 
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Sikor, 2006; see chapter 3 of this book). For example, Couillard et al. (2009) argue, on the 
basis of their study in five African countries – Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda – that indigenous people have not benefitted from the legislative 
changes since the pre-colonial era, which have continuously influenced contemporary land 
acquisition with the land being unilaterally declared as state property. 
In a rapidly changing rural and/or tribal pluralist society, forest tenure is characterised by 
competing claims about who has the right to manage the forest, to make claims, how territory 
is demarcated, who decides, and who benefits from forest resources. Failure to address these 
issues in tenure reform may result in new conflicts. The underlying cause of conflicts in forest 
tenure reform is the creation of a new local institution and authority, often overlapping with 
the existing traditional institutions (see chapter 3 of this book). These often contradict 
customary rights and contemporary formal legislation (Colchester, 2008). These competing 
claims are common in countries that have been colonised (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; 
Lund, 2008; Bose et al., 2012).            
An important argument favouring decentralised forest tenure reform takes a human rights 
perspective which factors in the historical struggles of marginalised indigenous forest-
dependent people for traditional rights (White and Martin, 2002; Colchester, 2008; Sunderlin 
et al., 2008; Sikor and Stahl, 2011). In India, the schedule tribes’ struggle to maintain their 
forest rights has recently received attention through the Scheduled Tribes and Other 
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act 2006 (henceforth cited as the 
Forest Rights Act or in acronym the FRA) that aims to undo historical injustice by 
recognising their traditional forest rights. For effective implementation of the Forest Rights 
Act, to overcome inequalities and to increase people’s participation in decision making, 
citizenship rights are considered important. The scheduled tribes in India legally hold full 
citizenship rights to vote and/or to contest elections. However, citizenship rights are less 
exercised in many parts of tribal areas as compared to urban areas in relation to basic rights to 
services such as clean drinking water, shelter, food, sanitation, health, and education. 
Although the state is obliged to ensure these fundamental rights for its citizens, tribal people’s 
basic needs and rights, particularly in relation to access to natural resources to ensure 
livelihoods in the form of forest rights, are rarely met (Springate-Baginski and Blaikie, 2007; 
Sundar, 2011; Baviskar, 2012; Bose et al., 2012). Ideally, an individual’s citizenship rights 
should not be related to his/her identity (caste, class, ethnicity, religion), but in India identity 
to a large extent determines citizenship rights. Sundar (2011: 427) explains that the ‘Indian 
Constitution walks a fine line between recognising individual rights in the polity (prohibition 
of discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, caste, sex, etc.) and legitimising group 
identity (notably caste and religion).’ Identifying the emerging perception of tribal people’s 
citizenship can elucidate their social struggle to claim their traditional belonging to forest land 
and to fight for tenure rights.  
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The main objective of this paper is to analyse the current implications of the Forest Rights 
Act on tribal households’ claim to individual forest tenure rights and the way it affects their 
citizenship rights. The next section explains that individual forest tenure in India is complex 
and can be understood from the viewpoint of three interrelated dimensions: forest tenure 
rights, citizenship, and conflicts. The background of the Bhil tribal people in Banswara 
district, Rajasthan, and the qualitative research methods are described in the third section. The 
fourth section presents the empirical findings, focusing on the relation between forest tenure 
rights, citizenship, and conflicts from tribal households’ perspective. The last section draws 
analytical conclusions reflecting on emerging struggles about forest tenure rights in tribal 
India.      
 
4.2 FOREST TENURE RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP AND CONFLICTS IN TRIBAL 
INDIA 
 
Forest tenure reform in India is a complex process that requires the re-organisation of both 
statutory and/or customary arrangements. This section explains the logic of choosing the three 
dimensions – individual forest rights, citizenship, and conflict – to analyse the effect of forest 
tenure reform on tribal India. Most state forest land in India is inhabited by scheduled tribes, 
who use the forest under a variety of local customary arrangements. Almost 75 per cent of 
tribal people are directly or indirectly dependent on forest resources for subsistence needs 
(Sunderlin et al., 2008). Historically, centralised state control over land defined as forest led 
to the establishment of powerful legal institutions and organisations (Forest Departments) of 
state forest management. Peluso and Vandergeest (2001: 763) use the term ‘political forests’ 
to show that in the nineteenth century governments in Southeast Asia made several attempts 
to gain control over what they labelled forest ‘through various legal means, through the 
creation of forest police, and by the disciplining of the population to think and act towards the 
“forest” in specific ways.’ The use of the term ‘political forest’ denotes the struggle that 
shapes the conflicting claims based on traditional practices and formal rules. These 
conflicting claims often occur between different actors (state vs. tribal; men vs. women) that 
create conflicting ideas about landscape and meaning ascribed to forests with different uses 
and tenure rights (Bruce et al., 1993).  
India’s new forest tenure reform, the Forest Rights Act, aims to redress the traditional 
rights of individual as well as collective forest management. At least on paper, this is a major 
policy shift from traditional centralised forest management towards decentralised reform. The 
term ‘decentralisation’ refers to true devolution from central to democratically elected local 
government that involves transfer of powers, functions, and decision making to citizens 
themselves (Ribot, 2002; Ribot et al., 2006). The definition of forest in both colonial and 
post-colonial India served the government’s purpose of converting all land with economically 
valuable tree cover and biodiversity into forest land, settling tribal people outside the newly 
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created forest territory, annulling their customary rights, and delegitimising their ways of 
managing and using the forest (see Agrawal and Sivaramakrishnan, 2000; Bose et al., 2012).  
The first dimension to consider is individual tenure rights. Forest tenure rights have their 
colonial historical background in the territorial demarcation of land as forest and in subject-
making of the scheduled tribes. Bose et al. (2012), referring to Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality, argue that, through the colonial and post-colonial history of categorisation, 
recent efforts by the national government to recognise traditional forest tenure rights have 
reinforced political control over the scheduled tribes through new forms of authority, and 
rules for inclusion and exclusion. Kidder’s (1978: 159) essay on Western law in India 
explains that, although the British Indian legal system was meant to preserve customs, the 
colonial courts altered processes of expressions of conflict, and litigation; for example, ‘the 
idea of land ownership was enforced in place of complex communal relationships as a means 
of isolating tax revenue responsibility and proprietary privilege with respect to the means of 
agriculture production’ (italics in original). The interaction between British India’s law and 
indigenous society was mixed in such a way as to manipulate the customary law in the 
interest of the colonial courts, while at the same time the operation of the colonial courts 
provided new opportunities for marginalised people to challenge identity-based political 
authority and economic relations.  
The post-colonial resistance of tribal people has continued to challenge government power 
by criticising the violence embedded in the categorisation of tribe, caste, and gender, and in 
the colonial classification of forests (Baviskar, 2012). The Forest Rights Act emerges out of a 
rights-based development strategy that challenges duty-bearers (e.g. government officials) to 
reinstate the rights of marginalised tribal people – the rights holders – and empowers them to 
claim their rights and responsibilities. Understanding why and how individual forest tenure 
rights claims are being made helps us to link these claims to individuals’ sense of belonging 
to the forests, the state, and associated conflicts. Any forest tenure policy reform can function 
only if it is clearly implemented, with minimum standards with respect to the rights of citizens 
without any double standard in policy implementation, and particularly with all actors on a 
level playing field (Larson and Ribot, 2007). The Forest Rights Act in itself does not mean 
that rights will be granted to forest people; it will only be implemented if appropriate by-laws 
or regulations exist with respect to its execution. Thus, individual forest tenure rights are 
about rights holders who are entitled to rights, to claim the rights, to hold the duty-bearers 
accountable, and who have the responsibility to respect the rights of others (Kierkemann 
Boesen and Martin, 2007). In brief, individual forest tenure rights are about the basic 
obligation on the state to take care of its vulnerable citizens and to acknowledge their human 
right to forest land.        
The next key dimension used for analysis in the study is citizenship. Citizenship is 
important in the debate on social justice, particularly with respect to ethnic minorities like 
tribal people. Current national policy focuses on citizenship wherein being a citizen is based 
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either on jus sanguinis (right of blood) or on jus soli (right to land). Citizenship, as defined by 
Marshall, is the ‘basic human equality associated with the concept of full membership of a 
community’ (1950, p.8 quoted in Sundar 2011: 421). Other scholars show that citizenship 
could be understood as the rights and responsibilities of individuals towards community, other 
than just the right to vote or hold an identity card (Patterson, 1999). Citizenship is crucial for 
forest tenure analysis because it encompasses tribal people’s sense of belonging and identity 
(self-identity vis-à-vis state-defined identity), and their idea of social justice. The politics of 
the social identity of tribal people is closely related to their struggle to secure rights to (forest) 
land, which has more than just a property or economic value because it holds a cultural 
significance and a sense of belonging to ancestral land (Colchester, 2008). Highlighting the 
issue of belonging, Ribot (2007: 46) notes: ‘in democracy, belonging, which infers 
citizenship, is residency based – where citizenship is the ability to be politically engaged and 
shape the fate of the polity in which one is involved. In private groups and NGOs, belonging 
is based on shared interests. In customary and religious institutions, belonging is often based 
on identity – such as ethnicity, place of origin, language or religion.’ Fraser (2000: 27) 
suggests that recognition is an issue of justice and that misrecognition is morally wrong in 
that it ‘denies some individuals and groups the possibility of participating on a par with others 
in social interaction.’ Although tribal people protest against the government’s denial of forest 
land rights as part of their citizenship rights, they continue to see the government as ultimate 
guarantor of property rights and other development welfare (Sundar, 2011).  
The third dimension, conflict, relates to the struggle for forest tenure rights and citizenship. 
Conflicts are a common phenomenon in forest tenure due to contradictory, overlapping, 
competing, or unclear legal frameworks to manage forests at various levels (FAO, 2011). It is 
inevitable that local level conflict emerges due to diversification of forest tenure and its 
implementation through new forest policies and laws. Forest-land tenure conflicts can 
undermine the functioning of local institutions and authority that govern resource use, and 
may increase the vulnerability of marginalised tribal people (White and Martin, 2002). 
Globally, many countries have introduced constitutional laws and reforms that recognise 
unique identities and rights of indigenous and tribal people. However, most of these reforms 
have failed to eliminate the historical discrimination against such people. One of the causes of 
conflict at national level in India arises from India’s official forest tenure system, which 
discriminates against tribal people’s rights and claims to land classified as public forests. 
Understanding the causes of conflicts and mechanisms to manage them is important, 
primarily for the better implementation of the decentralised Forest Rights Act.  
These three dimensions are now used to analyse the central underlying question of how the 
Forest Rights Act shaped tribal households’ ideas of individual tenure rights. The paper seeks 
to answer three operational questions: (1) why and how individual forest tenure claims are 
made by tribal households; (2) in what ways tribal households’ notion of individual forest 
tenure claims are related to citizenship rights; and (3) which factors prompt and/or supress 
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forest-tenure and citizenship-related conflicts. Finding answers to these questions will lead to 
a better understanding of the effects of forest tenure reform on the struggle for citizenship 
rights and social differentiation and the causes and management of conflicts within scheduled 
tribes.   
 
4.3 RESEARCH SITE  
 
The study area covers six tribal villages from two sub-districts, Kushalgarh and Bagidora, of 
Banswara tribal district located in the southernmost part of Rajasthan. Forest in this semi-arid 
region is highly degraded; often, forest areas are devoid of trees. The communal grazing land 
(gauchar) is either degraded or encroached upon, and, in some places, village Joint Forest 
Management committees and/or gram panchayats (elected village-level government bodies) 
have enclosed the land designated as forest. Banswara has tropical weather with the 
temperature reaching 45 degrees Celsius during the summer months and has an average 
rainfall of 650mm to 950mm. The main crops are maize (mostly rain fed) and millets for 
subsistence with few external inputs. Cultivation is by means of bullock traction. Droughts 
are a common cause of crop failure.    
 
4.3.1 Bhil Tribal People  
The Bhil tribal people are the third largest scheduled tribe in India. In Banswara, with over 72 
per cent of the tribal population, the Bhil are the predominant tribe (913,932 out of a total 
population of 1,420,601). The majority of Bhil people are poor, forest-dependent people with 
a low level of literacy. The land traditionally used by the Bhil was classified as forest during 
British colonial India (Skaria, 1999). The Bhil have a history of resistance against colonial 
and post-colonial rule, in the context of forest demarcation and rehabilitation projects (Skaria, 
1999; Baviskar, 1995). During the post-colonial period, the government’s objective was to 
keep forest-dependent people out of forests. In the 1990s, the Joint Forest Management 
Programme, attempting to introduce a ‘participatory’ approach, ignored the informal Bhil 
tribal institutional arrangements for managing the dry forests and for conflict resolution 
(Bose, 2009b).   
The majority of the Bhil tribal people were not traditionally agriculturalists or pastoralists 
and derived their subsistence needs primarily from non-timber forest products. During the 
colonial period, most Bhil people were made to practice settled small-scale agriculture 
without clear land tenure rights.  On average, the agricultural landholding of each Bhil 
household is less than one hectare. Due to the poor soil quality, lack of irrigation, and low 
rainfall, Bhil women, in particular, bear the worst impact of drought, poverty, land alienation, 
and scarcity of natural resources (Baviskar, 1995; Bose, 2011a).  
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4.3.2.  Data Collection Method  
Between 2008 and 2010, fifteen months of fieldwork was carried out to collect data using in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions. In total, 105 households (274 male and female 
respondents) engaged in in-depth semi-structured interviews, and four focus group 
discussions were conducted in six Bhil tribal villages in Banswara district (Table 4.1).  
 
Table 4.1 Characteristics of households and key actors interviewed in the study area. 
 
Tehsils Bagidora Kushalgarh Total 
Tribal villages  B1 B2 B3 B4 K1 K2   
Households (hh) interviewed 
(hh below poverty line) 
15 
(4) 
25 
(10) 
10 
(3) 
20 
(8) 
16 
 - 
19 
 - 
105 
(25) 
Female respondents  9 43 12 10 29 30 133 
Male respondents  15 27 12 24 25 38 141 
Total village respondents  24 70 24 34 54 68 274 
Officials, other  stakeholders 16 18 34 
Hh: the household comprises male and female respondents 
 
The first phase of data collection took place when the Forest Rights Act was in its initial 
phase of implementation, and the second set of data was collected after two years. Households 
were purposely selected to include all wealth categories within a village, such as elite, 
landless, and below-poverty-line households. The household interviews focused on socio-
economic and political issues, land rights, forest resource use and access, role of forest 
institutions, and forest dependency for agriculture. A semi-structured interview schedule was 
prepared that enquired about perceptions of individual forest tenure rights, access to forest 
land and forest resources, participation in decision making for collective management, and 
local-level conflict resolutions. In addition, in-depth interview meetings were conducted with 
34 officials from government departments (Forest, Revenue, Panchayati, and Tribal Welfare 
Departments) and non-governmental organisations to understand their viewpoint on forest 
tenure and conflict management.     
 
4.4 FINDINGS  
 
4.4.1  Claiming Individual Forest Land Tenure     
Of the total 105 Bhil households interviewed, about 40 per cent have property rights to an 
average of one hectare of agricultural land, mainly in the area demarcated as revenue land 
outside the forest. Except for one household that has property under joint ownership (with the 
man as primary and the woman as the secondary owner), all the remaining households’ 
property was owned by men. About 52 households were cultivating on land categorised as 
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forest land without any formal tenure rights. Five households were landless, and only 12 
households owned three to five hectares of land (outside the forest), mainly the economically 
well-off Bhil families. The concept of economically well-off household is relative to the local 
context and in comparison to the other households in the study area, based on criteria such as 
concrete house, electricity, personal well-being, etc.  
About 52 households claimed that they had used forest land without tenure rights before 
the Forest Rights Act. With its implementation, between 2008 and 2010, the number of 
households claiming individual tenure rights almost doubled to 97 households, even when 
people did not use land in the forest area. The former sarpanch (elected representative of the 
gram panchayat) of Bagidora explained that, ‘even poor households were ready to pay bribes 
in order to get the proof [given by elders of the village attesting that they have used the land 
for three generations] of their land claim approved by the village committee established to 
implement the Forest Rights Act. However, those households with better political connections 
were more successful than others.’ Of the 34 officials interviewed, the majority of them 
expressed the view that individual forest tenure claims were marred with corruption and 
conflicting claims. Bhil women, including those from well-off households, were not the 
primary claimants for individual forest land. 
The findings indicate that the Forest Rights Act changed tribal households’ traditional 
perception on individual forest tenure rights, because they claimed private property rather 
than collective forest rights. In the Kushalgarh villages, the collective perception of forest 
land rights, that is, the number of households wanting to use forest land as ‘reforestation and 
pasture with access for others’ was greater than that in the Bagidora villages (see Table 4.2).  
 
Table 4.2 Bhil tribal household’s planned use on claiming tenure rights to forest lands in the 
study area. 
Response of households (numbers) B1 B2 B3 B4 K1 K2 Total 
Use as private agricultural land 8 5 5 4 0 2 24 
Use as agricultural land, but open to 
others for grazing during fallow period  
1 7 3 12 2 3 28 
Use forest land in other form of private 
farm – forestry, horticulture, etc. 
1 1 0 2 0 0 4 
Reforestation 0 2 3 0 8 2 15 
Pastureland with access for others 1 10 3 2 6 4 26 
Total 11 25 14 20 16 11 97 
B1 to B4 are tribal villages in Bagidora sub-district and K1 and K2 are villages in Kushalgarh sub-district.  
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Almost all households in K1 and K2 villages are dependent on forest resources for sustenance 
and have struggled in the past against the Forest Department to maintain their customary 
arrangement of collective forest management (see also chapter 3 of this book). For the 
Bagidora villages, the forest land that had previously been managed collectively was divided 
among the four villages during the Joint Forest Management Programme in the late 1990s. 
Each village now has an independent forest area without collective forest tenure rights. To 
gain access to forest land, people in Bagidora have claimed individual tenure rights that left 
little interest among villagers to consider reforestation or to allow access for other traditional 
forest users outside the village. The planned use of the claimed forest land differed 
considerably between economically well-off and poor households. The latter intended to 
allow open access to their kinship group and to the nomadic pastoralists. 
Of the total of 24 households that wanted to make use of the forest land for private 
agricultural use, the great majority (21) were economically and politically well-off families, 
and the remaining three were marginal households. However, more was involved than just 
having title to land for economic reasons. This is nicely summarised by one of the 
respondents from Kushalgarh, ‘land is abundant in this region. Despite the forest being 
degraded, we claimed individual forest land because this forest has social and cultural 
significance for us. Things have changed politically, and we realised that getting tenure rights 
from government also means recognition of our identity – as forest-dependent Bhil adivasi 
(original inhabitants) – and our land. At least we can save some of our forest land on the basis 
of our individual claims.’  
 
4.4.2  Linking Individual Forest Tenure to Citizenship  
The focus group discussions indicated that the main reason for getting individual tenure rights 
was to acquire recognition of their belonging to the forest land as well as citizenship rights, 
which could be considered as an unanticipated reason for claiming land. The sarpanch from 
the villages in Bagidora tehsil explained, ‘earlier we, Bhil people, were unaware of the 
potential benefits of individual tenure rights. Now, we have begun to see linkages between 
tenure rights, authority, and political gain. Therefore, the Forest Rights Act is our entry point 
to gain citizenship rights.’ For the Bhil households, the political benefits of citizenship such as 
empowerment and having voting rights were less significant. This is evident from the finding 
that only 24 households had exercised their right to vote in elections in the previous ten years. 
The main reasons for the majority of the marginalised (as compared to relatively well-off) 
tribal respondents to claim individual forest tenure was to gain benefits relating to their 
citizenship rights such as food, roads, water, shelter, and education from the government (see 
Table 4.3).  
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Table 4.3 Bhil tribal respondents’ perceived notion of individual tenure rights in the 
citizenship context. 
Link between individual forest 
tenure and citizenship 
Male respondents 
(141) 
Female respondents 
(133) 
  
Well-
off 24 
Marginalised 
117 
Well-
off 24 
Marginalised 
109 
Gaining higher status in the 
community 0 9 2 35 
Belonging to ancestral forest land  2 21 1 4 
Recognition of citizenship services   0 49 4 24 
Ability to exclude others 11 7 0 2 
Increase chance of going into 
politics 3 17 3 5 
Secure property rights in the future 8 2 12 31 
Better participation in decision 
making 0 12 2 8 
 
When they were further probed about their logic of associating tenure rights with citizenship, 
the respondents explained that official land tenure rights would create a legal obligation for 
the government to acknowledge that tribal people have been deprived of their basic rights. On 
the other hand, the well-off tribal respondents (as compared to marginalised Bhils) mentioned 
that individual tenure rights would provide them with the authority to exclude others. The 
majority of the female respondents perceived that the individual tenure claim would benefit 
their household in gaining higher status in the community and would secure their property 
rights in the future.        
However, this did not mean that the Bhil perceived the recognition of private land rights as 
recognition of their traditional collective rights to the forest. The findings from the interviews 
indicate that 84 households thought that the government’s bid to recognise individual tenure 
rights has failed to recognise their traditional kinship relation and belonging to ancestral land. 
None of the households perceived that the individual tenure rights (even if approved by the 
government) would alleviate their struggle for livelihoods. However, a new meaning of 
citizenship through recognition of individual forest land rights seems to be emerging, which 
may create further dilemmas for the future. One of the officials from a non-governmental 
organisation explained: ‘historically the land belonged to the tribal people. Through the Forest 
Rights Act the government accepted the injustice done on tribal people by not recognising 
their traditional forest rights. The government is not giving any real new rights to tribal 
people, but only returning part of what rightfully belonged to the tribal people.’  
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During a focus group discussion, one of the participants expressed the view that, ‘most 
households are in a rat-race to claim forest land to enjoy their citizenship rights, even if it 
means excluding other traditional users, including their own kin within a hamlet. It is a trap, 
because even if our claims are recognised we will never get the alienation rights as per the 
Forest Rights Act. We will continue to be excluded from our fundamental citizenship rights.’ 
The reform may also have consequences for other forest users. In all six villages, the forest 
land and agricultural land were open to nomadic pastoralists during the fallow period. This 
traditional barter system was mutually very beneficial for both the tribal households and the 
nomadic pastoralists. However, two-thirds of households mentioned that in future they would 
be hesitant to give access of their land to the nomadic pastoralists because they might claim 
that they belong to the land (and eventually claim citizenship status) in the village. Of these 
two-thirds, the majority of well-off households were of the opinion that pastoralists did not 
have grazing rights because they were not resident-based citizens of the village.   
Out of 133 Bhil women respondents, 89 were of the opinion that claiming forest land (in 
the hope that it would be recognised) would improve their household’s social status. This, 
according to them, is crucial to get recognition within the village (including from mainstream 
rural society) and in turn to demand rights from the government. About 12 women mentioned 
that an increase in the household’s citizenship status directly benefited them, but the majority 
of women thought otherwise. According to one of the elderly Bhil woman, ‘government 
policies maintain the subordination of women by giving the land rights to the men and only 
few privileges to women. We are categorised as second-class citizens. How can we be 
socially equal? Without tenure rights the women are not directly involved in political 
representation at the community level.’ Moreover, a common point of agreement from 
interviews with the government and non-government officials is that the lack of independent 
status and empowerment to make decisions in relation to land use and land claims at the gram 
panchayat, gram sabha (village council), or on the village level FRA committee (set-up to 
implement the Forest Rights Act) – among many other village-level committees – make tribal 
women second-class citizens with or without forest land tenure rights.  
  
4.4.3.  Conflicts for Forest Rights and Citizenship  
Several factors prompted and/or suppressed conflicts about individual tenure as the findings 
indicate. Tenure conflicts can be classified into three main types: (1) conflicts between the 
government line departments and households, (2) conflicts between the households, and (3) 
intra-household conflicts.  
As the findings indicate, the conflicts between the government line departments and 
households were due to the formation of the FRA committee in the villages. This new 
committee was a cause of conflict because of competing claims about authority to manage the 
same limited forest resources involving existing village institutions including the joint forest 
management committee, panchayat, and local traditional practices. A main cause of conflict 
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between state institutions and the tribal households in the study area was that the new Forest 
Rights Act committee failed to take localised practices and rules into account. In total, 37 
households had conflicts with this new village-level committee on various issues relating to 
their claim for individual forest land tenure. One of the households, for example, had made a 
claim to farm land inside demarcated forest land, which now belonged to another village. This 
household explained that, under the traditional system, their land claim would have been 
considered legitimate even if it were in another village. However, such arrangements were no 
longer feasible consequent to state intervention through the Forest Rights Act. During focus 
group discussions, another cause of conflict that emerged between tribal households and 
government officials was the government’s inability to address the plural local notions of 
property rights (such as access to and use of forest land). The government department 
officials agreed that such conflicts were inevitable for technical reasons such as the lack of a 
clear demarcation of forest territory and the competition between the different line 
departments.  All 34 district level government and non-government officials interviewed 
agreed that, although the nodal agency for implementation of the Forest Rights Act should be 
the Tribal Welfare Department, the Forest Department used its authority to exert influence on 
the tribal households’ tenure claims, resulting in undue delays in the implementation of tenure 
reform.  
The second type of conflict is between tribal households. With households’ increasing 
claims to individual forest tenure rights, inter-household conflicts are on the increase. The 
primary reasons for inter-household conflicts were that the tribal households claimed 
individual forest land that was already in use by other households, or that they claimed a share 
of collective forest land even if they did not use this land in practice. Conflicts are referred to 
the formal village-level FRA committee set up by the Forest Rights Act. Although the village-
level FRA committee is authorised to sanction (or reject) forest claim applications and even 
takes responsibility for forest-related conflict resolution, for example, when the conflicts 
cannot be settled at village level, it is referred to the forest beat guard and/or the sarpanch. 
Before the Forest Rights Act such disputes were settled in village-level procedures by the 
elder(s) through informal negotiations and mutual agreements among parties. According to 
three-quarters of the interviewed households, this has changed because of the current trend 
towards formal settlement of conflicts, which has suppressed the conflicts. The households’ 
fear of wrongdoing as a consequence of involvement in the official judiciary system makes 
them avoid formal registration of their complaint because their illiteracy and poverty will 
hinder them from following up their cases in the court. Almost all economically poor 
households thought that the line departments and the gram panchayat were gaining influence 
in the village because the property rights-based conflicts are now reported to these formal 
institutions, giving these local institutions more power to monitor their activities.   
The third type of conflict is intra-household. The focus group discussions suggested that 
the major cause of intra-household conflict related to the fact that a land claim has to be 
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officially approved by the government, and this is leading to a breakdown of the traditional 
kinship bonding that existed in relation to forest land tenure. The focus group discussions 
suggested that the notion of belonging and tribal identity was closely linked to the kinship 
group, often covering several hamlets, so that inter-hamlet conflicts about forest use were 
limited. One household member explained that, ‘in the past when we had a fight within a 
kinship group the matter would be resolved by an elder (man or woman). But now, even 
conflicts between brothers about a land claim become a court issue.’ The intra-household 
conflicts, as the findings indicate, are mainly between men (father and son or between 
brothers) and rarely between men and women. About 90 per cent of women interviewed 
explained that the recognition of their identity and land (tenure and access) was dependent on 
their belonging to the household (and not as an independent individual). One of the elderly 
woman explained that ‘creating household conflicts will lead us nowhere. We cannot claim 
any property rights because we are always “outsiders” before and after marriage.’ 
 
4.5 DISCUSSION  
 
4.5.1  Dynamics of Tenure and Citizenship 
At the outset of this paper, three specific research questions were posed. The findings from 
this study have pointed to a number of insights and concerns relating to these three question 
about tribal India’s decentralised forest tenure reform, and in particular about tribal people’s 
notion of individual forest tenure rights. Each of these questions is discussed below following 
a schematic presentation of the overall findings in Figure 4.1.  
Figure 4.1 represents the overall findings based on empirical evidence drawn from the Bhil 
tribal households in western India. The introduction to this paper points out that the global 
rights-based forest agenda has influenced many governments to introduce forest tenure reform 
(Sunderlin et al., 2008; Sikor and Stahl, 2011). The rights-based agenda has indirectly pushed 
India to introduce national legislation, the Forest Rights Act, which aims to undo historical 
injustice perpetrated on marginalised forest-dependent people. The Forest Rights Act 
promoted an identity-based tenure right that in a way was promising for the Bhil people to 
claim restitution of their forest land. However, this proved far too optimistic, since the 
recognition process is still controlled by the government through the Forest Rights Act. No 
real authority has been delegated and no collective rights have been allocated in the research 
area (see chapter 3 of this book). Although the recognition of individual tenure rights is just 
one component of the Forest Rights Act, it is more emphasised than collective tenure rights. 
By opening the possibility of acquiring individual tenure rights, the Forest Rights Act 
effectively undermined the basis for collective forest management. In the figure, the 
horizontal dotted line connotes that a hierarchical distinction exists and calls for the state 
(provincial) government to decentralise authority to the forest-dependent tribal communities. 
The lower two tiers, as shown in the figure, are village and household level. This shows that 
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the large number of individual forest tenure claims for citizenship at household level has 
resulted in increased tenure-related conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Dynamics of individual tenure rights, citizenship, and conflicts at Bhil tribal 
household level. 
 
The overall findings also reveal that claiming forest tenure is a constant process of negotiation 
among different actors navigating between existing traditional practices and formal laws. 
Figure 4.1 also suggests that for households to gain their own recognition of belonging (to 
forest land) and rights they have to recognise the rights of others.     
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4.5.2  Identity-Based vs. Residency-Based Individual Tenure Claim 
First and foremost, the findings show that individualisation of forest tenure through the 
identity-based Forest Rights Act raises several issues such as who can claim forest rights, who 
participates and how do they participate, which resources are managed individually and/or 
collectively, who will benefit from the tenure rights, and how. Individual household tenure 
rights are overriding the traditional system of collective tenure rights. For the Forest Rights 
Act, households are distinct entities. This is different for local traditional practices, which are 
more adaptive and flexible. Within customary Bhil thinking, every household is first and 
foremost part of a community. This traditional practice allowed households to collectively 
access forest land coming under the jurisdiction of another village. Lund (2008: 4) uses the 
term ‘multirational’ politics to explain that rights over land come through local processes 
wherein local traditional practices, government institutions, and individuals with different 
economic and political connections influence these negotiation processes. The misrecognition 
of collective forest tenure through the Forest Rights Act is changing the idea of community 
control due to the preference given to individual tenure rights. In general, the marginalised 
forest-dependent people are at the losing end because of their poor economic and political 
status, in particular their inability to pay bribes to local institutions to make a forest rights 
claim.  
The findings indicate that the Bhil people, in particular elite households, embraced and 
considered their place of origin and tribal ethnicity as an important element to gain individual 
forest rights. This has posed a threat because, by claiming individual forest tenure rights, the 
relatively economically well-off Bhil households induced the exclusion of poor households 
from collective use, including that of non-resident traditional forest land users such as 
nomadic pastoralists. The construction of identity-based forest law tends toward the 
institutionalisation of tribal entitlements, rights, and privileges that create a differentiated and 
unequal status of citizenship within tribal communities. If the government had promoted a 
residency-based forest tenure reform, this could have reinforced decentralisation through local 
people’s empowerment and building of local partnerships. Thus, the residency-based policy 
intervention would have promoted de-individualisation of rights, making forest management 
more of a group phenomenon. In many ways, this finding corroborates Ribot’s (2007: 44) 
view; he explains that ‘multiplication of forms of belonging and the strengthening of lineage-
based and interest-based forms of belonging over residency-based citizenship appears to be 
fragmenting the local arena into competing and conflicting identity and interest groups.’  
 
4.5.3  Tribal People’s Citizenship through Individual Forest Tenure 
Property relations are not just about social relations, but have symbolic value that enables 
recognition of personal and collective identities (Hann, 1998). Forest tenure reform has 
introduced a different nuance for Bhil people’s traditional understanding of belonging to 
forest land. The Forest Rights Act is changing their perception of ancestral land in the 
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direction of property. Due to many decades of government refusal to recognise their 
traditional rights over the area demarcated as forest land, tribal people now look upon 
individual forest tenure as a gateway to claim citizenship rights such as electricity, piped 
water, etc. This process is not egalitarian because relatively economically and politically well-
connected tribal people have claimed more forest land, realising that citizenship centres on the 
capacity to exercise individual rights. Further, the construction of second-class citizens was 
translated into contesting and subjugating the forest rights of the nomadic pastoralist 
communities and tribal women.  
The trend towards citizenship could be viewed as emancipation from government’s 
categorisation of ‘scheduled tribe’ as a subject (see Bose et al., 2012). However, this paper 
indicates that, in this case, being a ‘citizen’ could also be just another form of 
governmentality, because, although tribal people wish to have citizenship rights via forest 
land, they have been appeased by the state with an empty shell. The government has the 
power to reverse the ‘recognition’ of individual tenure rights as the alienation rights of forest 
land remain under its authority. Rather than the government providing a common bond for 
people through the tie of citizenship, with equal rights, privileges, and obligation, both in 
precepts and practices, tribal communities have thus become fragmented. Almost similar to 
agrarian reform (see Agarwal, 1994), this study highlights the fact that tribal women are 
considered as second-class citizens, limiting them not just at household level, but also from 
engaging in the public domain at village and national level.  
 
4.5.4  Tenure-Related Conflicts at the Tribal Household Level 
Contemporary conflicts are fuelled by competing understandings of legitimate tenure rights. 
The aspiration to be recognised as a citizen through identity-based rights on the one hand may 
appear to give Bhil people their traditional rights to the territory demarcated as forest, 
whereas on the other hand the sense of collective belonging has created conflicts because 
individualisation of rights gained priority over traditional collective forest management. With 
the implementation of the Forest Rights Act, the conflict resolution mechanism has 
significantly shifted from informal local negotiations towards formal registration processes of 
conflicts as court cases, and sometimes as criminal cases when violence is involved. Although 
conflicts may have a negative connotation, they can also provide a means to develop a new 
arrangement for forest management. Lund (2008) points out, giving examples from Africa’s 
land reform, that any form of land reform is a political process and rarely gets implemented at 
the village level as it was envisaged. Moreover, he explains that state interference through 
strengthening of formal services such as individual titling and formal dispute settlement 
mechanisms may only create more disputes and may offer opportunities for manipulation of 
rights.  
 The history of skewed land demarcation during the colonial period (when land was converted 
to public/private land) makes the current forest tenure reform even more challenging. One of 
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the biggest challenges, as findings from this study indicate, is the non-alienation nature of 
tenure rights, which maintains government authorities’ control over forest land use. For 
example, the line departments (mainly the Forest Department) strengthened their control 
because by gaining authority they have manoeuvred themselves into a position to accept or 
reject the individual household forest land claims made to the Forest Rights Act committees.  
 
4.6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings in this paper clearly elucidate that there are strong inter-linkages between the 
three dimensions of individual forest tenure rights, citizenship, and conflicts through the 
implementation of the Forest Rights Act. Property rights in forests are a key asset for the 
government, and in particular for the Forest Department. Any reform brings changes in the 
relationship between actors within and between communities, as well as between the 
government and communities, because it changes relationships of authority (Lund, 2008). The 
paper shows that ultimately the government is not willing to cede control over forest land to 
tribal people. It also explicitly demonstrates that the local economically and politically well-
off households not only manage to capture and/or strengthen their control over forests by 
finding loopholes in the new legislation, but also shape the outcomes of conflicts. These 
findings are further confirmed by the findings of De Jong et al. (2006: 454) that well-off 
individuals base their ‘influence in part on [their] economic capacity, as this [gives them] 
political leverage which [they use] to assure property rights.’ 
 The implementation of forest tenure reform takes place against a specific historical 
background that has links to local struggles over forests. This struggle shows that a new forest 
tenure reform reinstating forest rights of forest-dependent tribal people also requires suitable 
local downwardly accountable institutions and practices, including tribal people’s 
empowerment, particularly marginalised nomadic pastoralists and tribal women. In the long 
run, tribal people’s struggle towards citizenship through identity-based belonging may not be 
fruitful in achieving their citizenship rights because identity-based policy intervention does 
not address tribal people’s empowerment. The recognition of individual forest land tenure 
(and even alienation rights) may not necessarily bring a more prosperous and secure future. 
Moreover, the findings of this study challenge the conventional understanding of citizenship 
that an identity-based (rather than a residency-based) form of belonging promotes equal 
tenure rights (see also Ribot, 2007; Sundar, 2011). In fact, for the marginalised tribal people 
and nomadic pastoralists ‘to become citizens entails true participation in the making of 
binding decisions regarding natural resources (and other public decisions) – or the ability to 
be able to influence the decision making process by those who represent them and are 
repositories of decentralised powers’ (Bazaara, 2006: 21).  
The insight presented in this paper shows that the relationship between individual forest 
tenure and citizenship cannot be taken for granted. In addition, legislative intervention such as 
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the Forest Rights Act creates new forms of belonging towards forest land and has minimum 
influence to realise citizenship rights. In fact, the Forest Rights Act created new restrictions 
on the use of forest resources, which were previously easily accessible to the community. The 
new restrictions, which cover grazing and collecting dry fuel woods, fodder, and other non-
timber forest products, may affect the livelihood of the marginalised forest-dependent people 
and may in practice lead to new types of forest tenure conflicts.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Women’s Access Rights 
 
A terracotta sculpture depicting tribal women’s rights movement in India. 
Photo credit: Prabir Bose 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Gendered dimension is present in forest tenure rights. In general, forest-dependent tribal 
women have primary responsibility as compared to men for collecting forest resources 
such as dry fuel woods, fruits, leaves, seeds, honey, etc., mainly for daily sustenance needs. 
However, women frequently lack secure access to resources. Control over forest resources 
is an important source of power. Marginalised tribal women’s tenure security therefore 
needs attention in view of social equity considerations.  
 
The previous chapters only touched briefly upon addressing the gender dimension, 
particularly tribal women’s rights in forest tenure reform. Thus, chapter 5 investigates the 
following question: How does the new decentralised forest tenure reform address tribal 
women’s forest-related access rights? And the related two operational sub-questions are:  
 What are the differences between tribal women’s perceived and actual forest access 
rights, past and present?  
 In what ways has decentralised forest tenure reform addressed tribal women’s 
participation in collective decision making with respect to forest management?  
 
To analyse the micro-politics of tribal women’s inclusion in and/or exclusion from forest 
rights, access is used as a conceptual framework.  
 
 
 
This chapter has been published as part of special issue on Forests and Gender by the Centre 
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). Bose, P. (2011). Forest tenure reform: exclusion 
of tribal women’s rights in semi-arid Rajasthan, India. International Forestry Review, 13 (2), 
220–232. 
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5  FOREST TENURE REFORM: EXCLUSION OF TRIBAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
IN SEMI-ARID RAJASTHAN, INDIA  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The current trend in forest tenure reform promotes identity-based categories, such as 
indigenous people, on the assumption that this provides better access to forest resources for 
marginalised groups. India’s historic Forest Rights Act of 2006 recognizes the traditional 
rights of the scheduled tribes and other forest-dependent people dwelling in and around 
forestlands. This paper examines the politics of individual and collective access to forestland 
and the political representation of Bhil tribal women in the semi-arid Banswara district, 
Rajasthan, India. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with 54 informants, and 
two focus group discussions. A rights-based access approach was used to analyse outcomes of 
forest tenure reform on tribal women’s access to forestland, and inclusion in, and/or exclusion 
from, collective decision making about forestland management. The findings indicate that the 
new identity-based forest tenure reform is mere tokenism and hinders rather than promotes 
tribal women’s political empowerment and access to forest-based resources.   
 
Keywords: Tribal women, forest tenure reform, rights-based access, exclusion, India 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In recent years, the substantial shift towards decentralised forest tenure reform (Capistrano 
and Colfer, 2005; Ribot et al, 2006) has led to the recognition of the rights of, and/or legal 
transfer of forests to, indigenous peoples in the global South (Colchester, 2004; Sunderlin et 
al., 2008). Forestland tenure security for forest-dependent indigenous people is believed to 
hold potential for good governance, improved livelihoods, and better forest management and 
conservation (White and Martin, 2002). Larson et al. (2010: 37 - italics in original) argue that 
‘the indigenous rights struggle brought the criterion of rights into tenure reforms globally, 
even if the initial intent involved ethnic identity, ancestral occupation and use of forestlands.’ 
The current trend in rights-based decentralised forest tenure, particularly ethnic identity 
rights, recognizes ancestral rights of indigenous peoples (Barry et al., 2010). In Latin 
America, Nicaragua and Bolivia in particular, the indigenous peoples' movement has 
successfully struggled to get formal recognition of traditional rights over their historic 
territories and forests (Larson et al., 2010).  
Forest tenure reform entails state recognition of traditional rights for people already living 
in and around the forests, as well as their customary laws. Often, forest tenure reform is 
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comparable to the agrarian reform of the 1960s. However, unlike the latter, forest tenure is 
often not about property or ownership rights, but about use and access rights. There is a lack 
of agreement among scholars about the advantages of state recognition of identity-based 
forest tenure rights. For example, Von Benda-Beckman (1997) explains that, if the state in an 
attempt to bring (abstract) equality does not recognize identity-based rights, then it may deny 
traditional rights of the several indigenous and traditional forest-dependent communities. In 
contrast, Marfo et al. (2010) argue that state recognition of identity-based traditional laws and 
practices of tenure reform could lead to inequitable or discriminatory outcomes that may 
possibly continue to exclude certain sub-groups within the identity-based category. This 
dynamics of identity-based rights makes India’s recent forest tenure reform – the Scheduled 
Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights Act), 2006 
(henceforth Forest Rights Act) – a complex issue.  
The Adivasis or the scheduled tribes (henceforth used interchangeably with tribal people) 
of India is an administrative category used to bestow constitutional rights and privileges to 
marginalised ethnic groups. About 84 million tribal people are acknowledged as the original 
inhabitants living in isolated areas in forests and mountains. The scheduled tribes are not 
recognised as indigenous people even though India has voted in favour of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly in 
September 2007.  
The present-day struggle over scheduled tribes’ forestland tenure can be traced back to 
India's colonial history. In general, tribal women are highly dependent on forest resources, 
with or without forest tenure rights. Yet, few studies have focused on women’s forest access 
and tenure rights among the tribal populations of India. Many tribal societies were 
traditionally matrilineal and conferred women with higher status, inheritance rights and 
privileges than in mainstream Hindu society (Mitra, 2008). This situation has been changing 
with the trend towards adaptation to the mainstream patriarchal society. In general, women’s 
rights under forest tenure reform are not given priority, just as in the past they were not given 
priority under state agrarian reforms, and this has resulted in gendered discrimination within 
the family due to inheritance laws and alienation rights, and control of property (Agarwal, 
1994). 
Larson et al., (2010: 4) explain that the range of forest tenure rights varies from ‘the titling 
of vast territories to indigenous communities, to the granting of small land areas for forest 
regeneration or the right to a share in timber revenues.’ Nevertheless, ownership rights and 
key decision making in forest management remains with the government. Sunderlin et al’s 
(2008: 15) study on global forest tenure reform states that ‘the extension of statutory tenure 
rights to communities and households does not mean women will enjoy the benefits of full 
citizenship and equity.’ This will depend on the kind of rights and resources that are 
transferred by the state, who are included or excluded and why, and how recognition of forest 
tenure affects access rights of traditionally excluded groups like tribal women. There is a huge 
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knowledge gap in the scientific literature regarding tribal women’s access to forestland and 
forest resources, primarily because property rights, particularly in South Asia, have been a 
gendered issue (Agarwal, 1994). The fundamental question, therefore, is how the Forest 
Rights Act 2006, which is meant to be a rights-based decentralised forest tenure reform, 
affects the access rights of forest-dependent tribal women.  
This paper investigates two dimensions of tribal women’s access to forestland and 
resources based on a mixture of national level legislation and customary rules. Forest 
governance in areas inhabited by tribal groups is based on a mixture of the newly formed 
village forest committees of the national Forest Rights Act (henceforth, the village FRA 
committees), gram panchayats (the elected government administrative body for one or more 
villages), the Joint Forest Management (JFM) committees and customary rules. The first 
dimension focuses on the tribal women’s individual ability to claim, control and access 
forestland and resources. The second dimension reflects tribal women’s collective capacity to 
gain access to forest resources and their ability to participate in local level institutions. In this 
paper, the individual and collective dimensions of access rights are examined using access 
theory as proposed by Ribot and Peluso (2003) and applied in an empirical case study of Bhil 
tribal women in western India. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the broad context of forest tenure 
reform with emphasis on India’s new decentralised Forest Rights Act (2006). Further, it 
summarizes the importance of a rights-based access approach in property rights. The third 
section provides background on the research site, the Bhil tribal people and the research 
methods used. The research results and discussion based on 54 in-depth qualitative interviews 
and two focus group discussions of forest-dependent Bhil tribal women is presented in section 
four. The discussion highlights the implications of the Forest Rights Act for Bhil tribal 
women’s individual access rights in terms of their social identity and their collective ability to 
participate in forest governance decision making. In section five, some conclusions are drawn 
and the future implications of the Forest Rights Act for tribal women’s access to forest are 
discussed.  
 
5.2  FOREST TENURE REFORM AND RIGHTS-BASED ACCESS 
                                                     
5.2.1  Forest Tenure Reform  
Colonial forest tenure reforms in many countries of Africa and Asia were based on the 
principles of scientific forestry, and these justified the centralization of decision-making 
power over forests (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Ribot, 1999b). In francophone Africa, for 
example, all forestland became state property and was categorized into classified forests and 
protected forests managed by the state for commercial use. Communities were given rights to 
use forests for subsistence purpose (Berry, 1989; Ribot, 1999b). The colonial state recognised 
chiefs’ authority to allocate land, but chiefs received no power to manage forests (Ribot, 
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1999b). In India, the customary institutions or chiefs were not recognised by the British 
colonial administration. The British colonial forest policies generally converted customary 
rights into privileges that were either exercised partially or totally abolished, thereby 
curtailing local communities’ access to forest resources. The 1878 Forest Act classified state 
forests into three types: reserved forests, protected forests and village forests. Reserved forests 
were meant for commercial timber exploitation that prevented the practice of customary 
rights. In protected forests, villagers’ rights and privileges were recorded but not settled. The 
third type, village forests, was never formalized. The implications are best summarized by 
Gadgil and Guha (1992: 135 - italics in original):   
 
[…] each family of ‘right holders’ was allowed a specific quantum of timber and fuel, 
while the sale or barter of forest produce was strictly prohibited.
 
This exclusion from 
forest management was, therefore physical – it denied or restricted access to forests and 
pasture – as well as social – it allowed ‘right holders’ only a marginal and inflexible 
claim on the produce of the forests.   
 
After India’s independence in 1947, the forest tenure reforms further marginalised the rights 
and privileges of the tribal people. The Forest Policy Act of 1952 took over three quarters of 
the land that was the traditional habitat of scheduled tribes as forests in order to achieve 33 
percent forest cover, a target set by this policy (Gadgil and Guha, 1992). One of the most 
controversial Indian laws was the Forest Conservation Act 1980 that abolished the tribal and 
forest dwellers’ privileges and access rights. With this legislation, a majority of tribal people 
inhabiting the forests whose rights were either not recorded or settled, or who were not 
residing inside the forest but dependent on forest resources, became encroachers. In India and 
elsewhere, it has become evident that the decision of policymakers to deny ‘local 
communities access and management rights to forests worked as a disincentive, exacerbating 
forest degradation, conflicts and poverty’ (Larson et al,, 2010: 7).  
Criticism of this exclusionary approach created pressure to adopt the Joint Forest 
Management programme in 1990. It was initiated in an attempt to protect and regenerate 
degraded forest with the participation of village communities. The Joint Forest Management 
programme was successful in some ways because it gave tribal communities rights to minor 
forest products. However, the programme had two major problems. First, it failed to devolve 
resources to local authorities, and secondly it did not recognize customary forest tenure rights 
in tribal areas (Hildyard et al., 2001; Shah and O.G., 2009). To rectify these problems, the 
decentralised forest tenure reform, the Forest Rights Act 2006, was introduced by the 
Ministry of Tribal Affairs. The Forest Rights Act is the first legislation that duly recognizes 
the rights of tribal communities as stated in clause 3, ‘to hold and live in the forestland under 
the individual or common occupation for habitation or for self-cultivation for livelihood.’  
The Forest Rights Act recognizes individual rights of those who do not have any 
documentary proof of their landholding, but they can claim land if they are cultivating it 
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themselves for a livelihood. Moreover, those whose land is in dispute between the Forest and 
the Revenue Departments, or whose land has been claimed by the Forest Department thereby 
making tribals encroachers on their own land, are also eligible to claim land. At the collective 
level, the Forest Rights Act recognizes traditional forest rights of tribals that include nistari 
(community forests), minor forest products, fish and other produce of water bodies, grazing 
land, traditional seasonal resource access of nomadic or pastoralist communities and 
community rights to intellectual property and traditional knowledge relating to biodiversity 
and cultural diversity. In addition to the existing JFM committees at village level, the Forest 
Rights Act instituted the FRA committees to scrutinize the individual land claims. The Forest 
Rights Act is national legislation. The way in which the collective rights are administered 
differs from one state to another depending upon the ways in which each state has 
implemented the reform. In recognition of tribal and women’s participation, this identity-
based reform reserves a quota on the village (as well as district and state) FRA committees as 
mentioned in the Clause 6(9) that among three members ‘[…] two shall be the Scheduled 
Tribe members and at least one shall be a woman, as may be prescribed.’ 
As compared to Joint Forest Management, the Forest Rights Act is seen as an important 
tenure reform for the scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwelling communities. 
From a purely identity-based rights perspective, there is no doubt that the Forest Rights Act 
on paper will potentially be beneficial to many tribal communities living in forests. The FRA 
committees at village, district and state level provide a multi-stakeholder (from the Forest 
Department, Revenue Department, Panchayat, and tribal men and women) executive 
committee to make decisions about forestland claims. Interestingly, globally and in India the 
struggle for the recognition of indigenous and tribal people’s traditional forest rights has 
assumed that both men and women have an equal bundle of rights, either at collective or 
individual level. Considering that the forest tenure reform has adapted the earlier agrarian 
reform, it may have similar flaws relating to the issue of gendered property and access rights, 
and decentralisation, for example a lack of recognition and devolution of power to women’s 
groups (Capistrano and Colfer, 2005; Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997).  
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) talk of five property rights applicable to forest tenure 
transition: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights. In agrarian 
reform these five property rights neglect the gender dimension (Agarwal, 1994). Interestingly, 
the tenure rights granted through the Forest Rights Act do not provide these five rights 
exclusively either to individuals or to the community. The forestland remains the property of 
the government. To what extent the gender dimension is addressed in the Forest Rights Act 
promoting these five property rights for tribal women demands immediate research. The 
conceptual issue of rights-based access, and in particular gendered access, is briefly discussed 
below. 
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5.2.2  Rights-Based Access 
Access and property have been used interchangeably in the study of resource management. In 
recent years, however, scholars of common property resources have begun to distinguish 
property from access (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Sikor and 
Lund, 2009). Ribot and Peluso (2003: 154) argue that, distinguishing access from property 
allows a better understanding of ‘a wider range of social relationships that can constrain or 
enable people to benefit from resources without focussing on property relations alone.’ Sikor 
and Lund (2009: 4) explain that, in post-colonial contexts, ‘property regimes are negotiable 
and fluid to some degree because of the multiplicity of institutions competing to sanction and 
validate (competing) claims in attempts to gain authority for themselves.’ If property is about 
a web of interests (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008), then access could be considered as a 
more complex web of negotiations between individual, collective and public rights and 
powers over forestland and its resources. 
Jesse Ribot and Nancy Peluso (2003: 153) define access as ‘the ability to benefit from 
things - including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols.’ They emphasize that 
the term ability – to benefit from things – refers to access as opposed to rights, which are 
associated with property. Access patterns change over time depending on the social actor’s 
(individual or collective) position (identity, class, caste, status, etc.), interests and authority 
(Berry, 1989). Therefore, access needs to be understood as a process mediating the social 
actor’s ability to claim, control, use and maintain resources. Explicitly, property and access 
overlap in many ways, particularly with regard to benefits or values – ‘through appropriation, 
accumulation, transfer, distribution and so forth’ (Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 155). Access 
recognizes different mechanisms that are not necessarily legal. It includes claims that are 
made through statutory law, force or illegal claim, or based on informal customary systems 
such as practices, norms and rules of a local community, personal abilities, knowledge, social 
relations, status and gender.  
The key difference between the legal vs. illegal access mechanisms is that the former is a 
rights-based claim sanctioned by politico-legal institutions, while the later is about extra-legal 
and/or illegal. The main distinction between extra-legality and illegality is that ‘the former 
refers to properties held not against the law, but not protected or recognised by law, whereas 
the latter may be held “in direct violation of the law”’ (Assies, 2009: 576). Illegal or 
unsanctioned access often becomes a source of conflict; therefore, there is an increasing need 
to recognize extra-legal and illegal access by the national, positive, legal system. Ribot and 
Peluso (2003: 154 - italics in original) argue that access analysis explains ‘why some people 
and institutions benefit from resources, whether or not they have rights to them.’ It helps to 
analyse the micro-dynamics of who is included and excluded from resources, and how the 
ability of an actor (or collective) to benefit from resources is based on access qualifications, 
‘particularly capital and social identity, which influence who has resource access priority’ 
(Blaikie, 1985 cited in Ribot and Peluso, 2003: 164-165). Capital and social identity are 
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interrelated. For example, in a study in Africa, Berry (1989: 42) shows that ‘control over 
capital goods – cattle, granaries, gold – was also often based on social identity or status.’ This 
suggests that social identity and status are dependent on a combination of ascribed and 
achieved qualifications.  
Gendered differences may exist within rights-based access qualifications, for example 
through access to knowledge, markets, technology, authority and labour opportunities. 
Rocheleau and Edmunds (1997: 1354) explain that the analysis of gendered access rights to 
forestland and its resources is important because ‘land titling often underplays the 
significance of women’s existing resource use and ownership rights’. In addition, gendered 
access varies over time, products and the choice of institutions that represent them politically. 
In many countries, including India, property policies, be they agrarian land reform and/or 
forest tenure reform, tend to overlook the issue of gender differences (Agarwal, 1994, 
Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi, 2008; Rocheleau and Edmunds, 
1997). In this context, the main objective of this paper is to examine how the Forest Rights 
Act has changed in practice tribal women’s access rights to forestland and its resources.  
 
5.3  THE STUDY AREA AND RESEARCH METHOD 
 
5.3.1  Banswara District and the Bhil Tribal People  
The study area is the semi-arid Banswara district of Rajasthan state – geographically the 
largest state in India. Banswara district is one of Rajasthan’s politically and economically 
isolated districts and categorized as a scheduled area. The scheduled area is an administrative 
term in India to designate areas with tribal domination, which have special legal and 
governance arrangements to protect the tribal people and the natural resources. Banswara’s 
predominant population is the Bhil tribal people. With around twelve million people, the Bhil 
are the third largest of the 600 recognised scheduled tribes in India (Census of India 2001). 
Bhil people are forest-dependent mostly inhabiting hilly and dry deciduous forests in a 
number of adjoining tribal districts of the Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan states of 
western India. The region has a tropical climate with temperatures reaching 45 degrees 
Celsius during summer months and has an average rainfall of 650mm to 950mm. In most 
areas, the dry deciduous forests are either denuded or severely degraded. In some areas, there 
are some regenerated Teak (Tectona grandis) trees. The gauchar – communal grazing – lands 
are often encroached by settlements, or banned for use as open grazing. Agriculture is mainly 
rainfed and labour intensive. On average, the agricultural landholding of a Bhil household is 
less than a hectare. Each year, forest-dependent Bhils are forced to migrate (to neighbouring 
towns) to earn supplementary income because of low production of forest resources and 
recurrent crop failures due to droughts.    
The name Bhil is believed to be derived from the Dravidian word, Billu, meaning bowman, 
as the tribe is renowned for its archery skills. Before the eighteenth century, under the Rajput 
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warrior rulers, the Bhils politically dominated many western and central hilly and forested 
regions of India. These regions were divided into a number of small princely states, which 
were governed with the support of Bhil chiefs. During this period, the region witnessed 
several battles; the Rajput employed the Bhils as bowmen to defend their territory or to raid 
peasant villages in the adjoining areas (Baviskar, 1995). Citing work of several scholars, 
David Mosse (2005: 49) notes that ‘an image of “wild hill tribe” was firmly rooted in a 
colonial discourse which contrasted the ordered society of the plains under Rajput royal 
authority with the unruly hill tribes and forest dwellers (jungle log).’ To civilize the tribes and 
manage the forests there was a common notion in the strategies adopted, that is, that both wild 
tribes (Bhils) and forests had to be protected from the outside. Thus, scientific forestry 
introduced during the colonial period set the Bhils and forest apart (Gadgil and Guha, 1992; 
Skaria, 1999). In this process, the Bhils’ traditional rights to forestland and forest resources 
were denied.  
A typical Bhil village in Banswara district is composed of several phalias, or hamlets, 
spread across hillocks and ridges. Each village has approximately 150 to 200 hectares of 
demarcated reserve forest area in an undulating terrain. This demarcated forestland is the 
object of a Joint Forest Management programme as well as the object of land claims under the 
Forest Rights Act. The social composition of phalias reflects their history of settlement. 
Before the introduction of colonial scientific forestry, the local customary rule was that the 
forestlands were allocated to men who were invited to marry and stay in the village in order to 
clear forest, expand cultivation and increase security, or it was already cultivated land that 
was offered in lieu of bride price (Sjoblom, 1999 cited in Mosse, 2005). This meant that Bhil 
women were ‘relatively more powerful, that power was a deeply contested one, and was often 
considered illegitimate’ (Skaria, 1999: 87). Over the years, the majority of Bhils have become 
settled agriculturalists, and like mainstream society they use patrilineal kinship to determine 
land title rights (Baviskar, 1995, Mosse, 2005). Marriages of Bhil women were different from 
mainstream Hindu culture. It often occurred through abduction, which was considered an 
honourable act, and a women’s family was offered a dej, bridewealth payment. In general, 
abduction gives more power to women because it is a silent (pre-arranged) agreement 
between the man (abductor) and the woman (abducted). To the present day, there is an annual 
fair, Bhagoria, where such abduction happens and often conflict results if the girl’s family are 
not satisfied with the bridewealth settlements (Baviskar, 1995; Skaria, 1999).   
Today, the Bhil women’s identity, property ownership, and access to forestland and forest 
resources are derived from their husband, and they may have little or no access to their natal 
family property (Mosse, 2005). Often, those Bhil women who inherit their husband’s or in-
laws’ property may hold power in household agricultural practices and may have a voice 
(depending upon age and economic status) in collective village decision making. Such women 
have the ability to participate and negotiate on issues relating to labour and property. In other 
words, women’s identity and position in Bhil society is shaped by kinship-in-relation-to-land 
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that determines resource endowments or political participation (Baviskar, 1995; Mosse, 2005; 
Skaria, 1999).  
 
5.3.2  Research Method 
Individual interviews were held with Bhil tribal women and case studies were elicited using a 
participatory approach. Case study research provides an in-depth understanding of women’s 
land access (Yin, 1994). The data were collected as part of a larger project of forest tenure 
reform in ten months over three intensive visits to the study area between 2007 and 2009. 
Two revenue villages – villages with definite surveyed boundaries – were selected each from 
Bagidora and Kushalgarh blocks of Banswara district. The main criteria for site selection 
were that the villages were in the scheduled area, were dominated by the Bhil tribals and were 
part of the Forest Rights Act intervention, and that few households were below the poverty 
line. These selected villages did not have piped drinking water, irrigation, sanitation, 
electricity and proper healthcare facilities.  
The case studies examined in the two villages show diverse histories in relation to the 
evolution of collective forest access rights, privileges and village forest institutions. The Joint 
Forest Management programme was introduced in 1995 and within ten years became defunct 
due to lack of financial support. The Bhil tribal women were active members of the JFM 
committees and were involved in protecting the forest. The FRA committees in both the 
research villages had selected (instead of electing) inexperienced tribal women as members of 
the executive committee, thereby excluding active tribal women members of the JFM 
committees. Only one woman among the respondents was a member of the executive 
committee of the gram panchayat.  
Each of the two focus group discussions involved about 40-50 women and men.  In 
addition to focus group discussions, other techniques were used, such as observation of tribal 
women’s participation in the gram sabha (village council) and the village FRA committee 
meetings under natural conditions, a transit walk inside the forest area to determine tribal 
women’s individual and collective access rights activities undertaken in the forest, and 
participatory mapping. Three Forest Department officials and one Revenue Department 
officer working at the research sites were also interviewed to understand their perception of 
the effect of the Forest Rights Act on Bhil women. Data collection provided information 
about village-level forest governance that functions in conjunction with the national level 
legislation adopted by the Rajasthan state, gram panchayats, customary hamlet by-laws and 
traditional forestland ownership rights. Semi-structured individual interviews were conducted 
with 54 Bhil tribal women selected at random from each of the villages and representing 
different socio-economic and political status groups (see Table 5.1).   
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Table 5.1. Categories of respondents 
 Category of respondents                             
Bhil tribal women  
Kushalgarh 
Block Village K1 
Bagidora 
Block Village 
B2 
Number of 
respondents 
women-headed households 1 3 4 
executive committee members of new 
village forest institutions 
2 3 5 
representatives of gram panchayats 1 0 1 
ex-joint forest management members 6 8 14 
non-members of any formal 
committees 
14 11 25 
landless 5 0 5 
Total 29 25 54 
Source: author interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009. 
 
The interviews and discussion focused on Bhil tribal women’s perception of changing 
forest access rights. Interview questions were qualitative, semi-structured and allowed 
respondents’ flexibility to answer. Each individual interview ranged roughly 45 to 60 minutes. 
Most of the interviews were in the Bhili dialect, Hindi and Gujarati language, and were either 
audio and/or video recorded with the prior consent of the respondents. The data were coded 
and translated into English. For the qualitative data analysis, a database of codes was 
developed, the interview texts were coded and the data were verified. In the next section, the 
research findings of two focus group discussions and individual interviews about collective 
and individual access rights to forestland and forest resources are presented.  
 
5.4  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.4.1  Results 
The results indicate that the Bhil tribal women’s ability to control, manage, access and use 
village forestland varied depending upon their individual rights and privileges, position and 
status within their family and community. Forest products such as fuelwood, bamboo, honey, 
tendu pattas (leaves of Diospyros melanoxylon), mahua (flowers of Madhuca indica), chirota 
(Cassia tora) and resins form an important part of Bhil people’s household needs (Shah and 
O.G., 2009). Almost 90 percent of the respondents used village forest resources for various 
household needs such as fodder, fuelwood, fruits, bamboo and timber poles for construction 
of houses.  
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5.4.1.1  Individual Access to Forestland and Forest Resources  
The majority of the Bhil tribal women (n=54) were dependent on forest resources mainly for 
subsistence use. The general perception among all respondents was that they had customary 
rights to collect non-timber forest products. Respondents reported that under customary rules 
they collected fodder, fuelwood, fruit, leaves and bamboo for making baskets, and that they 
could collect as much of the non-timber forest products as they needed for household needs. 
Landless respondents were economically dependent on some of the non-timber forest 
products, selling them during the haat, the weekly village market. The formation of the JFM 
committee to protect the forest in participatory cooperation with the Forest Department 
provided most of them with secured usufruct access rights. Only one respondent felt that the 
JFM committee restricted her customary free access to forest areas. The concept of free access 
to forest areas, according to respondents, referred to grazing for cattle, collection of bamboo 
and timber for the construction of houses. Two-thirds felt that, compared to customary rules, 
the JFM committee’s major disadvantage was its emphasis on equal benefit sharing of forest 
resources among villagers. Respondents said that the principle of equal benefit sharing 
undermined the customary practice of collection and distribution of forest resources because 
the JFM committee did not differentiate between households on the basis of family needs, 
size and economic status.  
There was considerable confusion about the content of the Forest Rights Act. Almost 90 
percent of the respondents were unaware of the possibility of demanding collective tenure and 
access rights. The six (11 percent) respondents who represented women in the gram 
panchayats and the executive FRA committee member said that they thought that the Forest 
Rights Act granted forestland ownership rights to household heads only (mostly men). The 
respondents were illiterate and therefore relied on literate men on the village FRA committee 
to explain the rules of the Forest Rights Act. As compared to the JFM committee’s 
regulations, the majority of respondents (73 percent) mentioned that their access to the forest 
had decreased, while uncertainty increased due to the village FRA committee formed as part 
of the implementation of the national Forest Rights Act. They said that new regulations 
imposed by the village FRA committee, such as the ban on collection of Jatropha seed and 
bamboo as non-timber forest products, had a negative impact on their livelihoods (see Table 
5.2).  
The village FRA committee restricted the collection of Jatropha seed by not recognizing it 
as a non-timber forest product because of its high commercial value as a source of biodiesel 
fuel at local markets. Before the village FRA committee was established, Jatropha seed was 
regarded as a non-timber forest product and all respondents had access and rights to collect it 
in large quantities for sale at the local market. 
Now that the village FRA committee had taken control of the seed for commercial 
purpose, the benefits were controlled by the executive committee members and not distributed 
to the villagers. In village B2, the village FRA committee relaxed the rule (in 2009) because it 
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was a drought year and allowed a women’s self-help group to collect Jatropha seeds. This 
gaining of access could be because of women’s increased access to social relations, i.e. 
women represented in greater numbers in this village, and access to labour, i.e. most men had 
migrated to neighbouring cities for wage labour and therefore there were few men to engage 
in collecting seeds in the forest. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents who had previously 
been economically dependent on tendu leaves (used to roll cigarettes) were denied access to 
collect the leaves by the village FRA committee (see Table 5.2). These rules imposed by the 
village FRA committees are local interpretations and not necessarily those of the Forest 
Rights Act. The Act, however, does not go into details with respect to non-timber forest 
products, leaving room for local interpretation.  
Before the village FRA committee was formed, only poor families were permitted to 
collect stones and clay from forestland when they were building or repairing mud houses. 
Only two respondents had used their access rights to collect stones and clay from the forests 
before. However, after the implementation of the Forest Rights Act, more than half of the 
respondents who had claimed individual forestland (through their husband or son) were 
allowed to collect stones and clay, and to cut live trees for timber poles used for building 
houses from claimed forestland. Almost two-thirds of the respondents claimed that they had 
lost access to fodder and fuelwood after the Forest Rights Act was implemented through the 
village FRA committee. In general, respondents agreed that customary rules as compared to 
the Forest Rights Act were less stringent, promoted equity and, before the FRA was 
implemented, forest access arrangements were often adopted on the basis of the specific forest 
resource needs of the marginalised groups.   
 
Table 5.2 Bhil tribal women's individual access to forest land and forest resources before and 
after the implementation of the Forest Rights Act  
Forest resource access Before FRA After FRA 
 
Percent (%) n=54 Percent (%) n=54 
fuelwood 100 54 37 20 
fodder 100 54 35 19 
tendu leaves 88 48 na na 
livestock grazing  22 12 25 13 
timber poles from live trees 7 4 60 33 
Jatropha seed collection 65 35 na na 
bamboo 42 23 5 3 
stones for construction of houses 3 2 50 27 
claims of individual forestland 5 3 98 53 
*na refers to zero indicating restriction or ban imposed by the forest institution 
 
 
 
 Source: author interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009. 
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The increase in the number of individual forestland claims had negative implications for 
the Bhil tribal women. The large majority (88 percent) of respondents said that their male 
relatives had claimed individual forestland tenure rights, sometimes on behalf of the 
respondent or her (male) children. The majority of women were not in favour of individual 
land claims. However, a landless woman explained, ‘claiming the forestland provides future 
security for our children, and a title deed to land can act as a safety net for the future by 
renting it out in exchange of money.’ The respondents (19 percent) who were household 
heads and those who were active members of the executive committee said that their male 
relatives (husband or son) had proposed their name for individual ownership as primary 
claimants of forestland. These women, even as primary claimants, had little or no control over 
managing and using the forestland; however, they had access to the land to collect non-timber 
forest products from their so-called own forestland.   
Ten respondents (who were landless and not members of the formal committees) had filed 
a forestland claim in their own name, but their claims were rejected by the village FRA 
committee. The perceived reasons for failure to get individual tenure rights were inability to 
pay bribes, gender bias within household and community, lack of an influential male relative 
on the village FRA committee, lack of authority to sustain their land claim in the forestland, 
and lack of information about the Forest Rights Act. Further, they claimed that due to the 
Forest Rights Act the well-to-do tribal families were evicting the marginalised original users 
of forestland by showing fake documents and taking over the land. This makes the 
marginalised users worse off than they were before the start of the process to recognize 
traditional forest rights.   
Sixty-five percent of the respondents reported that their control over forestland and access 
rights to forest resources had been reduced considerably by the individual claims on 
forestland. The majority of respondents (82 percent) believed that the Forest Rights Act 
implemented at the village level was detrimental to their more favourable customary rules. 
The respondents considered that in general forest legislation was gender biased (favouring 
men).  
 
5.4.1.2  Collective Forest Tenure Rights  
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of spontaneous non-tribal settlers in 
this semi-arid tribal district. This immigration has promoted the conversion of forestland to 
itinerant agriculture and settlements. In an attempt to safeguard the forestland from 
encroachers, tribal women began to protect and manage their forestland collectively. This 
self-initiated forest protection institution had its own rules, which villagers (including men) 
tended to follow. With the implementation of the village FRA committees, the village elders 
(both men and women) of the customary institution were pushed aside by the formal 
executive committee in the research villages. Hitherto, the Bhil tribal women had been in the 
forefront to collectively control, protect and manage the forestland. Their access to and 
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control over forestland and forest resources were perceived similar to those of the men. The 
Forest Rights Act was perceived as disadvantageous by respondents (88 percent) because it 
did not recognize their traditional local collective rights to forest resources. The two focus 
group discussions briefly presented below explain the current status of the tribal women’s 
collective forest access rights in Banswara district.  
 
Source: author interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Figure 5.1: Comparative analysis of Bhil tribal men and women’s access to forest in K1 
village, Kushalgarh 
 
With the Forest Rights Act, Bhil tribal women experienced a loss of decision-making 
authority. Before the Forest Rights Act came into force, there was a tradition of collective 
forest management by both men and women in Kushalgarh sub-district’s village, K1. As one 
of the Bhil tribal women explained, ‘in earlier days, we (women) were excluded by the Forest 
Department and our rights were not recognised. Today, some of our own community 
members exclude us from our forests as a result of the new forest tenure reform.’ A common 
concern among women is aptly summarized by an elder tribal woman during the group 
discussion:  
 
Panchayats and the FRA committee provide thirty-three percent reservation 
quotas to appoint us (women) to the executive committee as if we cannot 
participate equally like men. It is due to the reservation quota and the 
formalization of individual forest land claims that we are made to assimilate 
rural (non-tribal) women’s identity resulting in loss of our collective decision-
making authority and control over forest resources.  
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The quota system in practice may have the consequence of tribal women being less 
represented and never being able to be in the majority. Even though women attended the 
village FRA committee meetings, only one tribal woman as compared to 27 tribal men (see 
Figure 5.1) was involved in decision making – such as formulating rules, decisions for 
managing the resources, allocation of land and forestland use planning. None of the women 
respondents, in contrast to tribal men, had power to exploit forest resources commercially 
(such as tendu patta, poles from live trees) and sell them at the local market.  
 
 
  Source: author interviews conducted between 2007 and 2009. 
 
Figure 5.2: Comparative analysis of Bhil tribal men and women’s forest access in B2 
village, Bagidora 
 
In comparison with K1 village, the Bagidora sub-district’s village, B2, had a better 
representation of tribal women in the management of the village forest (see Figure 5.2). 
According to a tribal elder man, women actively participated in management roles because 
‘some of them (tribal women) were animist and did not practice purdah (veil) like mainstream 
society.’ However, the same tribal identity of women was used by the village FRA committee 
to exclude them on the ground that they were not well-mannered (unlike assimilated and 
mainstream Hindu women). Instead, those women were included who had assimilated to 
mainstream women’s identity, had no or low dependence on forest resources (higher class) 
and had no problems with the loss of collective forest management rights. The issue of forest 
resource collection, such as dry fuelwood and cutting timber poles from live trees for house 
construction, was a sensitive topic for discussion between those women who had primary 
tenure rights (though dependent on their male relatives) and those women who were landless, 
because they were more dependent on forest resources for subsistence.   
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In both the study villages, K1 and B2, women were actively involved as caretakers of the 
forest – involving patrolling the forest to protect fodder and fuelwood – whilst their male 
relatives were engaged in wage labour in neighbouring towns. It was only during the seasonal 
migration period that the women had more control over forest management decision making. 
Interestingly, male respondents in the focus group discussion considered that individual 
tenure rights would provide them with land tenure security that would be beneficial in the 
long run. The female respondents, on the other hand, thought that individual land rights were 
the cause of their loss of control and traditional collective forestland rights claim.  
The perceptions of the three Forest Department officials interviewed regarding the 
forestland title deeds for the Bhil women differed. The higher ranking forest officer was of the 
opinion that the Bhil women’s social status with or without the forestland title deeds would 
make little difference to their existing social status, whereas the two forest officers at the local 
level believed that Bhil women should be secondary or dependent claimants, because that 
would enhance their position in the household. The officials considered that there was no 
point in giving women primary ownership rights of forestland because the Forest Rights Act 
did not give individual forestland alienation rights. The Revenue Department official stated: 
‘the Bhil married women often when unhappy in marriage often elope with other (Bhil) men. 
Under such circumstances, if she holds the property rights, then her husband will be in a 
difficult situation to control the forestland. Therefore, the primary claimant of the forestland 
tenure rights should remain with the Bhil men.’  Overall, the government official’s perception 
of the Bhil women’s rights to forestland could be summarized as follow, ‘the Bhil men are a 
good choice as the primary claimants because they could be involved in collective decision 
making for forest landscape planning. The Bhil women always extract forest resources such 
as fodder and fuelwood, and leave the cattle open-grazing in the forestland, and this hampers 
the forest management.’ In contrast to the official’s comment, Bhil women (84 percent) were 
of the opinion that forestland title deeds would bring them higher social status as well as more 
decision-making power within the household and more negotiation ability at the community 
level.  
   
5.4.2  Discussion  
Traditionally, the Bhil tribal communities were matrilineal and therefore women used to 
enjoy inheritance rights and had some power to use resources that is absent in patriarchal 
societies (Skaria, 1999). Mitra (2008: 1216) suggests that ‘isolation of the scheduled tribes 
from the mainstream population for many years led to the continuation of the relatively high 
status of tribal women and the absence of gender discrimination in many tribal communities.’ 
Increasingly, the Bhil people are being assimilated into Hindu mainstream society. This is 
apparent from the fact that women cover their head in front of men, men and women are 
segregated in collective meetings, a gendered distribution of tasks and workloads is 
implemented, dowries are paid and idol worship is on the increase. This has changed gender 
 ~ Chapter 5 ~ 
116 
 
relations with a negative impact for the position of the women. The Forest Rights Act fostered 
inequality among the Bhil tribal women because women who assimilated into mainstream 
Hindu society and/or were literate were selected to participate on the village FRA committee. 
It is evident that the gender identity of Bhil women is a reason for inclusion or exclusion from 
institutional arrangements at the village level. The village FRA committee promoted forest 
management institutions that are different from the traditional role of the Bhil tribal women. 
Moreover, the village FRA committee’s biased interpretation of the clause that provides a 
quota for women on the committees has undermined the Bhil tribal women’s ability to be 
involved in decision making and to manage the forest collectively.   
This had implications for the Bhil tribal women’s individual and collective claims, access 
and tenure rights in respect of forestland and forest resources. Prior to the implementation of 
the Forest Rights Act, collective access rights were based on their extra-legal traditional 
collective rights, which were neither legal (recognised by the statutory law) nor explicitly 
prohibited. However, with the introduction of the Forest Rights Act, these extra-legal claim 
and access rights became either legal or illegal depending on whether the claim was approved 
or denied by the relevant statutory institution. Collective rights, which were particularly 
important for women, were not granted in either of the study villages where individual rights 
were primarily allocated to men and (mainstream) assimilated women. The Forest Rights Act 
recognizes traditional forest rights of tribals that include nistar or minor forest products, fish 
and other produce of water bodies, grazing land, traditional seasonal resource access of 
nomadic or pastoralist communities and community rights to intellectual property and 
traditional knowledge relating to biodiversity and cultural diversity. However, none of these 
was recognised as a formal collective right by the village FRA committee in the study area.  
The poor landless women and those depending on forest produce for subsistence became 
more vulnerable because of the changing gender-role expectations and denial of access to 
hitherto collective forest resources. Promotion of women’s self-help groups to manage forest 
resources, particularly recognizing collective rights to bamboo (used commonly for basket 
weaving and sold at local markets) can enhance livelihoods of tribal communities (Shah and 
O.G., 2009).  Gender bias among government officials further supported tribal men to file 
individual forestland claims, and women to be secondary dependent claimants. To some 
extent, the implementation process of the forest tenure reform promoted gender inequality 
with respect to access rights to forest resources, and in this way reinforced dominant Hindu 
patterns of gender relations.  
The empirical evidence in relation to the Bhil tribal women’s access to forest rights reveals 
two main consequences. The first aspect is that a tribal woman irrespective of her social status 
holds no primary property rights to forestland. A woman household head may have greater 
access to forestland, but claiming individual forestland title deeds remains the domain of male 
relatives. The second dimension relates to collective forest management rights. Otherwise 
vocal and vigorous Bhil tribal women have now become subject to the new forest institutional 
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arrangement that fails to support their subsistence needs. With the imposition of hard and fast 
rules of forest tenure legislation on adaptive local customary practice, Bhil tribal women are 
becoming more and more dependent on their male relatives for individual access to forest 
resources. The rights-based forest tenure reform presented here indicates that Bhil tribal 
women’s social identity, authority, capital, social relations and knowledge shape their ability 
to benefit from forest resource access.  
 
5.5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
India’s Forest Rights Act is undoubtedly a progressive law that overturned centuries-old 
British colonial legislation. It aimed to undo the historical injustice for tribals and other forest 
dwelling communities who were not given titles to their landholdings. For generations, these 
vulnerable poor communities were systematically excluded from their land, categorized as 
encroachers, and forced to abandon cultures and livelihoods on the pretext of forest and 
wildlife protection. However, after two years of implementation, this landmark legislation 
shows signs of falling short of achieving the commendable objective of meeting the legitimate 
needs of the forest-dependent tribal people, particularly women. It is undisputable that a 
policy decision has been taken to recognize traditional forest rights of indigenous and tribal 
people. However, recognizing traditional rights without taking account of gender and intra-
ethnicity differences can become a roadblock to development. Any tenure reform that is 
proposed to assign rights to resources – be it through individual titling or collective holdings – 
requires thorough analysis to avoid any hindrance to women obtaining rights.  
The use of three dimensions provided insight into Bhil people’s notion about forest rights 
that may influence future of tribal forest governance. The findings highlighted differences on 
a number of issues that demand immediate attention to prevent the Forest Rights Act from 
creating chaos among the tribal and forest-dwelling communities and further destroying the 
remaining forests. First and foremost, this law shows male bias in assigning individual 
property rights. This bias primarily stems from the influence of mainstream patriarchal 
property rights, and an assumption that men and women operate on a level playing field 
without any gendered differential capacity to access resources. The reform enables well-do-to 
tribals (men) to claim forestland, making poor tribals, particularly disempowered women, 
worse off.  
Second, collective forest access rights have been ignored in the two research villages 
because of the undue focus on individual property rights. Currently, tribal women are 
dependent on extra-legal or illegal means to access forest resources for subsistence. This 
problem has major consequences on the future of tribal communities’ dependence on the 
forest as a common pool resource that is now converted into private property. Recognizing 
women’s traditional collective access to forestland and its resources may empower women in 
decision-making authority and change institutional rules; this in turn will help women to gain 
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individual property rights. Ownership of forestland and its resources through women’s 
collective titling and formal access rights will contribute to their socio-economic and political 
empowerment.   
Third, the reservation quota for women on the executive committees may show on paper 
that the law is gender progressive, but on the ground it is not good enough. Tribal women face 
exclusion from the executive committees because the bureaucrats and gram panchayat 
functionaries take the reservation quota literally and thereby prevent women from ever being 
in the majority. Lack of tribal women’s political representation and involvement in decision 
making, whether at gram panchayat or village FRA committee level, will fail to integrate 
their forest rights. A gender progressive policy needs a more inclusive approach that 
empowers all women rather than giving them a few token representational reservation quotas 
on the committees. The empirical work discussed in this paper suggests that any degree of 
reservation quota system without empowerment will end up excluding tribal women’s voice 
and rights.    
Fourth, the present focus on individual rights and denial of access to collective forest 
resources threatens tribal women’s (and household) dependence on non-timber forest resource 
products such as bamboo, honey and medicinal plants to meet subsistence needs. What is 
needed is that the forest tenure transition should focus on traditional, locally adaptable, 
multiple user, tenure access arrangements. This means that a collective ownership right will 
take into account the diversity that exists within a homogenous tribal community (those 
assimilated into Hindu mainstream vs. traditional tribal culture) and be aware of local gender 
asymmetries between men and women and within women’s groups (landowner vs. landless; 
women household head vs. dependent women).  
Lastly, but importantly, the way in which local bureaucrats execute the forest tenure 
transition calls for urgent attention. For example, there is a history of skewed social relations 
combined with mistrust and insecurity between the Forest Department and tribal people. 
Delays in granting forest title deeds and a lack of initiative to make tribal communities aware 
of their collective forest rights will reinforce the existing gaps between bureaucrats and tribal 
communities. It can be levelled out by recognizing that tribal communities are not static but 
changing with outside influence, and have a history of struggle and traditional institutional 
norms that affect the tribal women. At the same time, the state government should promote a 
gender sensitive decentralisation process that devolves power to the local village elected 
council (e.g. gram panchayats) or other traditional committee, which equally promotes 
women’s political participation  (Capistrano and Colfer, 2005; Ribot et al., 2006).  
A theoretical point to be highlighted here is that an exclusive research focus on property 
rights in forest tenure reform will obscure the importance of illegal and extra-legal access of 
women to forest resources. There is need for more in-depth empirical research to understand 
the implications of the Forest Rights Act through access analysis as proposed by Ribot and 
Peluso (2003) – going beyond the bundle of property rights – from the tribal and other forest 
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dwellers gender perspective. Doing so will throw light on how various forms of power, such 
as identity, authority, knowledge and social relations, affect men and women’s rights-based 
mechanism to access forest resources.    
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The Future of Forest 
Tenure Reform  
 
 
An overloaded jeep with Bhil people in Baswara tribal district, Rajasthan. 
Photo credit: Purabi Bose 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
The future of forest tenure reform is contingent upon many factors, including social and 
legislative processes, and on the country-specific political-historical context. Forest tenure 
reform is unique because it is not just about improving livelihoods, but also about 
reinstating indigenous communities’ ancestral rights that were in the past appropriated by 
the state. Decentralisation is a crucial element in forest tenure reform as it aims to 
improve the downward accountability of local institutions and to empower marginalised 
forest-dependent people.  
 
Using a micro-politics perspective, this book has explored the emerging – sometimes 
unintended – consequences of decentralisation and new forest tenure legislation for 
marginalised tribal forest people in India.  
 
To summarise the findings and central issues, this concluding chapter is divided into two 
parts. The first part discusses:      
 The four key research questions proposed at the start of this book, with emphasis 
on the related principal findings reflected in the preceding chapters; and  
 The central argument of this research conducted from the micro-politics 
analytical perspective.  
 
The final part makes an overall argument based on the chapters as well as on experiences 
from other outputs of this research: an international conference, a documentary film, and 
an infobrief. Taking into account lessons learnt, it proposes the way forward towards 
decentralised forest tenure reform.   
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6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
“Because things are the way they are,  
things will not stay the way they are.” 
 
- Bertolt Brecht (20th century German poet, playwright, and theatre director)    
-  
 
 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This concluding chapter summarises the main findings of this study with respect to the four 
questions posed at the outset of the research. It discusses lessons learnt, plus the emerging – 
sometimes unintended – consequences of decentralisation and new forest tenure reform for 
marginalised forest-dependent tribal people in India. The chapter is divided into four sections. 
In the next section, the principal findings reported in the preceding chapters are discussed. 
The third section summarises the central argument of this research from the micro-politics 
perspective used in the conceptual framework (see Figure 1.2). Further, the sub-sections focus 
on (i) general lessons learnt on decentralisation and forest tenure reform; (ii) identification of 
areas that need further research in the light of reflection on the theoretical, methodological, 
and empirical approach of this thesis; and (iii) experiences from other outputs of this research: 
an international conference, a documentary film, and an infobrief. On the basis of the lessons 
learnt, in the fourth section, I propose the way forward in decentralised forest tenure reform 
by giving some recommendations to render forest tenure policy reform more effective.     
 
6.2  THE REALISM OF FOREST RIGHTS 
 
Over the past two decades, historic changes have taken place in the formal legislation on 
forest tenure arrangements in many parts of the world, and in particular in tribal India. The 
underlying aim of this thesis was to understand the extent to which India’s decentralisation 
and forest tenure reform have recognised collective and individual rights of marginalised 
forest-dependent tribal people. In doing so, it analysed whether decentralisation and forest 
tenure reform in tribal India achieved their two overall objectives: (1) to empower local 
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institutions and political participation of marginalised tribal people; and (2) to recognise tribal 
people’s traditional forest rights. This section reflects upon the four dimensions (see Figure 
1.1) of the research problem investigated in this thesis. It does so by assessing the outcomes 
of the reforms as reflected in the empirical evidence collected in poor semi-arid tribal villages 
in Banswara district, Rajasthan, India.     
The four key research questions examined in the context of decentralisation and forest 
tenure policy reform, particularly the Forest Rights Act (FRA) of 2006, focused on: (1) the 
influence of the history of forest legislation, (2) the role of different local institutions and 
authority on collective forest management, (3) the effect of households’ perception of 
individual forest rights, and (4) the consequences for tribal women’s forest-related rights. The 
most salient evidence is discussed in relation to the research questions without repeating the 
findings of each chapter, and related issues are highlighted throughout the conclusion.  
 
6.2.1 Governmentalisation: Shaping Traditional Rights 
 
 
“I do not know what is forest right for them [tribal]:  
traditional practices or modern laws;  
choosing either/or is a difficult choice.” 
 
-     Forest Department, Beat Guard (2009, Banswara, Rajasthan)  
-  
 
The evidence on the first question shows that the historical trajectories of the categorisation of 
scheduled tribes and forest land demarcation have shaped current forest governance processes 
and outcomes (see chapter 2) through a process of governmentalisation. The first component 
of the findings clearly reveals that the categorisation of tribal people continues to be 
influenced by contemporary legal reforms. By bringing all the tribal communities under the 
single umbrella of the ‘scheduled tribe’ category, legislation undermines the scope for 
specific traditional practices, and it also sets their identity as a separate and unique entity, 
different from mainstream Indian society. A similar process took place when land that had 
traditionally been used for various purposes was categorised as single-use forest. However, I 
argue that any unique and generalised categorisation of forests, the scheduled tribes, the 
scheduled areas, and traditional forest rights in the current forest tenure policy reform is 
misleading, because it will lead to further marginalisation of the scheduled tribes, and 
especially those that are already marginalised. The impact of categorisation from colonial 
time onwards is evident in contemporary reforms in numerous ways. The principal problem in 
relation to such categorisation is its ambiguous nature and its dubious definition that fails to 
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take into account historical context, local customs and practices, and changes that happened 
due to development project interventions, including Joint Forest Management, but was 
actively rejected. In the past, the colonial government appropriated land and categorised it as 
forest, even though it was inhabited by people (often marginalised) and used for their daily 
sustenance. The systematic appropriation of forests through scientific forestry and colonial 
and post-colonial legislation (see Table 2.1) legally dispossessed many forest-dependent 
people, in particular tribal people. The demarcation of forest land is still contested because of 
the competing claims made by the government and by people who depend on the forest for 
their livelihood. In other words, categorisation of land as forest has created a fissure that 
continues to divide the government from forest-dependent people. The authoritarian top-down 
structure of the Forest Department since the colonial period exercises a strong hold on both 
the tenure of forest land and its managerial aspect. This unchallenged authority of the forest 
administration poses a threat for any new intervention of forest-related laws because it allows 
the forest administrators little flexibility in identifying the diversity of forest use and the 
forest–people relation (see also Poffenberger, 1990; Skaria, 1999; Tiwari, 2004).  
The much-awaited historic legislation in the Forest Rights Act was introduced to undo 
injustice by recognising traditional rights. However, it is in fact generic national legislation 
that is a mere extension of the colonial notion of forests, to be administered without any real 
clarity on the meaning of traditional rights. In reality, the entire notion of traditional rights is 
complex and cannot be addressed without understanding the locally specific forest–people 
relations (see also Li, 1996; McNeely, 1995). Chapter 2 further reveals that, because of its 
long history, the Forest Department, generally and throughout the whole country, has been 
able to build up a powerful position on all issues relating to forest management. Unlike the 
Forest Department’s historical legacy, the Panchayati Raj Department is a relatively new 
administration unit. Village-level democracy became a reality in 1992 with the seventy-third 
amendment to the Constitution of India. However, this law did not cover the scheduled 
(tribal) areas. It was only in 1996 that the Panchayat’s Extension to Scheduled Areas Act 
(PESA) introduced tribal self-rule, with the provision that the government should not make 
any contradictory law with respect to the recognition of customary law, social and religious 
practices, and traditional management practices of community resources, including forests. 
This decentralisation process through gram panchayats had been envisaged to manage natural 
resources, including forests. However, the efforts to implement decentralised local tribal 
governance in consonance with the PESA norms failed. A similar effort proposed during the 
British colonial period had also remained unimplemented. The main hurdle in the proper 
implementation of the PESA comes from the nexus of forest bureaucrats that have long 
viewed (from the British colonial period) the resource-rich tribal regions as a source of 
revenue. In addition, the panchayats continue to be dominated by the central government (see 
chapter 4). The striking (perhaps unintended) outcome of forest categorisation is that the 
Forest Rights Act proved beneficial for the Forest Department for many reasons, even though 
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the nodal agency implementing the legislation is the Tribal Welfare Department. To illustrate, 
the governmentalisation of the forest as a ‘territory’ of the Forest Department through the 
Forest Rights Act has reinforced their authority. The Forest Department retains control over 
the public forest that falls under the geographical boundary of the scheduled areas – the 
territory to be administered by the Tribal Welfare Department. Moreover, the Forest Rights 
Act remains vague about what the recognition of traditional forest rights connotes. 
Historically, traditional rights were not fixed, but rather evolved through a negotiation process 
between forest-dependent people and their own traditional authorities. Codification of some 
traditional practices was introduced under the guise of scientific forestry during the British 
colonial period and these were then defined as traditional rights; these ‘rights’ were 
subsequently re-allocated to the population as privileges. The contemporary government 
perpetuates identity-based reform by allocating rights through legislation, without recognising 
the role of traditional authority. This further justifies the Forest Department’s role in the 
conduct of conduct – to govern the forest-dependent tribal people and their access to forest 
land and forest resources.        
The conduct of conduct notion brings us to the second component of this key question, that 
is, the implication of the historical legal identity of scheduled tribe as imposed by the 
government. As demonstrated in chapter 2, the imposed tribal identity (or the process of 
subjectification) of the Bhil in western India is strongly influenced by the statutory legislative 
classification and has to a great extent been internalised by the Bhil themselves. The 
depressed class identity established during British colonial rule was formally defined as ‘the 
scheduled caste’ and ‘the scheduled tribes’ in the constitution after India’s independence. 
Such identity has both enabled and constrained tribal people in claiming their forest rights. 
Typically, laws are intended to “respond not only to citizens’ claims, but to their feelings – 
feelings that are understandable in the shared culture law inhabits” (Cotterrell, 2009: 373; see 
also Jhering, 1915, on citizens’ feelings of what is right and just). However, in the case of the 
tribal people, the ‘feelings of citizens’ have not yet been addressed. The Constitution of India 
formalised their political identity, clearly distinguishing them from the non-scheduled tribes. 
Unlike the categorisation of the scheduled caste in India, scheduled tribes such as the Bhil 
were placed outside the caste system.   
I make two observations from analysing the influence of legislation on tribal identity: first, 
their political identity gives the Bhil people the right to exclude ‘non-tribals’ from benefiting 
from their traditional forest rights. Losing their statutory identity as a scheduled tribe may 
lead them to lose their ability to determine inclusion in, and/or exclusion from, the forests. It 
is evident that the loss of recognition of ethnic identity is immense because of its close link to 
their claims for traditional rights to natural resources, particularly forests. The second 
observation is that the internalisation of the imposed political tribal identity has had the 
unforeseen effect of fragmenting the Bhil community, because some also wish to belong to 
mainstream Indian society. This can be seen in some Bhils’ efforts to be recognised socio-
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economically and culturally at par with the mainstream community (non-scheduled tribes) by 
identifying themselves as Bhilalas and making a conscious choice to differ from their 
ancestral ethnic culture. Because of their status, the majority of them are well-represented in 
the local institutions, and by imbibing mainstream culture and ideology they indirectly 
become carriers of the hegemonic Indian norms in their villages. Paradoxically, the Bhilalas 
also embrace the political identity of tribals, aware that ‘ethnic marginalisation’ will facilitate 
their claims to forest rights from the government.  
At the micro level, the Bhils are not passive subjects but try to actively perform or resist 
the imposed identity. They adapt their identity to specific situations at different temporal and 
spatial scales. The Bhil people are aware of the subject-making process to the extent that they 
consciously or subconsciously decide to be part of it (for example by claiming to be 
indigenous people or adivasis) or try to remain outside it (for example by showing cultural 
affinity towards non-scheduled tribes), in order to gain back their forest rights. As chapters 3 
and 4 demonstrate, I argue that this plurality of identities enables as well as constrains the 
tribal people. The plurality of identities provides Bhils with a mechanism to defend 
themselves by creating countervailing power to deploy strategies within the forest governance 
regime: they shift between informal rules and formal laws; between the past and the present; 
they manoeuvre forest rights by representing them as collective, or distance themselves from 
collectivisation; they move between traditional practices and codified rights; they resist 
territorialisation (of land), but defend and claim their traditional territories; and they even 
alternate between different identities, demanding to be recognised at par with others. By 
‘playing’ with the different imposed categories, they constantly filter their classification and 
chose one that will fulfil their particular needs at a particular point in time.  
     
6.2.2 Decentralisation of Collective Rights: An Absurd Idea?    
 
 
“Where is the logic of the decentralised collective forest rights 
when we are told how and what to do by them [officials]?” 
 
- A former sarpanch (2010, Banswara, Rajasthan)  
-  
 
The answer to the second question confirms that formal forest tenure arrangements have a big 
impact on local collective forest management. The top-down notion of collective rights 
imposed as a project intervention idea (through the Joint Forest Management Programme or 
Forest Rights Act) to protect forests is an absurd logic from the perspective of Bhil people’s 
traditional knowledge and understanding of their forest rights. There are various reasons to 
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call it absurd, as shown in chapter 3: the definition of community has a different connotation 
in the world of the Bhil than in the world of administration. The Bhil communities, rather than 
being a strictly closed entity defined by demographic and geographic administrative 
boundaries, value their traditional kinship network structure (through phalias – hamlets) that 
goes beyond the concept of community in its administrative meaning. The paradox of 
community as defined by practitioners, policymakers, and academicians fails to capture the 
flexibility of tribal people’s networks and leads to misrepresentation of their collective rights. 
The challenge of the term community is that there is no universally shared specific idea and it 
cannot be easily defined or measured, yet it cannot be considered insignificant (see also 
Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Etzioni, 1996; Guijt and Shah, 1998; Spierenburg et al., 2008). 
Chapter 3 carefully highlights the concern that the tribal people have historically been 
marginalised, therefore making it even more difficult for an outsider to distinguish local 
differences within a tribe (for example, Bhil vs. Bhilalas). Missing out such nuances may 
create misleading discourses that influence the way projects are implemented, leading to 
conflicting claims and local struggles over resources (see also Li, 1996; Alden Wily, 2008).  
If we look at the case of the Joint Forest Management (JFM) Programme in the study area, 
it is evident that the government Forest Department persistently uses the imagined sense of 
the spatial definition of community to impose and to legitimise JFM as shared norms and 
practices that help to extend their (government) control further. This mandatory top-down 
collective community participation promoted for political representation, democracy, and 
conservation has run into difficulties in project implementation, because it has given the 
government more control in arenas where previously forest management and decision making 
resided at local level, in the study area (see also Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Nightingale, 2002; 
Kumar, 2005). Agrawal and Ostrom (2001: 513) criticise the prescript of the community-
based project because “not all local groups will self-organize to manage local forests 
sustainably just because central governments are willing to devolve authority,” and because 
community-based forest management is not necessarily pro-poor (see Hobley, 2007). In 
contrast, as I have shown, Bhil people have to some degree resisted the government’s lack of 
interest in decentralisation and the imposition of a new ‘community’ at village level to engage 
in collective forest management: they would prefer to continue their traditional arrangement. 
Similar to the territorialisation of forest land and the scheduled areas, the use of the terms 
community and participation does not take into account the different definitions ascribed to 
the explicit meaning of forest rights by the government and the tribal Bhil. The divergence 
hinges on differences in relation to the meaning of collective forest rights. For the Bhil, these 
rights are open to the bargaining and negotiating power of the tribal kinship groups in the 
hamlets. This bottom-up collective right has a different meaning than the top-down idea of 
community and of collective use.   
Chapter 3 also illustrates how specific local institutions – designed by the government to 
represent communities – are not based on traditional authorities, and neither recognise nor 
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take into account existing traditional practices. In other words, they fail to promote an 
institutional structure based on the Bhil community’s demand for forest rights. This has a 
historical linkage with the colonial and post-colonial forest governance regime that has either 
suppressed these rights or superimposed new administrative institutions on customary land 
rights, and these institutions have become a mere extension of government authority (see also 
Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Hobley, 2007; Bose et al., 2009b). As Figure 3.1 illustrates, 
the traditional village institutions were removed historically from the decision-making arena 
and more recently were overlaid first by the JFM committee, then by the gram panchayat, and 
recently by the FRA committee. The risks of all these reforms lie in their implementation 
because of several intended and unintended consequences. The reform processes are 
manipulated by filtering, bribing, selective use of information, etc. In this way, the interests of 
communities become divided. As a result, the government has more control over which 
community gets collective rights and which community does not. However, the rights and 
rules embedded in these different institutions and authority cannot, by themselves, act or 
achieve their goals, but require legitimisation from collective action by a group of individuals 
(see also Cohen, 1969; Lund, 2008). The Bhils choose and legitimise a specific institution 
only when they consider their forest rights will be at stake. The legitimisation of an institution 
happens through negotiation, contestation, and manipulation. Consequently, the ability to 
choose is not entirely under their control: rather, they are disempowered when they take sides 
and make their belonging visible, particularly when they choose formal institutions over 
traditional ones. They are further challenged by not being able to make their customary 
institution visible because there is no one authority or practice that could be identified as a 
generalised rule. Through strategic formulation of ethnic identities, and by replacing the 
traditional authority and practices with formal institutions, the government creates visibility. 
This visibility of an institution acts as an illusion of decentralised future forest tenure 
arrangements by claiming to recognise traditional rights. Foucault (1995 [1975]) calls this the 
visibility trap because, by increasing the visibility of a formal institution and authority, the 
government more easily exercises control on individuals and counters criticism of its policies.  
The Bhils’ struggle for forest rights is linked to the confusion about what tradition means, 
and in particular what traditional authority means. The risk is that ignoring and/or accepting 
traditional forest rights without a legitimate institution will lead to a situation of 
misrepresentation; the need is, rather, to make decentralisation work (see also Bae, 2005; 
Fitzpatrick, 2005; Tacconi, 2007; Ribot et al., 2006). The recognition of collective rights 
through the Forest Rights Act is not yet formalised at local level, remains highly uncertain, 
and may have the same fate as that of previous collective tenure rights through the JFM and 
the PESA in tribal India. The construction of authority relations at the gram panchayat occurs 
through multiple manifestations of the government and the Bhil people by confrontation and 
communication among plural institutional arrangements. The Bhil definition of collective 
forest rights, I argue, is dynamic but rooted in its local history and forest land struggle. A 
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mutually agreed legitimate collective representation – downwardly accountable authority and 
decentralised institutions – that balances the forest rights of the government (modern laws) 
and of the community (traditional practices) can bridge the gap between these two distinct 
politico-legal and cultural entities.     
 
6.2.3 Individualisation: An Administrative Desire 
 
 
“I belong to this place but then I do not know why  
I am deprived from using my [forest] rights?”   
  
- A forest-dependent Bhil elder (2010, Banswara, Rajasthan)  
-  
 
Citizens are responsible for asserting legal rights dynamically as a duty to themselves and 
their society (Jhering, 1915). Throughout this research, one of the basic questions was to see 
how the tribal people both defend and extend their forest rights by manoeuvring their forest 
identity of being a ‘subject’ of the government and as a ‘self-conscious citizen.’ Chapter 4 
shows how, in their struggle to gain forest rights, the Bhil people’s perspective on individual 
(household) rights and citizenship gets shaped. It highlights further complexities about the 
influence of the Forest Rights Act on tribal households’ perspective on individualisation of 
forest rights. Typically, the idea of individualisation of forest rights may find its root in 
property rights and is grounded in the fact that a sense of ownership and the secure use of 
forest land are critical for forest-dependent people’s livelihoods. Forest rights are considered 
to be linked to forest-dependent people’s poverty issues. However, it is perhaps naïve to 
expect forestry interventions alone to reduce vulnerabilities and livelihood insecurities (see 
Angelsen and Wunder, 2003; Kaimowitz, 2003; Ellsworth and White, 2004). Therefore, tribal 
households’ choice of specific forest tenure rights goes beyond their wish to reduce poverty 
and their understanding of forest as a safety net. The forest-dependent tribal people have 
rarely – before the Forest Rights Act – received legal attention in relation to their individual 
forest rights. Now forest rights may give a new meaning to the recognition of their identity 
because, by granting forest rights, the government gives them a renewed sense of belonging. 
The shift towards citizenship rights by claiming their individual tenure rights is not based on 
abstract ideals. Instead, as my findings indicate, Bhil people are constantly struggling to be 
recognised as normal citizens as against the identities imposed by the government (see 
chapter 2).  
Von Benda-Beckman (1997) notes that, as a citizen or a stranger, the visibility of one’s 
rights is dependent on one’s choice of a specific identity that is constructed out of those 
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generated by formal government institutions and/or those that challenge these institutions, 
such as local traditional arrangements. The desire of tribal people to get recognition of their 
traditional individual land rights does not necessarily coincide with an individualisation of 
forest rights, but there exists an administrative desire for such individualisation. Through that, 
the government will be in a better position to control forests and people. Control is easier 
when it concerns individuals with different interests rather than communities claiming their 
collective rights. To some extent, the government’s imposition of project interventions via 
line departments influences the adoption of individualisation of forest rights among Bhil 
households. This, however, differs considerably between (and within) tribal households, 
because different individuals have diverging notions about the relationship between forest 
rights and citizenship.  
The citizenship rights of India’s forest-dependent tribal people have not received much 
attention, although these are pertinent in contemporary forest tenure rights (see also Sundar, 
2011). Citizenship is an illusory concept in India. Mitra (2010: 47), for example, argues that 
‘citizenship is a specific form of political identity. [...] In this vein, citizenship belongs to a 
“third space” which constitutes the interface of legal specification of individual citizenship in 
the constitution on the one hand and the primordial concept of personhood germane to Indian 
society on the other.’ However, forest-dependent Bhil people’s realisation of citizenship 
rights is interlinked with identity-based forest tenure reform. There exist socio-economic and 
cultural differences that determine who gains and who loses with respect to access, use, and 
management of forests among the local forest users (settled people and others like the 
nomadic pastoralists). Table 4.3 illustrates how well-off Bhil households distance themselves 
from the collective action of forest management to gain more individual rights in order to 
further enhance their political ‘belonging’ – within and outside the Bhil community – to 
mainstream Indian society and to the government. By justifying the significance of collective 
forest rights, the marginalised Bhil in their daily struggle strategically choose to represent the 
other excluded forest users, to promote their interests as a community, and emphasise their 
group identity as tribal people. There is to some extent a realisation that the 
institutionalisation of individual entitlements, rights, and privileges will create a differentiated 
and unequal citizenship status, and potentially harm their claim for collective rights. 
Nonetheless, the Bhil households’ wish for individualisation of forest rights is reinforced by 
the association that they perceive between it and receiving fundamental recognition from the 
government of their citizenship rights, in particular when they cannot secure their collective 
rights.      
Just as it has imposed top-down collective rights (as shown in chapter 3), the government 
has imposed individualisation. The granting of individual rights – where the Bhil’s forest 
rights are recognised – with the rationale of legitimising traditional rights is mere tokenism. 
By transforming oral history into a specific interpretation of customary rights, the government 
fails to recognise the specificity of forest-dependent Bhil people’s historic, cultural rights and 
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current needs (see Skaria, 1999). This, in fact, ends up strengthening conventional mainstream 
Indian society’s biases. Individuals know that forest rights recognition will not be able to 
shield them from different forms of local-level conflicts and forest rights struggles as shown 
in Figure 4.1. Such recognition will remain utopian without local empowerment. The 
individualisation of households’ forest tenure prompts new conflicts among community 
members and within households and suppresses old conflicts with the Forest Department. 
Often, the decision-making authority for statutory forest tenure policy reform is assigned to 
those who are socio-economically and politically well-off, and also on the basis of gender 
(see Chapter 5). It is not surprising that the well-off households (with minimum interest in 
forest conservation) control the other forest users by including them in, or excluding them 
from, accessing and managing forest resources. Conflicts are inevitable in the local 
management of natural resources and constantly take place between as well as within 
communities (macro level) and individual households. It is unclear whose forest rights claims 
are to be recognised and considered as constituting real access rights.   
In this context, I argue, on the basis of my findings in chapter 4, that conflict analysis of 
forest tenure must be approached by identifying the differences between individuals (well-off 
or marginal) in their ability to get their forest rights recognised as legitimate. Such a process 
is challenging because the socio-economically and/or politically well-connected households 
try to exclude the marginal forest users’ access, use, and management rights to forests. One of 
the challenging tasks is to actually recognise rights because the underlying issue of tribal 
people’s claims and the struggles for rights among multiple rights is dynamic and context 
specific (see Larson et al., 2011; Sikor and Stahl, 2011). Recognition of a uniform 
‘individualisation’ of forest rights is unlikely to level the uneven playing field. This calls for 
re-visiting rights in order to ascertain which form of legitimacy asserted to claim forest rights 
(for example, Bhil tribal residents, nomadic forest users, and officials) should be recognised. 
Conflict resolution in relation to individual forest tenure rights requires a transparent debate 
that acknowledges differences and that highlights the fact that recognising the rights of one 
individual means that another individual will have fewer rights (see also Edwards, 2011). My 
findings challenge the proposition (e.g. Phuc, 2011) that the devolution of forest tenure rights 
should grant use rights rather than alienation rights to the households. I argue in chapter 4 that 
unless forest rights are residency based, that is, vested in the community and give authority to 
local institutions by empowering the citizens, it is futile to debate for or against alienation 
rights. The decentralisation of forest tenure rights is necessary to prevent the government 
from being able to re-centralise forest land rights (either by not recognising or by retaining the 
alienation rights) and to prevent the well-off households from accumulating forest land.     
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6.2.4 Marginalisation: Women’s Forest Rights    
 
 
“Why does the Forest Department have no women as beat guards 
or district officer [in the study area]? They call us [tribal women] 
backward! Let them first change their own system!” 
 
- Harki-ben, a former sarpanch (2010, Banswara, Rajasthan)  
-  
 
The results presented in chapter 5, relating to the fourth research question, clearly demonstrate 
that forestry is male biased and that the Forest Rights Act has left women further excluded 
from access rights, including from decision making about forest management. Within the 
village institutions that manage forest land and forest resources in the study area, men rather 
than women are represented. This is also typical among the government officials, such as 
those representing the Forest Department. At tehsil and/or village level, there are no female 
officials. By bringing in more female personnel, gender-biased attitudes will hopefully change 
and the realities faced by the tribal women will be better highlighted (see also Gurung, 2002). 
The gender literature is unclear about the meaning of gender. Often, gender is denoted as 
‘women’s issues’ – a denotation that may (unintentionally) receive negative reactions from 
men (see also Mai et al., 2011). I deliberately choose not to represent Bhil tribal women’s 
forest rights as just a gender issue; rather, they are intertwined with complex dynamics around 
their rights, identity, and belonging. One of the pertinent reasons is that project intervention in 
the study area categorised the Bhil women without acknowledging that these women already 
had a certain way of participating traditionally. By creating a separate identity, the projects 
marginalised women by imposing the need for them to be ‘included’ in new ways of 
participation. Women are involved in forest management because it is considered necessary 
to involve them for good governance in project interventions of the JFM, the PESA (gram 
panchayat), and the Forest Rights Act (see also Bose, 2011b). To some extent, this has 
created an image of Bhil women as uneducated, and implies that they need to be educated to 
participate. I outline in chapters 1 and 5 how the Bhil women traditionally had a matrilineal 
society and exercised a certain degree of freedom, unlike their counterparts from mainstream 
Indian society, and were involved in traditional forest use and management before the forest 
reforms.  
Chapter 5 demonstrates that Bhil women’s struggle is first to maintain their collective 
tribal identity, then they are expected to assimilate the identity of non-scheduled tribe women, 
and also to adopt an identity (ascribed by external institutions) of ‘backward women.’ Bhil 
women are jiggling between these identities, and they are struggling (especially older Bhil 
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women) to resist these images of backwardness and to claim rightful access to forest land and 
forest resources. I argue that it is not good enough to give women the right to vote or to 
participate in meetings under the women’s predetermined of quota without empowering them. 
The policy of taking gender into account makes a token gesture towards women and gender 
issues and often results in a quick fix solution through the women’s quota, rather than fixing 
the root causes of such marginalisation. Even worse, the authority takes the reservation quota 
literally, preventing women from being in the majority, be it at the gram panchayat or the 
JFM committee of the village-level forest rights committees. Remarkably, as shown in 
chapter 5, there exists division within the homogenous category of tribal women, that is, elite 
vs. marginal women. This division occurs when the positions reserved for ‘backward’ women 
are taken by women from well-off households (who themselves may be subordinate to their 
male relatives), creating a further gap in achieving participation and equitable forest 
management (see also Agarwal, 2009; Bose, 2009a). What is needed is inclusive forest 
management. As Agarwal (2010) has suggested, women’s participation should not be 
segregated by forming a separate women’s group; rather, there is need to increase women’s 
numbers in the meetings in order to encourage them to challenge the existing power relations. 
The Forest Rights Act has brought all sorts of perceived and actual forest access rights to the 
Bhil tribal women. Any decentralisation without considering women’s rights will be futile 
(see also Colfer, 2005) and may in fact prevent women from achieving their collective forest 
rights.  
For forest tenure rights to be implemented successfully, it is important that the 
decentralisation process does not exclude women, or include them just for the sake of the 
project intervention and make it mandatory to participate without the true essence of 
participation (see also Bose, 2009b). It is clear that decentralisation of forest management will 
bring no change for tribal women if they are not considered as individual citizens. 
Individualisation of tenure rights manifested through the Forest Rights Act makes it necessary 
for tribal women to contest the emerging masculine ideologies, because men continue to be 
the primary claimants, as discussed in chapter 3. Tribal women are in a dilemma because they 
prefer collective forest access rights, but they cannot push for that because then they would 
have to forego the possibility of their male-dominated household getting access to individual 
forest tenure rights. In the forest land claim, tribal women have been left behind because their 
traditional association with forestry has been in collective form to access non-timber forest 
resources, mainly for the sustenance of their households. In general, in collective forest 
management, marginal tribal women tend to function as ‘we,’ as compared to their male 
counterparts who function as ‘I’ by being recognised as the rights holder because of the 
authority they hold over forest land. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 elucidate that the individualisation of 
forest land tenure is less beneficial to women in their future access rights to forests. Forest 
access rights, rather than property rights, are more significant for enabling women to 
collectively organise themselves and to make decisions.  
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6.3  THE KEY ARGUMENTS  
 
In this section, I summarise the central argument of this research, focusing on the conceptual 
micro-politics framework used for the empirical analysis in this thesis, as shown in Figure 
1.2. This research has demonstrated that the micro-politics framework, by going beyond the 
limits of one specific concept, is crucial in understanding the intricate dynamics of 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform. The use of these micro-politics concepts – 
governmentality, institutional pluralism, authority, citizenship, and access – helps us to 
understand that these different dimensions of forest tenure reform are intertwined (see Figure 
1.1) and at different scales, ranging from the individual, via the household, to the gram 
panchayat (see Figure 1.2). The conceptual framework explains that forest rights are 
interconnected at various levels and that every activity, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
suggest, is simultaneously macro-political and micro-political. The concept of forest 
governmentality explains the different dialectics in the workings of power of the colonial and 
post-colonial government through the conduct of conduct, identity, and the visibility trap. It 
throws light on the fact that governing forest and people is not just about forcing people to do 
what the government wants. It is also about processes of constructing an identity of ‘self’ – as 
a tribal individual and/or group – that is internalised. The coupling of institutional pluralism 
and authority in the framework allows for a more complete analysis of the current socio-
political changes at the gram panchayat level, and makes visible the mechanisms of 
legitimisation – through practices and rules – of certain kinds of statutory institutions and 
authority. Equally important, the focus on institutional pluralism reveals that having different 
types of authority is not necessarily a good thing for making legitimate choices about forest 
rights. The polycentric character of authority based on different local-level institutions 
interferes with the democratic process of forest governance. The threat for the implementation 
of the Forest Rights Act is that the institutional pluralism created here as well as ignoring 
existing traditional authority is likely to impede the collective forest rights of tribal people.  
At the household level, the concept of citizenship in the micro-politics analysis explains its 
linkages with the other two concepts: forest tenure rights and conflicts. At the same time, the 
concept of citizenship exposes the governmentalisation – i.e. subject-making – of the Bhil 
people as the other side of the same coin. In other words, although the trend towards 
citizenship could be viewed as a form of emancipation from the government’s subjectification 
of the scheduled tribes, this is not the case. At government level, the power to reverse the 
recognition of individual forest tenure has remained with the government, since the alienation 
rights of forest remain under its authority; and at the village level, forest rights-related 
conflicts have emerged because of the new competing claims on forest resources and land as a 
consequence of the Forest Rights Act. These conflicts show that the elite households exert 
control over marginal Bhils through their power to exclude others. The conceptual micro-
politics framework shows that, through the individualisation of forest tenure rights, tribal 
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people are fragmented by the state, without actually being empowered with real citizenship 
rights.  
Gender mainstreaming by addressing tribal women’s exclusion from their access rights to 
forest land and forest resources is the fourth domain of micro-politics analysed here. The 
theory of access has been very significant in framing the analysis because it explains the 
dynamics of ownership versus usufruct rights to forest land and resources. This concept helps 
in explaining not only the way access is perceived by women (from legal to traditional 
notions), but also how new and different institutions and authority undermine the political and 
social inclusion of women, making them second-class citizens, even in a local society that 
was traditionally matriarchal.  
 
6.3.1  Lessons Learnt  
Decentralisation and forest tenure reform are among several processes involved in shaping 
tribal people’s livelihood outcomes. From the legalistic point of view, legislation in itself does 
not solve the problems on the ground. Yet, it is important. Decentralisation for tribal India 
was not an easy legal process. The Government of India introduced the Panchayati Raj in all 
areas of India except in the demarcated scheduled areas – excluding the majority of tribal 
India. Tribal people had to struggle for their decentralisation rights, which were recognised 
only three years after their implementation in mainstream India. The success of 
decentralisation in tribal India is strongly dependent on the choice and recognition of local 
(forest management) institutions and upon the authority of the citizens to hold these 
institutions accountable. The choice of institution and recognition could either consolidate or 
lead to fragmented forms of authority (see Ribot et al., 2008). One of the pertinent lessons 
that I would like to highlight here is that it is not enough that the decentralisation is legalised 
(as in the case of the Panchayati Raj) and that the decentralised institutions are recognised 
through a local democratic process (gram panchayats/gram sabhas). Rather, what is required 
is that citizens do not fall into the trap of becoming subjects as defined by the authority. In 
other words, the implementation of decentralisation does not automatically empower local 
marginal tribal people to claim their citizenship rights. To ensure a level playing field, 
decentralisation must take account of the local dynamics, illiteracy, tenure rights, inequality 
between households, and the political participation of those who have never been involved by 
the government in the process of decision making (the macro–micro linkages). There are 
challenges for the tribal people to be at par of belonging with the others. To achieve this, 
decentralisation could be used as an instrument for tenure transition if implemented 
appropriately.  
Forest tenure reform is expected to provide security of the bundle of rights for tribal 
people that in turn would enhance good governance. However, all kinds of institutional 
dynamics on the ground make the outcomes of the law often different than expected, and 
sometimes there are unintentional outcomes. These unintended outcomes can only be 
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explained by studying the dynamics of micro-politics. Forest tenure policy reform is at the 
interface of traditional rights and statutory rights, and, most often, superimposing the latter on 
traditional rights will only result in insecurity. It is obvious that what is needed is ‘getting the 
rights right,’ acknowledging both the local traditional dynamics and knowledge in the formal 
arrangements. Rather than identifying a single institution and/or authority from the existing 
dynamic institutional pluralism, it is important that the forest people’s rights are recognised 
through nested institutions and authority. The term nested institutions refers to a co-ordinated 
body that reduces the risk of unnecessary overlap of administrative authority and competing 
claims among different institutions. On a more global level, forest tenure reform is very 
important in relation to successfully reducing emissions from deforestation and preventing 
forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+), especially in marginalised areas 
inhabited by vulnerable populations. The national government, in an attempt to win REDD+ 
finance, may attempt to do a quick and dirty fix of impending tenure rights that may not 
directly benefit the rights of marginalised populations and rights holders (see also FAO, 
2011). It will also look for justifications to recentralise forest management by retracting actual 
devolution of power to local institutions and/or by claiming to be the legitimate authority and 
representative of forest-dependent people (see Sundar, 2001; Ribot et al., 2006; Phelps et al., 
2010). There is, therefore, an urgent need for clarity on forest tenure. 
 
6.3.2 Reflections 
From the above discussion it is clear that forest tenure policy reforms have been influential in 
shaping tribal people’s forest rights. Given that forest tenure reform is a large domain, it 
requires different dimensions to understand the implications. I have therefore consciously 
used different analytical concepts depending on the theoretical implications of the research 
questions. This thesis, however, has certain inherent limitations in its theoretical, 
methodological, and empirical approach. For example, this study has not been able to 
straightforwardly identify the interrelations between the micro-level dynamics and the macro 
or meso level projects and policy interventions. There is need to elucidate the macro and 
micro interface in order to ascertain the correlation between tenure rights and other market 
mechanisms that currently remain unclear, namely, will market-based initiatives provide 
benefit through loans to the tribal community without alienation rights? To what extent will 
the lack of collective tenure rights impact the conservation of forests? How will other rights-
based reforms, such as the Right to Food campaign or Rural Employment Guarantee schemes 
in tribal India, affect the Forest Rights Act? What are the rules of the game among the 
different competing government line departments (Forest Department, Panchayati Raj, 
Revenue Department, and Tribal Welfare Department) with overlapping authority to manage 
the resources?  
From the methodological perspective, the choice of the gram panchayat as the unit of 
analysis helped to clarify the micro-politics of forest tenure reform. It is evident in the study 
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areas that there is a high degree of variability in terms of institutional arrangement. Just 
because Joint Forest Management, the Panchayati Raj, or the Forest Rights Act have been 
implemented by creating new village-level committees does not mean they will continue to be 
active without actual political decentralisation in place. This requires further investigation, 
beyond scope of this thesis, about why decentralisation and forest reforms are subverted by 
the different government departments in the process of implementation. Above all, what 
remains to be examined is how India’s push for legislation and formalisation of every right 
can be monitored without stringent rules in place in relation to implementation. When local 
officials from government departments become ex-officio member of the village-level 
committees, several points remain unclear: the extent to which they are downwardly 
accountable, whether local people are empowered enough to hold them accountable, and how 
the legal status of the local institutions differs significantly between different provinces/states 
in tribal India. This thesis focuses on the lesser researched topics of the dryland forests, 
citizenship of tribals, and forest rights of tribal people, which have in general so far been 
largely ignored by the policy discourses in India. The question is why the policy discourses 
and donors have ignored the marginal tribal groups and the domain of the dryland forests, 
especially when livelihood dependence on dryland forest resources is so high. A more 
comprehensive methodological approach would take into account the policy discourses of 
international and Indian actors, such as non-governmental organisations, donors, and higher 
government bureaucrats.   
Empirically, this thesis has used more qualitative data analysis, which proved beneficial in 
establishing a strong baseline for further investigation from the micro-politics perspective. 
The real allocations of individual forest land through the Forest Rights Act were under 
consideration at the district level. Further in-depth quantitative empirical analysis is needed to 
examine the status of approved/rejected forest rights claims. This is important, because the 
committee set up under the National Advisory Council by the environment ministry reviewed 
the implementation of the Forest Rights Act and showed that forest officers were not giving 
forest lands to rightful non-scheduled tribe claimants, and neither were they handing over 
community rights to forest resources (see Sethi, 2011). Such analysis would provide valuable 
insights into land use change and the effect of the Forest Rights Act. The extent to which 
forest tenure policy reform has livelihood impacts in terms of capabilities and assets – social, 
economic, natural, physical, human, and political – and particularly how to increase the 
accountability of public institutions to all citizens, demands future attention. Forest rights 
need to be considered in terms of micro–macro linkages in the context of decentralisation, 
tenure reform, vulnerability to food security, and adaptation strategies.     
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6.3.3 Related Research Outputs 
As discussed in chapter 1 (see section 1.5.1), I produced several research-related outputs on 
the basis of this thesis research. These outputs have indirectly generated knowledge that adds 
another interesting dimension to this thesis, that is, its applicability and generalisation to 
different regional context. The paper presentations at the international symposium in 2009 on 
‘Decentralisation, Power, and Tenure Rights of Forest-Dependent People’ essentially 
corroborate that decentralisation and forest tenure reform in tribal India are not a standalone 
case, but face similar challenges in Africa, South America, and other Asian countries (see 
section 1.5.1.1 and Appendix V).  
The paper presented at this international symposium by Weigelt (2009), for example, 
analysed the outcomes of tenure reforms in the Brazilian Amazon that aimed to secure forest-
dependent traditional people’s rights to land and forest. It provides empirical evidence that 
forest-dependent traditional people lacked the capacities and resources to elaborate 
management plans, the approval of which by the Federal Environmental Agency is mandatory 
for concession rights to timber. In effect, these traditional communities remained dependent 
on small traders who had control over financial resources and contacts to ‘legalise’ illegally 
cut wood. The findings suggest that the devolution of timber rights to the traditional 
communities in the Amazon by the Federal Environmental Agency is the way out. Likewise, 
in Africa, Idrissou et al. (2009) explain how the devolution of power is shared between the 
state and forest communities, and how social cohesion evolved in the management of the 
Ouémé Supérieure et N’dali (OSN) forests in Benin. Their study revealed that, after more 
than fifteen years of implementation of a participatory approach, the involvement of the local 
communities in forest management has declined. Some roles and responsibilities devolved to 
local communities in the participatory arrangement plan for the OSN forest have been 
progressively taken away by the forest administration. Social cohesion was built at the 
beginning of the process and boosted stakeholder participation. Unfortunately, the cohesion 
between the stakeholders was deconstructed and led to conflict between the stakeholders. In 
Burkina Faso, Lingani and Savadogo (2009) analysed how the local institutions and forest 
policies in force can help in the process of devolution of powers. They also evaluated whether 
the populations at the local level have influence over, and a voice in, the institutions. Their 
results show that local institutions/government impede the devolution of power processes 
regarding forest management, and the local people are excluded from the decision-making 
process. They show that decision making is a prerogative of influential individuals like 
traditional authorities, leaders of forest management groups, and local elected councillors. In 
the Asian context, Khadka (2009) explored how the ‘community forestry’ policy itself has 
been involved in creating the problem of exclusion, rather than solving it. The analysis 
focuses on the problems caused by the dominant perspective of environmental management in 
the community forestry policy and power/knowledge relationships in the policymaking 
process. The findings highlight a paradox that exists in community forestry because, on the 
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one hand, government and international donors consider community forestry to be 
instrumental in addressing poverty and the Millennium Development Goals. On the other 
hand, exclusion continues to take place in community forestry, and is possibly even 
increasing. With research findings from Orissa, Eastern India, Sarangi (2009) demonstrated 
that, even though participatory forest management projects have increased in number in the 
tribal area, they still have major faults in their functioning. The study revealed that a number 
of constraints have resulted in very poor livelihood conditions among the forest-dwelling 
communities in the state of Orissa.   
All the papers presented at this international symposium, along with these abovementioned 
five studies on traditional forest-dependent people in Brazil, Benin, Burkina Faso, Nepal, and 
India, show that my research arguments in this thesis are relevant globally on various aspects 
of decentralisation and forest tenure reform. The main globally relevant arguments include: 
(1) actual devolution of power to forest-dependent people is absolutely essential; (2) simply 
decentralising without empowering forest people can create problems in social cohesion 
(state–community), leading to conflict; and (3) decision-making processes are influenced by 
elites who hold power to exclude others.  
The CIFOR’s infobrief ‘Forests: Gender, Property Rights and Access’ (see section 1.5.1.3; 
Sun et al., forthcoming) draws on Bose (2011a) in addition to two research papers from 
Africa and Latin America. It emphasises that the management of forests is intertwined with 
the human rights of forest-dependent women and their families; that forest tenure reforms in 
Africa, Asia, and Latin America neglect the property rights of women and their rights to 
access forest resources; and that the male–female balance in forest management groups 
influences the quality of forest governance.  
This research has also produced output in audio-visual form (see section 1.5.1.2). The 
‘Forest Rights’ short documentary film (see attached DVD) depicts the current status of 
implementation of the Forest Rights Act in the study area. The story told through the voice of 
Bhil people provides further insights on the issue of corruption (forgery of forest claims, 
bribery, etc.) that are prevalent and may have increased due to the implementation of the Act. 
It shows that the Forest Department officials at local level (range forest officers and beat 
guards) realise the reasons why the Tribal Welfare Department and not the Forest Department 
was chosen as the nodal agency for the implementation of the Forest Rights Act. The film 
also shows that the beat guards follow the instruction of higher level Forest Department 
officials, even though they know that there are complications in the implementation of 
traditional forest rights, such as the lack of resources to conduct thorough demarcation, 
funding, lack of empowerment of tribal people, the sour relationship between forest people 
and the state, among many other factors. The film further shows that the Bhil people are 
continuously struggling with different types of forest management intervention projects that 
are either replaced by a newer version and/or never implemented appropriately, as with the 
case of the decentralisation process through the PESA. Screening the film at conferences and 
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workshops has helped to facilitate discussion among participants on emerging forest rights 
issues within and outside India. The film adds value to this thesis by visually substantiating 
the different dimensions of the micro-politics discussed in each chapter.            
    
6.4 THE WAY FORWARD TOWARDS DECENTRALISED FOREST TENURE 
REFORM  
 
From a layperson’s perspective, one of the simplest ways forward is to abandon the notion 
that concepts can be universally defined; rather, concepts should be put into practice in 
diverse and complex communities across multi-level societies and adapted to specific 
contexts. This may sound absurd for theorists, legislators, and donors because it does not help 
them to impart their resources to multiple actors; it is simply unmanageable from their 
perspective. Then, where can one draw a line between the undefined open access world, and 
the compartmentalised and codified world of forests, water, women, tribals, children, conflict, 
food, land, seen through different lenses. What is needed to achieve the well-intended 
decentralisation and forest tenure reform is to move towards a holistic national agenda on 
development.   
For the government line departments: One of the priorities for a way forward is to work 
towards harmonising the government’s own contradictory policies, and avoid competition 
between line departments. At the national level, there is need to reorganise the Forest 
Department’s control on forest people and forest resources through a number of technical and 
cultural changes, including: adding a gender dimension to their recruitment strategy at all 
levels (macro and micro); collaborating with other government line departments; and 
distancing themselves from controlling local governance through ex-officio membership of 
local committees. The central government as well as the state government should promote a 
nested institution that will reduce the risks of their own bureaucratic and administrative 
overlaps and competing claims by different institutions. There is a need for an integrated 
national level programme that combines forest rights with other human rights, such as the 
right to food, employment, capital, and the markets. Another priority is to make the 
implementation process for the PESA and the Forest Rights Act clear and transparent. At 
district and village level, there is a need to ensure that the implementation of decentralisation 
and forest tenure reform is conducted appropriately, particularly agreeing upon a legitimate 
collective representation and by ensuring downwardly accountable authority and decentralised 
institutions.  
For donors, policymakers, and civil society actors: If government departments need a 
revamp, then the donors, policymakers, and civil society need it too. Given past experiences, 
funding plays a major role in the implementation of projects. Donor-driven projects can 
engender the vicious circle of the falling trap, in that the national government – often trying to 
catch up with new sources of funding – continues changing institutional arrangements and 
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legislation. This does not help. Donors can in many ways change society. Making a project 
intervention donor driven may lead to a quick solution to a problem, but in the long run it may 
risk marginalising people even further. Policymakers and legislators, on the other hand, by 
creating policies and laws that are too specialised, may only fragment communities by 
dividing their interests; rather, there is a need to unify these groups. There is a need for actual 
decentralisation to involve the local marginal people, such as the forest-dependent Bhil, in the 
policymaking process or in framing the type of project interventions that will help identify a 
local way of moving forward.    
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EPILOGUE  
AUGUST 18, 2018 
 
On assignment for BBC television, I was travelling to tribal India to co-direct a documentary 
film series. I took this interesting assignment primarily to grab an opportunity to travel back 
to a tribal region in western India where I had initiated my research and development work 
almost twenty years previously.  
 
The ten-part film series would highlight the Government of India’s National Mission for 
Green India, initiated ten years previously as the country’s National Action Plan for 
Adaptation to Climate Change. The Green India Mission had a budget of over US$ 500 
million to increase and improve forest and tree cover on 10 million hectares of land and 
increase the income of about 3 million forest-dependent households, many from scheduled 
tribes and other forest-dwelling communities. This Green Fund differed from previous forest 
management initiatives in that it emphasised climate mitigation initiatives like the Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) and other market-based 
conservation, rather than addressing forest people’s fundamental right to forest land.   
 
On my way to New Delhi, India’s capital city, to kick-start filming, my mind was pondering 
several questions. What changes will I see? Has autonomy and local democracy been 
realised? Has the government devolved resources and empowered the gram sabhas – village 
councils? Did the tribal people gain their traditional forest land and forest resource rights, and, 
if so, how? My co-director and I began filming interviews with senior officials from 
ministries, including the Ministry of Environment and Forests. We were told that the US$ 500 
million budget was successfully spent on tree plantations and improving the forest cover. 
However, due to lack of funding the gram sabhas remained outside the ambit of political 
decentralisation. Forest tenure issues continued to be disputed. Reasons given for failure were 
the same as a decade previously, for example, lack of foresters for surveillance, and people 
encroaching on forest land, except that the senior government officials used terms such as 
democratic spaces, governmentality, access rights for women, and citizenship rights. We 
received a copy of a proposed new draft policy ‘Green India – People Plus,’ which promises 
tribal rights by 2030.   
 
We went to film people’s perspectives in tribal areas. To my surprise, not only ‘forest land’ 
but also the ‘wasteland’ and communal grazing land had been transformed into beautiful 
forests that were fenced. I got the impression that the pastoralist communities had shrunk. 
After probing several tribal people, I began to understand the change. In an attempt to 
increase tree cover, government promised the tribal people such as the Bhil that they would 
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benefit from payment for ecosystem services. In tribal villages, participatory forest 
management failed because there was (still) no democratically elected institution or any 
legitimate downwardly accountable authority, and gram sabhas were not empowered. The 
poor Bhils not only lost their forest-based livelihoods, but also received less income from 
government subsidy programmes due to a shift in the national below poverty line (BPL) 
indicator from US$ 1/day (approximately Indian Rupee 50) to a mere US$ 35 cents/day 
(approximately Indian Rupee 20). My optimist co-director tried to show me things through his 
lenses: first, the increase in highly valuable timber forests was good for the national economy, 
and, second, there had been an improvement in forest-dependent tribal people’s livelihood 
due to their out-migration as day labourers constructing concrete urban jungles. I sighed. My 
novice question that I had posed twenty years previously, ‘why tribal people are not involved 
in forest policymaking’ will hopefully be addressed in the immediate future.   
 
We decided to choose an optimistic title for our documentary film: ‘Tribal People’s Rights.’  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Overview of the administrative structure of the Forest Department, Tribal Welfare 
Department, and Panchayati Raj Department 
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APPENDIX II 
 
List of respondents to in-depth interviews 
 
II.1 Bagidora tehsil           
II.1.1  Village B1 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
B1.01 Ex-JFM chairperson Male Aug 2008 individual 1  
B1.02 Ex-JFM secretary Male Aug 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B1.03 VFI chairperson  Male Aug 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B1.04 Ex-women JFM 
members 
Female Sept 2008 group 2 (audio rec) 
B1.05 EC members of VFI Male Nov 2008 group 2 (audio rec) 
B1.06 Ward member#1, VFI 
Sec 
Male Nov 2008 individual 1 
B1.07 Customary leader elder Male Jan 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
Total 9 
 
 II.1.2 Village B2 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
B2.01 Ex-JFM chairperson Male Aug 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B2.02 Ex-JFM secretary Male Aug 2008 individual 1 
B2.03 VFI chairperson Male Aug 2008 individual 1 
B2.04 Sarpanch #P1 Male Jan 2009  individual 1 (video rec) 
B2.05 Upa sarpanch #P1 Male Jan 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
B2.06 Ward member# 2 Male Aug 2008 individual 1 
B2.07 Ward member# 3 Male Feb 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
B2.08 Customary leader elders Male Sept 2008 group 2 (audio rec) 
B2.09 Women rep of VFI EC Female Sept 2008 group 2 (audio rec) 
B2.10 Horticulture leaders Female Nov 2008 group 2 
B2.11 Forest resident # 1 Male Nov 2008 individual 1 
B2.12 Forest resident # 2 Male Oct 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B2.13 Forest resident # 3 Female Jan 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
B2.14 Cooperative leader Male Oct 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
Total 17 
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 II.1.3 Village B3 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
B3.01 VFI chairperson Male Sept 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B3.02 VFI secretary Male Sept 2008 individual 1 
B3.03 Ex-sarpanch P1 Female Sept 2008 individual 1 
B3.04 Self-help group leaders Female Oct 2008 group 3 
B3.05 Ex-JFM secretary Female Oct 2008 individual 1 
B3.06 VFI EC women member Female Nov 2008 group 3  
B3.07 Ward member# 4 Male Nov 2008 individual 1 
B3.08 Self-help group member Female Nov 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
Total 12 
 
 II.1.4. Village B4 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
B4.01 VFI chairperson Male Nov 2008 individual 1 
B4.02 VFI secretary Female Nov 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
B4.03 Forest residents + SHG Female Nov 2008 group 4 (audio rec) 
B4.04 Panchayat secretary P1 Male Feb 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
B4.05 Ward member # 5 Male Oct 2008 individual 1 (audio rec) 
Total 8 
 
II.2 Kushalgarh tehsil         
II.2.1  Village K1 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
K1.01 Ex-JFM chairperson Male Jan 2009  individual 1 (audio rec) 
K1.02 Upa sarpanch P2 Male Jan 2009  individual 1 (audio rec) 
K1.03 VFI chairperson Male Feb 2009  individual 1 (video rec) 
K1.04 Ex-JFM members Female Feb 2009  group 2 (audio rec) 
K1.05 EC member of VFI Male Jan 2009  group 3 (audio rec) 
K1.06 Ward member#1, VFI 
secretary 
Male Jan 2009  individual 1 
Total 9 
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II.2.2  Village K2 
NID Membership position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
K2.01 VFI EC women member Female Jan 2009  individual 1 (video rec) 
K2.02 Ex-JFM secretary, VFI 
chairperson 
Male Jan 2009  individual 1 
K2.03 VFI and P2 secretary Male Feb 2009  individual 1 
K2.04 VFI members Female Feb 2009 group 3 (audio rec) 
K2.05 VFI EC members Male Feb 2009 group 2 (audio rec) 
K2.06 Ward member #2 Male Oct 2009 individual 1 
Total 9 
 
II.3 Others: Government and non-government officials      
   
NID Position Gender Date Interview Respondents 
01 Conservator of Forests Male  individual 1 
02 Acting DFO, Banswara Male Oct 2009 individual 1 
03 District forest officer Male  individual 1 
04 Forest range officer Male Jan 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
05 Forest beat guards Male Jan 2009 group 2 (video rec) 
06 NGO member # 1 Male Feb 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
07 NGO member # 2 Female Feb 2009 individual 1 (video rec) 
08 Patwari/Revenue officer Male Jan 2009 individual 1 
09 Tribal dev. officer  Male Nov 2008 individual 1 
Total 10 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Open-ended and semi-structure interviews for decentralised forest management and forest 
land tenure study 
 
III.1 Household interviews  
Household (HH) identification        
 Name of the village (VID) 
 Name of the tehsil (TID) 
 Household (HID) 
 When was the household formed?  
 Household head (PID=0) name, age, marital status, gender, edu, ethnicity 
 Was the household head born, and how long has the head lived, in this village? 
 Name of each household member and PID for each respondent (e.g. PID 1, 2…) 
 Relation to household head 
 Gender of each household member (0=male; 1=female) 
 Education of each household member (0=illiterate; 1=literate)   
 Ethnicity of each household member 
 Age of each household member 
 
Access and claim to forest land and forest resources     
 How much land (in acres) do you currently hold (own/rent)? 
Type Acres % 
Total land   
Total statutorily land owned   
Claimed land   
Rented out   
Rented from others   
Others (details)   
 Did household agricultural land holding increased in last ten years? (No=0, Yes=1) 
 If increased, by how many acres? 
 Does the land belong ‘inside’ official demarcated forest land? (No=0, Yes=1). If yes, 
is it statutorily recognised? 
 What was the mechanism (inherit, gift, purchase, claim, or other)? 
 Describe land use activities. 
 Describe the main products grown by household. 
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Land type Total 
area in 
acres 
 Ownership 
status 
(code) 
 
Main products grown in last two 
agricultural seasons  
 
 Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 
Private  forest      
Cropland       
Pasture       
Agro-forestry      
Pasture      
Horticulture      
Other land and 
veg use 
     
 How many livestock does your household own? Cattle = __, Buffalos= ___, 
Sheep=___, Goats=___ Other=___ 
 Do you leave your cattle for open grazing?  
 What kind of land do you use for cattle grazing?  
 Describe how gauchar (grazing/common) land is used.  
 From where do you get fodder for cattle?  
 Is fodder free or do you have to buy it?  
 Do you have to pay fees or fines for cattle grazing on communal land?  
 Does your choice of cattle depend upon land holding? Explain how.  
 What are the main livelihood activities? Rank each activity according to importance. 
 How much land-related activity contributes economically to livelihood? 
 What factors influence your decision to choose land-related activity?  
 Do you access forest land? (No=0, Yes=1) 
 Who determines your forest land access rights?  
 If you access forest land, for what purpose do you use it?  
 Is the access right formal or informal (describe)? 
 Did you break the forest-land access rules and trespass?  
 If yes, explain what kind of trespassing.  
 Describe how newly formed village forest institutions determine your access rights to 
forest land.  
 Any forest land claim in last 30 years? (No=0, Yes=1) 
 If yes, who (household member) claimed?  
 When was it claimed?  
 Is it statutorily recognised?  
 How many acres claimed, recognised, and controlled by household?  
 When it was statutorily recognised?  
 Did you have to pay for the land claim, can you describe the process?  
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 Do you have access to communal forest resources?  
 If yes, do you have tenure rights to use forest resources? 
 What kind of forest resources do you access?  
 Describe the significance of forest resources for livelihood needs.  
 Who decides your access to forest resources?  
 
Authority and types of tenure rights for forest land and forest resources   
 Describe how informal (non-statutory) tenure rights recognise forest land  
 How do informal rights recognise forest resources?  
 Which institution in village (at panchayat level) has power to determine individual 
tenure rights? 
 Which institution (formal/informal) is preferred for claiming?  
 Is decision of an institution on forest land tenure resisted? (No=0, Yes=1) 
 If yes, explain why.   
 
Consequences of New Forest Rights Act 2006 on forest tenure    
 Describe how decentralised forest tenure rights influence individual forest tenure 
rights. 
 From where was the information about FRA received? 
 What information about forest tenure rights was received?  
 Any household conflicts relating to forest tenure rights as a result of new policy? 
 
 III.2 Additional flexible unstructured questions posed to village women  
  
Interviews were kept flexible, and open questions related to access rights, control of forest 
resources and forest land and women’s position (participation and decision making) in 
decentralised village forest institutions (VFI).  The following points were used by the 
interviewer to elaborate the question and probe during discussion.  
 
Access rights and actual control of forest resources and forest land   
 Responsibility in agriculture, labour work, and household activities   
 Importance and role of forest resources and forest land 
 Types of traditional access rights (formal and informal)  
 Traditional role of women in forest management 
 Forest resource and forest land access rights for women  
 Changes in women’s access rights with new forest governance 
 Significance of statutory forest tenure rights for women 
 Women’s work and its significance in forest management 
 Ownership of private trees (agro-forestry, horticulture) by women 
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 Control of forest individual land rights 
 Control of forest collective resource rights 
 Implications of women claiming forest land and forest resources 
 Access and control of forest resources related to economic independence 
 
Participation and discretionary decision-making position at VFI    
 Opinion about exclusion of/quota for women on VFI executive committee 
 Types of participation in forest management by women 
 Who participates (exclusion and inclusion) 
 Kind of women’s decision-making authority at VFI 
 Role of decentralisation on women’s forest management practices 
 Difference in VFI participation between men and women  
 Involvement of women in local (panchayat) political decision making 
 Motivation and hindrance for participation in VFI 
 Importance/challenges of VFI for women’s access rights  
 Opinion on individual claim to forest land v/s community forest management  
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Focus group discussions and key actor interviews to study decentralised village forest 
management institutions 
 
This protocol was used to facilitate the focus group discussion and as an outline for 
interviews with key actors (including village and panchayat respondents, Rajasthan 
Government Forest Department, Tribal Development Department, and non-governmental 
organisations). 
 
Background 
Demography                      
 Name of the village (VID) 
 Year this village was statutorily established 
 Current total population and households of the village 
 Number of person(s) that have out-migrated from, and in-migrated to, the village 
 Types of ethnic  groups (tribes and castes) in the village 
 Name of the village group gram panchayat (PID) 
 Name of panchayat headquartered village 
 Number and name of villages in gram panchayat 
 Average rainfall in the area (district) in past 10 years 
 Number of droughts in past 10 years and which years 
 
Resources and infrastructure         
 Number of households with electricity 
 Number of households with drinking water (piped) supply 
 Number of households with sanitation facility 
 Presence of functional healthcare centre in the village (0=no; 1=yes) 
 Primary school in the village (0=no; 1=yes); in the panchayat (0=no; 1=yes) 
 Secondary school in the village (0=no; 1=yes); in the panchayat (0=no; 1=yes) 
 Number of households with access to formal bank (credit)  
 Currently any informal credit groups in the village (0=no; 1=yes) 
 Village forest land (in hectares); panchayat forest land (in hectares) 
 Village common land (in hectares); panchayat common land (in hectares) 
 Village revenue waste land (in hectares); panchayat revenue wasteland (in hectares) 
 Nearest river to the village (in kms) 
 Community irrigation for the village (0=no; 1=yes) 
 Distance from the village to the nearest local town market (in kms) 
 How many forest managing groups are there in the village? (list) 
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 How many ward(s) panchayat in the village?  
 
Decentralised forest management institutions  
History of forest management (20 or 25 years ago)  
 How was forest managed before India’s independence? 
 Any customary forest management practices? (0=no; 1=yes)  
 If yes, what kind of practices?  
 How many people from the village were members?  
 Describe chiefs’ roles and responsibilities.  
 Were they accountable to locals?  
 How did people select a chief?  
 Is this customary forest management still in practice? 
 If yes, describe how it functions.  
 If no, what factors hindered the practice? 
 Who owned the ‘communal’ forest rights? 
 Who took the decision about forest-land and resource access? 
 Was there any meetings held to discuss the rules? 
 When did people meet? 
 Did people accept the decisions taken?  
 How was consensus reached?  
 How were conflicts (if any) resolved? 
 Did women make management decisions? 
 If yes, what kind of decision?  
 Are the decisions accepted by all? 
 Describe what kind of forests existed. 
 How was forest land demarcated?  
 Who demarcated the forest land?  
 Did anyone oppose the forest land boundary?  
 If yes, who opposed?  
 Why did they oppose? 
 How was it resolved? 
 How was forest land used by people? 
 What kind of rights did people have to use the forest land? 
 Did people cultivate ‘inside’ forests?  
 If yes, who allocated forest land for cultivation? 
 How many households were cultivating or living inside forests? 
 Did they have statutory rights from government? 
 Describe how forest resources were used.  
 Who benefitted from within and outside the village?  
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 What kinds of benefits were received from the forest?   
 Did forest user groups have statutory rights to use forest resources? 
 Describe how other common resources (water, gauchar land, etc.) were managed by 
the local community. 
 
Joint Forest Management (JFM) Programme: community management     
 When was the JFM committee formed? (yyyy) 
 Is the JFM committee registered by the Forest Department? 
 Is the JFM committee still functional?  
 If no, when did the committee cease to function? 
 Describe how the JFM committee was formed.  
 Who initiated the formation of JFM committee? 
 How were executive committee members chosen?  
 Were the executive committee members the same as pre-JFM authority? 
 Describe the main reasons for joining JFM. 
 Who (actors) were included as JFM members?  
 Who were excluded as JFM members? 
 Reasons for inclusion and exclusion of members. 
 What are the main responsibilities of the executive committee members? 
 Are the executive committee members accountable?  
 If yes, to whom? Explain how. 
 Did the committee members have authority to decide? 
 If yes, what kind of decision-making power? 
 Describe the kinds of management changes that were introduced with JFM.  
 How do the new rules impact people’s livelihood? 
 Are the new rules accepted by the people?  
 What was women’s role in JFM (as compared to past)? 
 Did JFM involve women’s decision making? If yes, how? 
 How did JFM change the sharing of forest resources and forest land?  
 
Village forest institution (VFI): power and tenure rights     
 When was the VFI established? 
 Who initiated the VFI?  
 Is the VFI statutorily recognised by the Forest Department?  
 How was the executive committee formed?  
 Were the executive committee members the same as for JFM? 
 If no, who were excluded? 
 Why were they excluded from the VFI? 
 If new members, who are they?  
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 Describe how the new executive committee is different. 
 How different or similar is the VFI and the JFM committee?  
 What are the roles and responsibilities of the VFI committee? 
 Who are the members of the VFI?  
 Are any members of JFM excluded from the VFI?  
 Did everyone from the village become members of the VFI?  
 If not, who are excluded and why? 
 What are the main responsibilities of the VFI executive committee?  
 Describe whether the new VFI rules are the same as those of JFM?  
 If not, what are the differences?  
 How are the VFI accountable?  
 If yes, to whom? Explain how. 
 What kinds of management changes are introduced with the VFI? 
 How do new rules impact livelihoods, mainly women? 
 How many meetings were held after formation of the VFI? 
 Did women participate? If yes, what are their roles in the VFI? 
 Describe how the VFI decides on individual forest land tenure rights. 
 Did new people claim forest land from the VFI?  
 How many new claims have been approved? Why? 
 What is the status of community forest rights under the VFI?  
 How does the VFI share the forest resources among its members? 
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APPENDIX V 
 
List of international participants for the symposium titled ‘Decentralisation, Power, and 
Tenure Rights of Forest-Dependent People’ held in Dahod, Gujarat, India, 27–29 October, 
2009.  
 
 
 Name of participants Affiliation Abstract Title and Study Country 
 
1.  Latifou Idrissou 
Aboubacary  
 
PhD student at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Devolution of power to local 
communities in participatory forests 
management in Benin: The case of 
the Ouémé Supérieure et N’dali 
(OSN) forest’s management. 
2.  Jes Weigelt 
 
Faculty at Humbolt 
Univeristy, Berlin, 
Germany 
Reforming access? Outcomes of 
forest tenure reforms in the 
Brazilian Amazon, Pará 
3.  Pascaline Lingani and 
Patrice Savadogo 
 
 Faculty at Swedish 
University, Sweden  
 
 
Decentralized forest management: 
Challenges, roles, policy 
implications and people’s 
participation in Burkina Faso 
4.  Sylvain Fortin 
 
 
 
Cegep of Gaspe and 
Chairman of land and 
NR board, Canada 
Regional land and natural resources 
board, a Quebec way to address the 
transfer of governance in natural 
resources at a regional level Canada 
5.  Prakash Kashwan 
 
PhD student at Indiana 
University, USA 
No paper presented. 
6.  Tapas Sarangi 
 
PhD student at ICSSR, 
India 
An analysis of decentralized forest 
governance in Orissa India 
7. Vivek Vyas 
 
 
Development 
Professional at Sewa 
Mandir, Rajasthan, India 
Status of the operationalisation of 
the Forest Rights Act: Does enacting 
legislation bring in tenure security? 
India 
8. Manohara Khadka 
 
PhD student at ISS 
Hague, the Netherlands 
Maintaining or addressing 
exclusion? Nepal’s community 
forestry policy 
9. Gopinath Reddy and  Anil 
Kumar 
Centre for Ecological 
and Social Studies, India 
Evolution of forest tenure rights In 
Andra Pradesh, India 
10. Chetan  Team leader FES 
Dahod, India 
Devolution in JFM India 
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11. Ravi Tripathi, Anuj Singh 
and Sneha Thaku 
 
National Law 
University, Lucknow, 
India 
Legal rights forest community and 
poverty challenge India 
 
12.  Josiah Z Katani 
 
PhD student at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Traditional management of water 
sources in forest patches: 
Implication of formal tenure system 
on land, forest and water resources 
in Tanzania. 
13. Teshale Woldemanauel, 
Bas Arts,  Freerk 
Wiersum, and Mulugeta 
Lemenih 
 
PhD student at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Local processes of ABC use in 
Borana: Changing roles of 
traditional institutions Ethiopia 
 
 
14. Estela C. Itaas,  Joy M. 
Mirasol and Zita I. Dales 
 
 
Bukidnon State 
University, Malaybalay 
City, Bukidnon, 
Philippines 
Environmental management in local 
governance for sustainable 
development:  The   
 Bukidnon State University 
experience in the  province of 
Bukidnon,  Philippines 
15. Clare Barn 
 
MSc student  
Utrecht University,  
the Netherlands 
No paper presented. 
16. Smriti Das 
 
 
ATREE, Fellow, 
Bangalore, India 
Politics of policy implementation 
Orissa, India 
17. Purabi Bose 
 
PhD student at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Conceptualized and organized of the 
symposium 
18. Harnath Jagawat 
 
Director of 
Sadguru Foundation, 
India 
Keynote lecture and host institute of 
the symposium 
19. Bas Arts 
 
Professor at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Keynote lecture and facilitator , the 
Netherlands 
20.  Han van Dijk 
 
 
Professor at 
Wageningen University, 
the Netherlands 
Keynote lecture and facilitator, the 
Netherlands 
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SUMMARY 
 
Forest rights are of utmost importance for the future of forest initiatives, be it for resource 
use, management, and conservation, or for climate change adaptation and mitigation. The 
growing trend towards acknowledging the relevance of the sustainable use and conservation 
of forests is intertwined with the recognition of the forest rights of people who have 
traditionally depended on the forests for sustenance – especially marginal indigenous and 
tribal people. Consequently, any decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform must include 
those who have been marginalised from their traditional forest rights. Forest tenure reform is 
arguably different from previous agrarian reform, but it has to some extent the same 
underlying rights-based approach. Given that decentralised forest tenure policy reform is 
relatively new, there is increasing need to study its implications for the individual and 
collective rights of forest-dependent people and to analyse concepts such as tenure, property, 
and access. The implications of forest tenure rights are extremely important, especially in 
those countries where forest-dependent people’s rights have not been recognised by the state. 
India’s changing forest tenure reform may have several implications for forest-dependent 
ethnic minority communities – the Scheduled Tribes – dwelling in and around forest lands.  
This thesis takes an analytical as well as an empirical approach to show how 
decentralisation and forest tenure policy reform have created new forms of forest rights 
through new institutions and authority that have resulted in contrasting outcomes – individual 
and collective, including and excluding people, peaceful negotiations and conflicts, etc. – for 
forest-dependent Bhil tribal people. It encompasses the historical trajectory of the legislative 
and political mechanisms that contributed to the categorisations of the current day ‘forest 
land’ and ‘scheduled tribe’ (used interchangeably with ‘tribal people’). This thesis focuses 
primarily on the emerging – sometimes unintended – consequences of political 
decentralisation and new forest tenure legislation for marginalised tribal forest people in 
India. By analysing a variety of past and contemporary legislation on decentralisation and 
forest tenure reform in tribal India, such as Joint Forest Management, Panchayati Raj, and the 
Forest Rights Act, it initiates discussion on the consequences of these changes from the 
perspective of Bhil tribal people at different levels: the gram panchayat, the household, and 
the individual. 
In Chapter 1, I introduce the research topics – decentralisation and forest tenure reform – 
central to this thesis. I elaborate on the research problem and micro-politics as a conceptual 
framework to analyse the four key research questions that guide the individual chapters. I 
discuss the main contributions in the literature around the concepts of the micro-politics 
framework – governmentality, institutional pluralism, authority, citizenship, and access – to 
show what the chapters contribute analytically. In addition, I set out the methodology of this 
research, explaining the background of the forest-dependent Bhil tribal people from semi-arid 
western India, and the data used for individual chapters, along with the different outputs 
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emanating from this research. Specifically, four key questions guide the research: How has 
the history of forest legislation shaped the current decentralisation process and forest tenure 
reform in tribal India (chapter 2)? To what extent does the new formal tenure arrangement add 
value to, contradict, or dominate existing local authority in collective forest management 
(chapter 3)? In what way does forest tenure reform influence tribal households’ perspectives 
on individual forest tenure claims and their idea of citizenship (chapter 4)? How are tribal 
women’s forest-related rights determined by the new decentralised forest tenure reform 
(chapter 5)? 
History plays a significant role in providing an in-depth understanding of the current state 
of affairs regarding decentralisation and forest governance. India’s British colonial past 
continues to linger in post-colonial modern society. Forestry is one such area that cannot be 
understood without reflecting on why British India established scientific forestry and how it 
continues to influence the current institutions governing India’s forests. Chapter 2 studies the 
process of governmentality behind the control over forest rights in tribal India. It analyses the 
historical influence of both British colonial rule and independent India to categorise scheduled 
tribes and forests in tribal areas. In doing so, it takes the micro-politics concept of Foucault’s 
notion of governmentality to argue that the history of the scheduled tribes’ subjectification 
and the related history of forest demarcation are indispensable for understanding the current 
politics of decentralised forest management in India. Within this micro-politics notion of 
‘forest governmentality,’ the discussion focuses on three dimensions, namely, the history of 
categorisation, the politics of social identity, and the technologies of forest governance. These 
three dimensions allow us to show how recent efforts to politicise forest tenure rights have 
reinforced political control to appropriate and legalise forest and the tribal people through 
new forms of authority, inclusion, and exclusion. The process of forest governmentality is 
overt, but I argue that Bhil people internalise their ethnic identity. By internalising their 
political tribal identity, they are able to create countervailing power and room to manoeuvre 
within the current forest governance regime.  
Forest tenure recognition may originate from the top down or from the bottom up, each 
shaping different forms of collective rights. Chapter 3 examines the current forest tenure 
reform from the micro level of village-level committees. I use two relevant concepts for 
micro-politics analysis, namely, institutional pluralism and authority. Institutional pluralism 
has become a characteristic of local-level forest management in India’s twenty-first century 
tribal villages. Historically, the traditional forest rights of tribal people were denied. Recent 
attempts at decentralisation and forest tenure reforms to formalise and transfer traditional 
rights to forest people have created new institutions and new forms of authority. However, 
uncertainty about local institutions’ recognition, accountability, and representativeness, and 
the legitimisation of authority among multiple institutions, may hinder formalisation of forest 
rights. In this chapter, I show some unintended consequences of institutional pluralism and 
authority relations on tribal people’s struggle for forest rights. For example, multiple authority 
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fragments the local forest management institutions and collective forest rights. Empirical 
evidence further indicates that institutional pluralism restricts Bhil people’s collective forest 
rights and democratic decentralisation, and in turn gives the elite and line ministries more 
discretionary authority to control forests.     
The forest tenure policy reform in tribal India provides a great opportunity to unravel the 
nature of individual tenure rights. Chapter 4 explains how the Forest Rights Act shapes tribal 
households’ claims to forest land rights. I analyse the micro-politics of this forest tenure 
reform using three dimensions, namely, individual tenure rights, citizenship, and conflict, to 
discuss the contested nature of household-level tenure rights to forest land. I illustrate how 
forest tenure reform has promoted the individualisation of forest right claims, which has had a 
direct influence on Bhil tribal inter-household conflicts. Negative consequences of the 
conflicts are explained, but I also explore how claiming individual tenure rights is justified by 
the Bhil primarily in terms of seeking formal recognition of their citizenship rights. The 
analytical debate in relation to citizenship in this chapter focuses on ‘belonging’ from both the 
customary and the current legal perspective. I argue that different forms of belonging to forest 
land create complexities in understanding rights and entitlements. I specifically examine why 
and how choices about specific forest tenure rights are made by tribal households. In what 
ways do tribal households’ notions of forest rights relate to citizenship? How do conflicts 
prompt and/or suppress households’ forest tenure and citizenship claims? I demonstrate that 
knowledge about the tribal people’s perceptions can help us understand individual 
households’ socio-political struggle for individual forest land tenure.  
Forestry is considered to be male biased, and this hinders the access rights of tribal women. 
The identity of a tribal woman is invisible within a community and within a household, 
mainly because she is dependent on her male relative or colleague to enact her rights, 
including forest rights. Chapter 5 focuses on the struggles of individual Bhil tribal women 
for their rights to access forest land and forest resources. The micro-political dynamics of 
women’s access rights as a consequence of changing individual and collective forest rights 
are illustrated. I argue that the identity-based categories promoted by the forest tenure reform 
have negative consequences for the marginal tribal women because their identity as tribal 
women is used to exclude them from forest committees. The current trend in forest tenure 
reform promotes identity-based categories on the assumption that this provides better access 
to forest resources for marginalised groups. This chapter shows that there is an interaction 
between the politics of individual and collective access to forest land and the political 
representation of Bhil tribal women. A rights-based access approach was used to analyse 
outcomes of forest tenure reform on tribal women’s access to forest land, and inclusion in, 
and/or exclusion from, collective decision making about forest land management. With 
empirical evidence, I demonstrate that the new identity-based forest tenure reform is mere 
tokenism and hinders rather than promotes tribal women’s political empowerment and access 
to forest-based resources.   
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Finally, chapter 6 provides a synthesis and general discussion based on the findings 
discussed in the preceding chapters. The first part of the chapter discusses the four key 
research questions proposed at the start of this book, with emphasis on the key findings as 
well as their mutual relationships in the preceding chapters. Also, the central argument of this 
research as conducted from the micro-politics analytical perspective is presented. The final 
part makes an overall argument based on the chapters as well as on experiences from other 
outputs of this research: an international conference, a documentary film, and an infobrief. 
Taking into account lessons learnt, I propose the way forward towards decentralised forest 
tenure reform. Also, I highlight a number of research areas that were beyond the scope of this 
current research and discuss how they might be addressed.  
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SAMENVATTING 
 
Rechten op bosland en bomen zijn van groot belang in het kader van beheer voor duurzaam 
gebruik, het beschermen van bos, en het voorkomen van en aanpassing aan 
klimaatsverandering. Er is een toenemende aandacht voor het belang van duurzaam gebruik 
en bescherming van bos, samen met een trend naar de erkenning van de rechten van de 
bevolking die vanouds van bos afhankelijkheid was om in haar bestaan te voorzien – vooral 
inheemse volkeren en tribale groepen. Daarom moet bij iedere vorm van decentralisatie of 
hervorming van rechten op bos diegenen betrokken worden die zijn gemarginaliseerd en hun 
rechten op bos zijn kwijt geraakt. Hervorming van rechten op bos is van een andere aard dan 
eerdere vormen van landhervorming. Het gezamenlijke onderliggende principe is dat mensen 
in hun rechten worden hersteld. Gegeven het feit dat hervorming van rechten op bos een 
relatief nieuw verschijnsel is, is er de noodzaak onderzoek te doen naar de gevolgen van deze 
hervormingen voor de individuele en collectieve rechten van mensen die afhankelijk zijn van 
bos voor hun bestaan. De strijd om rechten op bos is erg belangrijk, vooral in landen waar de 
rechten van mensen die van het bos afhankelijk zijn niet door de staat worden erkend. De 
recente hervormingen van rechten op bos in India kunnen belangrijke gevolgen hebben voor 
etnische minderheden die van bos afhankelijk zijn – de zogenaamde schedules tribes16 – die 
in en om het bos hun woonplaats hebben. 
Dit proefschrift zal via een specifieke analytische benadering en empirisch onderzoek laten 
zien hoe via decentralisatie en hervorming van bosrechten nieuwe rechten op bos worden 
gecreëerd, alsmede nieuwe instituties en vormen van autoriteit, die tot allerlei contrasterende 
gevolgen – op individueel en collectief niveau, via het uitsluiten en insluiten van mensen, en 
via onderhandelingen en conflict – heeft geleid voor de tribale Bhil in Rajasthan, die voor hun 
bestaan van bos afhankelijk zijn. Deze analyse omvat ook de historische wording van de 
juridische en politieke mechanismen, die bijdragen aan categorisering en definities van bos en 
bosland en scheduled tribe (gebruikt naast de term tribale groepen). Dit proefschrift richt zich 
op de steeds duidelijker wordende – en soms onbedoelde – gevolgen van politieke 
decentralisatie en nieuwe wetgeving ten aanzien van bos voor marginale tribale bosbewoners 
in India. Door het analyseren van een reeks van vroegere en contemporaine wetten op het 
gebied van decentralisatie en hervorming van boswetten, zoals Joint Forest Management, 
Panchayati Raj en de Forest Rights Act, beoogt deze studie een discussie op gang te brengen 
                                                 
16
 De term scheduled tribes gebruikt naast de term tribale groepen in dit proefschrift verwijst naar marginale 
bevolkingsgroepen in India, die ecologisch waardevolle gebieden bevolken zoals bosland en natuurgebieden. 
Scheduled tribes worden gedefiniëerd in de grondwet van India in atikel 366(25), waarin zij omschrevem 
worden als ’zodanige stammen of tribale gemeenschappen die als scheduled tribes worden genoemd in artikel 
342 voor de uitvoering van deze grondwet. Deze groepen krijgen daarmee een speciale status binnen India, die 
hen bepaalde voorrechten oplevert. 
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over de gevolgen van deze hervormingen voor de tribale Bhil op verschillend niveau, dat van 
de gram panchayat (gemeente), de huishouding en het individu. 
In Hoofdstuk 1 worden de centrale onderzoeksthema’s – decentralisatie en hervorming 
van rechten op bos geïntroduceerd. Deze thema’s gecombineerd met een focus op micro-
politieke processen vormen een centraal conceptueel kader voor de vier centrale 
onderzoeksvragen die leidend zijn voor de vier onderzoekshoofdstukken. Daarnaast wordt de 
theoretische literatuur besproken met betrekking tot de kernconcepten binnen deze focus op 
micro-politiek processen – governmentality17, institutioneel pluralisme, burgerschap en 
toegang – om de individuele bijdrage van de onderzoekshoofdstukken te laten zien. Daarnaast 
wordt de methodologie voor het empirisch onderzoek en de gegevens gebruikt voor de 
individuele hoofdstukken, en de uitkomsten van het onderzoek besproken alsmede de 
achtergrond van de problematiek voor de tribale Bhil in het semi-aride West-India,. Meer 
specifiek zijn vier kernvragen leidend voor dit onderzoek: Hoe heeft de historische erfenis van 
wetgeving met betrekking tot bos het huidige proces van decentralisatie en hervorming van 
bosrechten in tribaal India beïnvloed (Hoofdstuk 2)? In welke mate de nieuwe formele 
rechtsvormen de positie verstevigen van bestaande lokale autoriteiten in collectief beheer van 
bos, dan wel hun functioneren tegenwerken of marginaliseren (Hoofdstuk 3)? Op welke 
manier hervorming van wetgeving met betrekking tot bos het perspectief veranderd van 
tribale huishoudens op individuele rechten en claims op land en hun eigen idee over 
burgerschap (hoofdstuk 4)? Hoe worden de rechten van tribale vrouwen beïnvloed door de 
nieuwe hervormingen in wetgeving (hoofdstuk 5)? 
De geschiedenis speelt een belangrijke rol voor het verkrijgen van een beter begrip van de 
huidige stand van zaken met betrekking tot decentralisatie en het besturen en het beheren van 
bos. India’s Brits koloniaal verleden heeft nog aanzienlijke invloed in de moderne post-
koloniale samenleving. Bosbouw is een domein dat niet begrepen kan worden zonder 
aandacht te geven aan de wijze waarop Brits India ‘wetenschappelijke bosbouw’ heeft 
geïntroduceerd en hoe deze denkwijze en beheersvorm nog steeds de huidige instituties 
domineren die India’s bossen beheren. In Hoofdstuk 2 wordt het proces van governmentality 
besproken dat de controle vorm geeft over rechten op bos in tribaal India. De historische 
invloed van zowel het Britse koloniaal bestuur als onafhankelijk India om bos in tribale 
gebieden en tribale groepen als aparte objecten van overheidsbeleid te maken wordt hier 
geanalyseerd. Dit gebeurt door het concept governmentality van de Franse filosoof Foucault 
als centraal element te nemen voor het begrijpen van micro-politieke processen om te 
beargumenteren dat de geschiedenis van de ‘subjectivering’ van ‘scheduled tribes’ en de 
hieraan gerelateerde markering van bossen als een aparte juridische categorie noodzakelijke 
inzichten oplevert voor het begrijpen van de huidige politieke ontwikkelingen rondom 
                                                 
17
 De term governmentality naar de Franse filosoof Michel Foucault laat ik hier onvertaald, aangezien er geen 
goed Nederlands equivalent beschikbaar is. 
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gedecentraliseerd bosbeheer in India. Binnen dit micro-politieke kader van wat ik noem 
‘forest governmentality concentreert dit hoofdstuk zich op drie dimensies: namelijk de 
geschiedenis van de categorisering van bos en tribale groepen, de wording van en politieke 
strijd rondom sociale identiteiten, en de technologie van het beheer en bestuur van bos. Deze 
drie dimensies stellen ons in staat om te zien hoe recente pogingen om rechten op bos te 
politiseren, en om rechten op bos toe te wijzen en te legaliseren, de politieke controle over 
tribale groepen heeft vergroot, door nieuwe vormen van autoriteit en vormen in- en 
uitsluiting. Door het proces van ‘forest governmentality’ internaliseren de tribale Bhil 
tegelijkertijd deze ‘opgelegde’ tribale identiteit. Echter door deze internalisering van deze 
identiteit slagen zij erin een politieke tegenmacht te scheppen en enige manoeuvreerruimte te 
creëren binnen het huidige regime van bosbeheer en bestuur. 
De erkenning van rechten op bos kan zowel van de top naar beneden als van lokaal niveau 
komen. Bieden hebben verschillende invloed op de vormgeving van collectieve rechten. 
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op de huidige hervormingen van rechten op bos op het microniveau 
van comités op dorpsniveau. Het hoofdstuk wordt opgebouwd rondom twee relevante 
kernconcepten voor het analyseren van micro-politieke processen, namelijk autoriteit en 
institutioneel pluralisme. Institutioneel pluralisme is een kenmerk geworden van het beheer 
van bos op het lokale niveau in India’s tribale dorpen van de 21e eeuw. Historisch gezien 
werden de traditionele rechten op bos van tribale groepen niet erkend. Recente pogingen om 
rechten op bos te decentraliseren en om traditionele rechten te formaliseren en over te dragen 
aan tribale groepen hebben nieuwe instituties en vormen van autoriteit doen ontstaan. Echter, 
onduidelijkheid over de aard en de erkenning van lokale instituties, en de 
verantwoordingsstructuur, de represen-tativiteit en de legitimiteit van autoriteit van deze 
meervoudige instituties (ver)hinderen de formalisering van rechten op bos. In dit hoofdstuk 
laat ik een aantal onvoorziene uitkomsten van institutioneel pluralisme en autoriteitsrelaties 
zien voor de strijd van tribale groepen voor hun rechten op bos. Het wordt bijvoorbeeld 
duidelijk dat het bestaan van meervoudige autoriteitsrelaties lokale instituties voor bosbeheer 
uiteen laat vallen en collectieve rechten fragmenteert. Verder blijkt uit de 
onderzoeksgegevens dat institutioneel pluralisme de collectieve rechten van de Bhil en de 
decentralisatie van democratisch beheer beperkt en aan nieuwe lokale elites en de 
vakministeries meer discretionaire autoriteit en controle over bosbeheer geeft. 
De hervorming van bosbeleid in tribaal India geeft een goede ingang om de wording van 
individuele rechten op bos te analyseren. Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op hoe de zogenaamde Forest 
Rights Act aanleiding geeft voor tribale huishoudens om individuele rechten te eisen. In dit 
hoofdstuk staan drie dimensies van micro-politieke processen met betrekking tot de 
hervorming en decentralisatie van bosbeheer centraal, namelijk individuele landrechten, 
burgerschap en conflict, om het controversiële karakter van de rechten van huishoudens op 
bosland te bespreken. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe de hervorming van de wetgeving 
individualisering van rechten op bos heeft bevorderd, en dat dit heeft geleid tot een toename 
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van de conflicten tussen huishoudens. De negatieve gevolgen van deze conflicten worden 
besproken, maar ook hoe het claimen van individuele rechten door huishoudens door de Bhil 
wordt gerechtvaardigd in termen van dat zij een formele erkenning van hun burgerrechten 
proberen te krijgen. Het debat in dit hoofdstuk rondom de burgerrechten spitst zich toe op 
sentimenten van ‘toebehoren aan’ zowel traditionele als moderne vormen van recht. 
Verschillen in deze gevoelens zijn relevant voor het begrijpen van de complexiteit van rechten 
en waarom en hoe keuzes worden genaakt ten aanzien van rechten op bos door individuele 
huishoudens. Op welke manier is de wijze waarop huishoudens aankijken tegen rechten op 
bos verbonden met hun opvattingen over hun burgerrechten en burgerschap? Welke rol spelen 
conflicten in het claimen of het onderdrukken van rechten op bosland van huishoudens? Meer 
kennis over hoe tribale groepen deze claims zien kan ons helpen om de sociaal-politieke strijd 
van huishoudens voor individuele rechten op bosland te begrijpen. 
Bosbouw en bosbeheer zijn vaak activiteiten die door mannen worden gedomineerd, en dit 
beperkt de toegangsrechten voor vrouwen. De identiteit van vrouwen is vaak onzichtbaar 
binnen een gemeenschap en binnen een huishouding, voornamelijk omdat ze afhankelijk zijn 
van mannelijk familieleden om hun rechten uit te oefenen, inclusief toegangsrechten op bos. 
Hoofdstuk 5 richt zich op de strijd die individuele Bhil vrouwen voeren voor hun rechten op 
toegang tot bos en bosproducten. De micro-politieke processen met betrekking tot 
toegangsrechten van vrouwen worden geïllustreerd naar aanleiding van de veranderingen in 
individuele en collectieve rechten. De hervorming van rechten op bos en de creatie van 
categorieën zoals scheduled tribe als doelgroep van de hervorming hebben negatieve 
gevolgen voor de Bhil vrouwen, omdat hun identiteit als tribale vrouwen wordt gebruikt om 
hen uit te sluiten van de comités voor de toedeling van rechten op bos. De huidige trend is om 
via een doelgroepenbeleid rechten toe te delen, onder de aanname dat dit betere toegang 
verschaft tot bos en bosproducten voor marginale groepen. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat er een 
interactie is tussen individuele en collectieve vormen van toegang tot bos en de politieke 
representatie van vrouwen. Een benadering via recht werd gebruikt om te analyseren hoe de 
uitkomsten van de hervorming van rechten op bos en in- en uitsluiting en collectieve 
beslissingen over bosbeheer uitpakken voor vrouwen. Hiermee laat ik zien dat de hervorming 
van rechten op bos gebaseerd op identiteit symboolpolitiek is en de toegang van tribale 
vrouwen tot bos en bosproducten en hun politieke emancipatie eerder hindert dan bevordert. 
Tenslotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 6 een synthese en algemene discussie gepresenteerd op basis 
van de uitkomsten van de eerdere hoofdstukken. Het eerste deel van het hoofdstuk bespreekt 
de antwoorden op de vier kernvragen zoals geformuleerd in de inleiding van het proefschrift. 
Hierbij wordt de nadruk gelegd op de belangrijkste bevindingen maar ook op de samenhang 
daartussen. Daarnaast wordt het centrale argument, namelijk dat een focus op micro-politieke 
processen de uitkomsten van dergelijke hervormingen beter duidelijk maakt, besproken. Het 
tweede deel van het hoofdstuk trekt algemene conclusies uit de bevindingen van dit 
proefschrift en andere uitkomsten van dit onderzoek waaronder een korte documentaire en 
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een beleidsdocument. Op basis van de geleerde lessen worden voorstellen gedaan hoe verder 
te werken aan hervorming van rechten op bosland, en worden een aantal gebieden voor 
onderzoek geïdentificeerd die niet aan bod konden komen in dit onderzoek alsmede de wijze 
waarop die zouden kunnen worden opgepakt. 
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Decentralized natural resource 
management 
Research School for Forest and 
Landscape, University of Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
2008 8 
Gender and natural resource management Swedish University of Agriculture 
Science (SLU), Umeå 
2009 3 
Course on SPSS data analysis 
 
IIPS, Mumbai, India 2010 4 
C) Career related competences/personal development 
“Tribal self-governance and common 
pool resource management in India” 
 
The 15
th
 Annual International 
Sustainable Development Research 
Conference, Utrecht, the Netherlands 
2009      1 
“Decentralized forest management: 
Implications on tribal in India” 
The 18
th
 Commonwealth Forestry 
Conference, Edinburgh, UK 
2010 2 
“Community based adaptation of tribal 
women in semi-arid India” 
The 2
nd
 International Conference on 
Climate, Sustainability and 
Development, Brazil 
2010 2 
“Identity-based exclusion: tribal 
women’s forest tenure rights in semi-
arid Rajasthan” 
The 13
th
 International Association for 
the Study of Commons Conference, 
Hyderabad, India, Panel: CIFOR-
IFRI. 
2011 
 
2 
Organisation of an international 
symposium  ‘Decentralization, Power 
and Tenure Rights of Forest-Dependent 
People’ 
Wageningen University, the 
Netherlands and Sadguru 
Foundation, India. 
2009 2 
Total ECTS  62.6 
 
*One ECTS on average is equivalent to 28 hours of course work. 
